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Preface
On perception Harold A. Prichard wrote:
Perception as a subject of discussion seems to need no apology.
For, hackneyed though it may be, it is one of those subjects which
strike us as more puzzling the more we consider it, and the books
which deal with it, [...], are apt to be unconvincing and give
the impression that the key to the subject has still to be found.
(Prichard 1950: 52)
I think the same is true for the subject of knowledge, especially if these
“books which deal with” knowledge are written by those philosophers who
are standing in an analytic tradition. The unconvincing thing here is that
those philosophers are unable to handle the so-called ‘Gettier-problem’ in an
appropriate way, which leads them into a dead end: the unfruitful external-
ism/internalism debate. This is the reason why it appears to me “that the
key to the subject has still to be found”.
To quote again Prichard 1950: 52,
this [book] is an attempt to formulate a line of thought to which
I have been driven in the endeavour to clear up my own mind on
the subject [of knowledge], and in the main to put forward at any
rate for discussion [an argument] which run counter to current
views.
This is what I call the MS thesis: knowledge has to be understood as mental
state, therefore it is not a species of justified true belief. Indeed, knowledge is
no belief at all. That’s it, the point of substance of this current consideration.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
21.1 The starting point
Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration—a consideration
which could be characterised as a main theme—maybe the main theme—of
that part of philosophy we all know as epistemology: the nature of knowledge.
But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going
to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the
epistemological question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of
knowledge (Price 2002: 45 used in his Belief the formulation “mental acts”
and Williamson 1995, 2001 talks about a “state of mind”). Or to put it into
the question I chose as title: is knowledge a mental state?
At first glance the question whether knowledge is a mental state seems
itself questionable. What kind of thing is a ‘mental state‘? And why should
we treat knowledge as such a thing? Finally, what is the value of an account
which is based on the idea that knowledge is a mental state? A further doubt
about the value of a mental state thesis—in the following I will call it MS
thesis—is the fact that this kind of thinking upon the nature of knowledge
did not take a leading part through epistemological thinking in the history
of philosophy. In fact, the main (and most successful) account to explain
knowledge since Plato is the thesis—I will call it JTB thesis for short—that
knowledge has to be understood in terms of justified true belief. Thus, liv-
ing in the shadows is a correct way in order to characterise the existence
of the MS thesis as an epistemological theory. The advocates of an MS
thesis attempting to explain the nature of knowledge nowadays are Timo-
thy Williamson 1995, especially his Knowledge and its Limits 2001, Keith
Hossack 2007, Sayre 1997: 139n5 too “agrees [...] in treating knowledge as
cognitively basic”, and during the history of philosophy the so-called ‘Ox-
ford Realists’, philosophers like John Cook Wilson 1969 in his Statement and
Inference, Harold A. Prichard 1907 and especially his Knowledge and Per-
ception 1950 and as a descendant of both John L. Austin in his Other Minds
1979.
Even a few philosophers outside the tradition of the ‘Oxford Realists’ have
mentioned the possibility to explain knowledge as mental state, for example:
Ayer 1979: 14-26 in the short chapter Does knowing consist in being in a
special state of mind? of his The Problem of Knowledge, Price 2002: 42-46 a
small subchapter in the second lecture of his Belief, Travis 2005 an approach
of the Cook Wilsonian view, Tufts 2000, White 1982: 107-111 and Sayre
1997. And normally the result of this poor attention is a rejection of the MS
thesis (see Ayer 1979, Tufts 2000 and White 1982).
So we have to concede first that there is only a small group of philosophers
who used to explain knowledge in terms of a mental state, particularly the
3‘Oxford Realists’. And secondly, the acceptance of the MS thesis is low and
negative. There is an interesting detail here: unlike the poor interest in an
epistemic theory such as the MS thesis, philosophers like Prichard or Austin
(and their philosophical thinking) are not really living in the shadows of
philosophical consideration. Indeed their philosophical impact is high level, if
we consider for instance Prichard’s moral writings (see e.g. Prichard 2002) or
Austin’s theory of speech acts (1962a). I think we can conclude from this fact
that the reason of the ‘negative’ ignorance in respect of their epistemological
point of view was not caused by a negative quality of their philosophy.
Now, the question we are faced with (and that should be answered here)
is: what is wrong with the MS thesis even though it is held by high class
philosophers? Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, Prichard and
Austin aﬄicted with such ignorance? I will try to explain this later on with
the notion of an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic
thinking—a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington 2001 has called
“epistemic absolutism”.
So, there are three main purposes which I am pursuing in this considera-
tion:
1. To explain the reasons why there is such an ignorance towards an as-
sertion of the MS thesis. I am going to pursue this through an analysis
of knowledge which will demonstrate the inappropriateness of the JTB
thesis as an adequate analysis of knowledge.
2. To describe that it is a mistake to ignore or at least underestimate the
MS thesis in the discussion of an appropriate definition of knowledge
and to maintain that the MS thesis is the key to a general theory of
knowledge.
3. Conclusion: If the first two steps are correct, the JTB thesis is insuffi-
cient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge in general.
A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing
with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their
results—notably the well-known externalism/internalism debate—are
insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge
based on the MS thesis.
In the course of my consideration I am going to justify the following three
theses:
4• The JTB thesis as a definition of knowledge in general is deficient, as
the JTB thesis describes the propositional aspect of knowledge only.
But the propositional knowledge—the so-called ‘knowledge that’—is
merely one element among others that has to be recognized in search
of a theory of knowledge.
• The status of the ‘knowledge that’ is derivative and not ultimate. It
is derived from the non- propositional knowledge in order to make the
non-propositional knowledge communicable to others. The mode of the
‘knowledge that’ is indirect and thus can be stated in the third person
point of view only. This ultimate kind of knowledge—the knowledge
which the ‘knowledge that’ is derived from—is the non-propositional
knowledge. Its mode is direct and hence it is restricted to the first
person point of view. Therefore the basis towards a theory of knowledge
in general has to be this non-propositional aspect of knowledge.
• Hence, taking the first two theses for granted, an appropriate theory of
knowledge needs an account of the non-propositional knowledge. The
MS thesis will accomplish this task.
1.2 Road map
In order to achieve the above aims and to justify the three theses, our road
map looks like this: In the second and third chapter I will show that under-
standing knowledge in terms of justified true belief (as well as understanding
knowledge in any propositional way) means a fatal error. And this fatal error
is the result of an incomplete analysis of knowledge in general which does
not consider all the possible different meanings, various objects and disparate
ways of acquiring a knowledge. The second chapter is the attempt to provide
a comprehensive analysis of knowledge. I will further suggest in the second
chapter that, taking our analysis of knowledge for granted, we would have
to reject a theory of knowledge which is based merely upon the JTB thesis
as insufficient. With the second chapter my first objective—to explain the
ignorance of the MS thesis—will be achieved.
But now the question arises: what kind of knowledge is the non-proposi-
tional or, as I will call it, “direct” knowledge? The JTB thesis may be false
or even insufficient as an appropriate analysis of knowledge. Taking a look
on the enduring externalism/internalism debate, it seems to support such a
notion. However, an undeniable fact about the JTB thesis is that it really is
elaborated, even by virtue of the externalism/internalism debate. The third
chapter argues that an appropriate way to answer the question of how to
5understand non-propositional knowledge is the MS thesis. An interpretation
of Cook Wilson’s, Prichard’s and Austin’s theory of knowledge will give us
an account to understand the nature of the non-propositional knowledge and
concludes my second point.
So, my answer to this problem is giving an account of the non propositional
knowledge by the means of the first person point of view. And this means,
non-propositional knowledge is the knowledge of the first person point of view
observer—a first person authority in respect of an appropriate definition of
knowledge.
Finally, the fourth chapter will close my consideration with a conclusion
and a quick summary of the main points I have examined here.
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Chapter 2
An analysis of knowledge
7
82.1 Epistemic orthodoxy
In the introduction we explored the question of why there is such an ignorance
to the mental state concept of knowledge. And I stated that an explanation of
this phenomenon is due to an unreflected Platonian heritage. What does this
notion mean? And why is the MS thesis so unpopular among philosophers?
The present section will show that one part of the answer could be found
in the aspect of appropriateness of the JTB analysis of knowledge, whether
this analysis is appropriate or not. ‘Appropriate’ means considering really all
available aspects the term ‘knowledge’ is related to. At first glance it appears
that there is only one way to answer the question concerning the nature of
knowledge. Some kind of a quasi epistemological truth since Plato seems to
claim that the JTB thesis is the right way to understand what knowledge is
about. The JTB thesis states that knowledge is at best analysed as some kind
of propositional thing; thus knowledge would be some special species of the
propositional attitude belief (see Shope 1983, Sayre 1997 ch. 1). If we take a
look at the epistemological discussion about knowledge today, especially the
externalism/internalism debate (see e.g. Williams 2001), we will find that
the controversy is not about whether the JTB thesis is the (or at least an)
appropriate way of defining knowledge, but what kind of JTB thesis—an
externalist or an internalist interpretation—defines knowledge best. Hence
the controversy about knowledge is not a dispute between different ways of
understanding knowledge, but a debate about what propositional attitude
knowledge is about: an externalist or an internalist interpretation. I will call
this a one-way road to knowledge epistemic orthodoxy (see as well Urmson
1988: 15).
This orthodox way of defining knowledge is this (see e.g. Sayre 1997: 4):
Somebody, S, knows that something is the case, p, if and only if:
1. S believes that p
2. p is true
3. S is justified in believing that p is true
Now it is obvious that the orthodox kind of understanding knowledge is
merely propositional. But this merely propositional understanding of knowl-
edge is in fact an oversimplification of the concept of knowledge. For the
propositional knowledge—the knowledge that something is the case—is only
one aspect of knowledge among several other aspects. So my claim here is,
to speak with Austin, that the orthodox understanding of knowledge (and
the externalism/internalism debate too)
9is a typically scholastic view, attributable, first, to obsession with
a few particular words, the uses of which are over-simplified, not
really understood or carefully studied or correctly described; and
second, to an obsession with a few (and nearly always the same)
half-studied ‘facts’. (I say ‘scholastic’, but I might just as well said
‘philosophical’; over-simplification, schematization, and constant
obsessive repetition of the same small range of jejune ‘examples’
are not only not peculiar to this case, but far too common to
be dismissed as an occasional weakness of philosophers). (Austin
1962b: 3) [Italics by Austin]
Indeed it is not a secret insight in the course of the history of philosophy that
there is more than one aspect in the concept of knowledge. One prominent
distinction in the nature of knowledge was Ryle’s notion of differentiating
between two kinds of knowledge (see Ryle 1949):
• knowing that
• knowing how
Another distinction could be made in the mode of the perspective from which
a knowledge is stated (see Price 2002, Hookway 1992, Craig 1990, Searle
1987):
• third person point of view: Peter knows something, e.g. that p.
• first person point of view: I know something, e.g. that p.
So, we could find in the epistemic literature the notion that there are many
aspects to the concept of knowledge. In my example from above: knowing
that/knowing how and third person/first person point of view. But sure
enough this notion is not reflected in the JTB thesis as the orthodox answer
to the question of what knowledge is. Seeing that there are these different
aspects of knowledge, the question now arises: why is there such an oversim-
plification in conceptualizing knowledge as it is shown in the JTB thesis?
According to Searle in his Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person
we will find an answer to the last question in the manner of analysis epis-
temologist use in order to find an answer to the issue of knowledge. Searle
considers:
10
I think it rests on a resolute rejection of mentalism [sic! ] in lin-
guistic analysis, with a consequent insistence on having a third-
person point of view. Once you grant that a fundamental unit
of analysis is intentionality, then it seems you are forced to ac-
cept the first-person point of view as in some sense epistemically
different from the point of view of the third-person observer. It
is part of the persistent objectivizing tendency of philosophy and
science since the seventeenth century that we regard the third-
person objective point of view as preferable to, as somehow more
“empirical” than, the first-person, “subjective” point of view.
What looks then like a simple declaration of scientific fact [...]
turns out on examination to be the expression of metaphysical
preference and, I believe, a preference that is unwarranted by
the facts. The crucial fact in question is that performing speech
acts—and meaning things by utterances—goes on at a level of
intrinsic first-person intentionality. (Searle 1987: 145)
If Searle is right in his notion, then the reason for the stated oversimplification
in the definition of knowledge is the search for objectivity. Uncritically, it
is presupposed that knowledge has to be something necessarily objective;
thus knowledge would be absolutely and universally valid and without any
possibility to fail (see Hetherington 2001: 3, who calls a similar point an
“epistemic absolutism”). If we take this assumed epistemic objectivity for
granted in order to answer the question of what knowledge is, the answer
is found in a special kind of truth: viz. this kind of truth about the things
which is independent of the special conditions and cognitive capacities of an
epistemic subject (see Brendel 1999, v. Kutschera 2006: 94). The perspective
of the third person point of view means the independence of the special
conditions and cognitive capacities of an epistemic subject, whereas the first
person point of view means the opposite position.
This search for objectivity may be an expression of a special kind of meta-
physical preference, as Searle argues above. But I am inclined to say that
this—the objectivity of the third person point of view—is rather an ideal
observer position representing the way knowledge ought to be. And truth
is merely the function of this idealised observer whose role it is to generate
an objective knowledge (for more about the ideal observer perspective in
epistemology see e.g. Zagzebski 2006).
But human knowledge does not really work like this, i.e. in terms of an
third-person point of view, which necessarily generates objective knowledge.
It would be the knowledge God has. Thus I am suggesting here as a central
claim of my consideration, that the opposite, the first-person point of view,
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is the basis of knowledge, because the third-person point of view is merely
an idealised observer position. The third person point of view indicates a
normative claim rather than a descriptive position. Such a position is stating
what knowledge ought to be, but it does not analyse what knowledge really is.
Suggesting this, I hope to justify as a conclusion of this consideration the first-
person point of view as primary (maybe we can call it first order knowledge)
and the third-person point of view as derivative (a second or higher order
knowledge). The existence of the third-person point of view as an idealised
observer is limited to its function: to generalise the knowledge acquired by
different epistemic subjects. In doing so, subjective knowledge transforms
into objective knowledge. As a result, truth becomes essential. But the task
of epistemology, from my point of view, is to give an account of an ‘earth
grounded’ human knowledge and not to develop a theory of what knowledge
ought to be. Insofar some kind of ‘naturalized’ epistemology is really needed
here. ‘Naturalized’ is used in the sense of being aware of the situation a real
epistemic subject is confronted with and does not explicate the example of
a perfect mind, which is merely hypothetical. From my point of view, it
requires an answer to the question what knowledge really is, or to put it in
a phrase from Kornblith 2002: 1, an examination of “knowledge itself, not
our concept of knowledge” is required. This situation of a real epistemic
subject is characterized by the perspective of the first-person point of view
which I want to advocate here. From the primacy of the first-person point
of view concerning knowledge I will conclude later that there is knowledge
without truth—a second central claim; i.e. the knowledge which is gained in
the first-person point of view perspective.
If we take a brief look at the history of philosophy, we can see the de-
velopment of the objective knowledge (the third-person point of view) as
an idealised observer position. First, there is Plato’s epistemology in search
for a definition of knowledge with its well-known result in the Theaetetus :
knowledge is justified true belief. But the first problem is that Plato’s epis-
temology is based upon his metaphysics. His definition of knowledge is the
definition of the knowledge of Ideas; and the Platonic Ideas are metaphysical
entities, not epistemic ones. For if we reject Plato’s metaphysics, then there
is no reason why we should accept the definition of knowledge in terms of
the JTB thesis as an appropriate definition of knowledge any longer. Even
more, now the necessity of the truth condition is questionable, too. As the
Theaetetus shows, Plato needs the truth condition only in order to justify
the highest possible knowledge: the knowledge of Ideas. As Ideas are eternal,
unchangeable and absolute, there is no possibility to know them fallible (for
the aspects of fallible knowledge see e.g. Hetherington 1999). And if this is
true, the truth condition is merely metaphysical, too. Thus I consider the
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orthodox concept of an objective knowledge to be the key access to an appro-
priate definition of knowledge, and its necessary companion, an unreflected
platonian heritage. But if this heritage is a mere metaphysical claim and
not an epistemic one, then there is no reason to hold it as an appropriate
definition of knowledge—if there is any such definition at all.
Further more, if we understand scepticism not as the denial of the pos-
sibility of knowledge in general but as a mere refutation of the possibility
of objective knowledge, and if objective knowledge really is a metaphysical
claim, then scepticism is defeated in that moment we acknowledge that ob-
jective knowledge is merely an ideal observer position. And a look into the
Theaetetus shows that knowledge is indeed a matter of degree.
In order not to get misunderstood in my present argument, I am not
claiming that there is not any objective knowledge (or stronger: that there
could not be such a thing as objective knowledge). This would also be a
scholastic assumption and would necessarily lead to scepticism.
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2.2 Dimensions of knowledge
2.2.1 Different meanings of ‘knowledge’
Now let us turn our attention to the point of perspectives and aspects of
knowledge. What does it mean—being in the first or third person point of
view perspective and what exactly are the various ‘aspects’ of knowledge?
In lecture 2—The Varieties of Knowledge—of his book Belief Henry H.
Price considers various ways of understanding the concept ‘knowledge’. At
first Price distinguishes between two meanings of the term ‘knowledge’: “acts
and dispositions” (Price 2002: 42-46). So for Price there are two meanings
of using the word ‘knowledge’ in sentences or common speech:
1. in a dispositional way
2. characterizing a special mental state (Price 2002: 43/44 speaks of
“mental occurrence” or “mental event”)
Price distinguishes these two meanings of the concept of knowledge with a
reference to Plato who had distinguished in the Theaetetus “between pos-
sessing a piece of knowledge and using it” (Price 2002: 42). Hence, Price
described the dispositional meaning of ‘knowledge’ as “the possession of a
piece of knowledge” (Price 2002: 42). He continues:
For example, we all possess or ‘have’ the knowledge that 7
x 7 = 49. We acquired this piece of knowledge many years ago
and probably we shall retain it for the rest of our lives. We are
not always actually thinking of or attending to this mathematical
truth. It actually ‘comes into our minds’ only occasionally, once a
week perhaps, or less often than that. Nevertheless, we have the
capacity of recalling this proposition whenever we need to (for
example, whenever we are engaged in a calculation to which it is
relevant), and of actually ‘realizing’ or ‘acknowledging’ that it is
true.
This is what is meant by saying that our knowledge that 7
x 7 = 49 is a disposition rather than an occurrence. [...] The
disposition shows itself or manifests itself from time to time by
actual mental occurrences, for example, when we actually use the
proposition 7 x 7 = 49 in calculating the size of a carpet. But a
disposition is something which we still have or possess at times
when it is not actually being manifested at all. (Price 2002: 42)
On the other hand there is the “mental occurrence” sense of knowledge,
which Price understands as follows:
14
They [philosophers–jk] have conceived of knowing as a spe-
cial sort of mental occurrences. [...] It has one rather surprising
consequence. If someone know something, in this act or occur-
rence sense, it would make sense to ask at what time he knows
it. (Price 2002:43)
Sometimes, [...], we do find ourselves using the ‘word’ know
in an occurent sense, to refer to a datable mental event.
In 1918, when I was learning to fly, aerial navigation hardly
existed. We used to find our way by following main roads or
railwaylines. One day I was lost in a fog over East Anglia. I
came down very low and read the name on a small railway station.
Then at least I knew where I was. Here the word ‘know’ is used
for a mental occurrence or act, occurring at a particular time [...].
Something ‘dawns on us’ at a particular moment. (Price 2002:
44)
Now, if we take a look at the two characterizations of knowledge, the
disposition sense and the mental act sense given by Price in his quotations
from above, then the difference between the two meanings of knowledge is
clear: it is an issue of being actually manifested or not.
There is a kind of knowledge which is there without necessarily being
manifested or actualized—or to put it in terms of Plato’s distinction, without
being used. This is the dispositional knowledge, a knowledge whose essential
characteristic it is to be stored in the corners of our minds until we want
so use it. And recalling is the act of actualizing it. Or to put it in Price’s
words: recalling is the way in which dispositional knowledge “comes into our
minds”. A plain example which Price used to clarify the difference between
those two senses of knowledge is the sleep. He wrote:
But we are speaking of normal sleep, and using it as the most
striking example to illustrate Plato’s distinction between ‘possess-
ing’ and ‘using’; for here a man still possesses all the knowledge
he has in his waking hours, but for the time being he is not using
any of it, at any rate if his sleep is dreamless. To put it techni-
cally, he still has very large number of acquired dispositions, but
for the time none of them are being actualized. (Price 1969: 43)
On the other hand, there is a sense of knowledge—the mental occurrence
sense—which means a knowledge that necessitates the fact of awareness or
actuality in an epistemic subject. “Something ‘dawns on us’ at a particular
moment”, Price said. If we follow his argument, we are not able to have this
15
kind of knowledge without being actually thinking of it, as his autobiograph-
ical example shows. In other words, the mental state sense of knowledge
includes some form of activity which is lacking in the dispositional sense.
As a summary, the dispositional knowledge is an indirect way of knowing
something, because we need to recall it in order to be aware of it. Knowing
something in the sense of mental occurrence, however, is knowing in a direct
way. No instance of recalling is needed to be aware of it.
In considering this, Price concludes:
We need not to reject the ‘act of knowing’ terminology all to-
gether, [...], and certainly the fact that ‘act of knowing’ is a tech-
nical term is not itself a good reason for abandoning it. But
we must not suppose that all the things we need to say about
knowledge can be said in ‘mental act’ or ‘mental occurrence’ ter-
minology. (Price 2002: 46)
2.2.2 Various kinds of knowledge
Now, the first dimension of knowledge is elaborated: the two meanings of
the term ‘knowledge’. But what is the object of knowledge? What kind
of knowledge can be known either in a dispositional way or in the sense
of a mental state? Looking again at Price, we will find three distinctions
concerning the object of knowledge (Price 2002: 78).
• knowledge ‘how to’
• knowledge by acquaintance
• knowledge ‘that’
Knowledge how to
Let us begin with the knowledge of ‘how to’. The notion of this term goes
back to G. Ryle’s The concept of mind (1949) and refers to that kind of
knowledge which is practical:
So far, we have been considering only various cognitive senses of
the word ‘know’. But it also has what may be called a practical
sense, when it refers to some kind of expertness or skill or pro-
ficiency. This is what Professor Ryle calls ‘knowing how to’, for
example knowing how to ride a bicycle or how to cure someone
of influenza. (Price 2002: 69)
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So, the object of the ‘knowledge how to’ is the competence of an epistemic
subject to do something. In other words, being competent is knowing how
to do something, thus an epistemic subject has a practical knowledge. And
then we call someone a competent doer, she knows what she is doing because
of her competence, she is an expert of something. If I know how to ride a
bicycle, to use Price’s example, then I am able to handle or use a bicycle in
an appropriate way, so ‘using something in an appropriate way’ means using
it in the way it is conditioned by its function.
But using something in an appropriate way does not entail doing it well,
too (see as well Ryle 1949: 28). Thus we have to differentiate further in the
category of practical knowledge between:
• doing something in an appropriate way which means having a mere
competence to do something
• doing something well which means excellence in performing the com-
petence
To clear up this distinction it will be helpful to take a look at the Greek
language. In Greek there is a difference between the term ergon—having a
special function—and the term arete—performing that function in an excel-
lent way. This difference between competence and excellence is meant when
I say that there is a difference between using something appropriate to its
function and doing it well.
If this is true, then it is possible for an epistemic subject, A, to know how
to do X better than epistemic subject B. For instance, both Lance Armstrong
and I know how to ride a bicycle. But sure enough he knows better than I
do. And that means, having a practical knowledge is a matter of degree (see
Hetherington 2001: 5 too). An epistemic subject has to specify in which way
she exactly knows how to do X in order to decide whether she has a mere
competence or whether she is excellent.
Knowledge by acquaintance
Our attention should now be turned to the second kind of knowing something:
a kind of knowledge which Russell has called ‘knowledge by acquaintance’
(Russell 1911). Price has characterized this kind of knowledge as follows:
What is known here is not a fact or a truth but an entity of
some kind, or sometimes a group of entities (Price 2002: 50).
‘Knowledge that’ may be called a ‘propositional attitude’. But
the knowledge we are now discussing is not a propositional atti-
tude at all. It is sometimes called knowledge by acquaintance.
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One cannot have it unless one has actually encountered the per-
son or thing which is known. To be acquainted with something
A, you must have been aware of A itself (Price 2002: 51).
We may notice two features in our ordinary everyday con-
cept of knowledge by acquaintance. On the one hand, knowl-
edge by acquaintance has a first-hand or face-to-face character.
Knowledge by acquaintance is contrasted with the second-hand
or ‘hearsay’ knowledge which we get from testimony, spoken or
written (Price 2002: 54).
But knowledge by acquaintance, in our ordinary way of con-
ceiving it, [...], has another character as well. We should not
ordinarily be said to know something by acquaintance unless we
had familiarized ourselves with it in some degree, so that we are
able to recognize it when we encounter it again (Price 2002: 55).
Putting it very short, to know something by acquaintance means to be famil-
iar with it. As we have seen above, the object of the practical knowledge is the
competence/excellence of an epistemic subject to do something. The thing
which is known by an epistemic subject in the kind of knowledge at present is
objects or particulars. Looking at the first paragraph quoted above, to know
something by acquaintance means that the epistemic subject has knowledge
about an object or particular whereas this knowledge consists in being famil-
iar with the object (or to use Price’s phrase “an entity of some kind”) known
by the epistemic subject. Thus I will call it in the following ‘knowledge of
objects’.
An epistemic subject obtains knowledge of objects by meeting a particular
in a direct way. Examples for this kind of knowledge are: to know a person or
place, or to know how something tastes or how something feels, etc. Therefore
knowledge of objects can only be acquired by contact to the object. This
relation of acquaintance is defined by Russell in the following way:
We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which
we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of
inference or any knowledge of truth. (Marion 2000: 319) [Italics
by Russell himself–jk]
So, there must be a direct relationship between the object known and the
epistemic subject which is signified by the process of awareness of a given
particular, whereas the characteristic quality of this kind of knowledge is its
unaffectedness by any kind of reasoning. So, I am only able to know Paris
if I really was in Paris walking the boulevards by myself (see as well Price
2002: 64). I will only know how bean soup tastes by eating it, and so forth.
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Knowledge that
The third category of knowing something is the ‘knowledge that’ and its
object is that of facts or broadly speaking of truth (Price 2002: 47-50). As
Price notes, it will be helpful to
divide ‘knowledge that’ into two kinds (1) knowledge of facts (2)
knowledge of a priori truth. (Price 2002: 49)
The object of the knowledge of facts is
something we can ascertain by observation or experiment or his-
torical research. A matter of fact is something which just happens
to be the case. It is what philosophers call ‘contingent’. There
happened to be tigers in India, but conceivably there might not
have been. (Price 2002: 48)
The opposite is true of the knowledge of a priori truth. Its object “does not
just happen to be the case”. For instance, the knowledge that “7 x 7 = 49 or
that 17 is a prime number and 18 is not” (Price 2002: 48). Thus, Price calls
them “necessary truth” and points out about the difference between the two
kinds of knowledge that:
they [a priori truth–jk] cannot be denied without contradiction.
It is logically impossible that 7 x 7 should not be equal to 49. But
the denial that there are tigers in India involves no contradiction.
It is logically possible that there should be no tigers in India,
though as a matter of fact there are. (Price 2002: 48)
There is a further characterization concerning the object of the ‘knowledge
that’. Remember a quote cited in the context of knowledge of objects. Here
Price speaks of: “ ‘Knowledge that’ may be called a ‘propositional attitude’ ”.
In other words, we can call the ‘knowledge that’ a propositional knowledge,
too. For the known thing here is neither an object one is familiar with, nor a
competence to do something. But the object of the knowledge that is ‘that
something is the case’ which could refer either to a fact or an a priori truth.
Thus the epistemic subject knows a truth of a given proposition or state of
affair. If a given proposition is true, then we say that it is expressing a fact.
And such a fact could be related to the world—there are tigers in India—or
it means a logical relation; i.e. an a priori truth such as 7 x 7 = 49.
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Knowledge by description
In addition to the three kinds of knowledge already mentioned, Price noticed
a further kind of knowing something: ‘knowledge by description’—a term
which goes back to Russell as well (Russell 1911). Price characterizes this
kind of knowledge with reference to Russell as follows:
In order to know something by description we have to know that
there is something, and only one thing, to which a certain de-
scription applies. (Price 2002: 64)
In order to clear up what is meant by this notion he quotes Russell’s definition
of that term which is:
‘I shall say that an object is known by description when we know
that it is “the so and so”, i.e. when we know that there is one
object, and no more, having a certain property’. (Price 2002: 63)
[Italics quoted from Price.]
To say it briefly, at first glance knowledge by description seems to be a knowl-
edge of objects that is not acquired in the direct way of being familiar with a
particular, but by having a description of its characterizing properties. Then
we have a knowledge—the knowledge of the characteristic properties—of a
particular, which is indirect: because the epistemic subject is not confronted
with the particular itself but with the description of its properties.
For example, one cannot know Paris by acquaintance unless
one has actually been there, but one may know it by description
as the capital of France. (Price 2002: 64)
The knowledge that there are lions in Africa, although per-
fectly good knowledge as far as it goes, is something very different
indeed from actually seeing or touching a lion, or feeling it bite
you. (Price 2002: 66)
So the difference between the two kinds of knowledge of an object is the way
an epistemic subject has an access to the object known. On the one hand,
there is a direct access that generates the knowledge of the object itself,
because the epistemic subject was in touch with a particular. On the other
hand, a knowledge of the object could also be generated without a direct
relation between the epistemic subject and a particular. Here she knows
something about a particular she never got in touch with because there is a
description about the properties of the particular available that characterize
that particular as a definite so-and-so. Thus,
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[k]nowledge by description does not have the character of ‘first
hand encounter’ which knowledge by acquaintance has. There is
something indirect or second hand about it. Most frequently we
get it from testimony, from reading what others have written, or
hearing what they tell us. (Price 2002: 65)
Again, knowledge by description has an abstract character,
by its very nature. It is the knowledge that a certain abstract
idea, or set of ideas, has one and only one instance. (Price 2002:
66)
Because of its indirect character the second kind of knowledge of objects does
not seem to be really a knowledge of objects. What an epistemic subject gets
from a knowledge by description is not a knowledge of a particular itself—
e.g. knowing Paris—as it is the case in knowledge of objects, but it provides
a knowledge of true propositions that can be ascribed to a particular—e.g.
that Paris is the capital of France. But we have seen in the consideration
above that this kind of knowledge, the ascription of true propositions, is the
object of a ‘knowledge that’.
So Price is right in arguing:
Yet when a piece of knowledge by description is analysed, it turns
out to be reducible to knowledge that, knowledge of facts or truth.
We know that a certain description applies to something, and that
there is only one thing to which it applies. (Price 2002: 65) [Italics
from Price.]
Thus, knowledge by description indeed is a special kind of the ‘knowledge
that’—a propositional knowledge if we “most frequently get it from testi-
mony, from reading what others have written, or hearing what they tell
us”—and not as Russell seems to support some kind of a knowledge of ob-
jects. For this indirect knowledge of objects is mediated by an informant and
can only be acquired by an epistemic subject from an informant. In this con-
text ‘informant’ means any kind of resource that could generate information
about a given particular. If an epistemic subject is informed about a partic-
ular, then she has propositional knowledge about the particular. And that
means she merely possesses information about a particular without having
experienced the particular itself. As Price notes:
[...], we still have to say that almost the whole of our historical
and geographical knowledge is knowledge by description. (Price
2002: 67)
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This is true because there is no possibility for an epistemic subject to get in
touch with any kind of epistemic objects, such as historical objects as Julius
Caesar, and most of the epistemic subjects do not have the possibility of a
direct access to geographical objects like the North Pole. But sure enough
most people have knowledge about Julius Caesar or the North Pole, because
there is information available about these things—books about Julius Caesar
and scientific research about the North Pole for instance—which give them
the possibility of indirect, propositional, knowledge about those particulars.
2.2.3 Ways of acquiring knowledge
Up to now we have considered two dimensions of knowledge: first, the dif-
ferent senses of the term knowledge, and second, various kinds of knowledge.
Now I turn to a third dimension of knowledge; let us call it the formal or
technical dimension. This expression refers to the mode in which an epis-
temic subject acquires a knowledge. As we have seen in the consideration
above, there are three different kinds of knowledge:
1. The practical knowledge. It is the competence of an epistemic subject
to do something, for instance to ride a bicycle. And because differ-
ent epistemic subjects can do the same thing in a different manner,
practical knowledge is a matter of degree from mere competence to
excellence.
2. The knowledge of objects which is being familiar with an object because
the epistemic subject gets in touch with a particular itself.
3. The propositional knowledge. Here the epistemic subject knows a given
proposition.
As these three kinds of knowing something have different objects, it seems
obvious that the way in which an epistemic subject acquires these different
kinds of knowledge differs among them as well. And indeed the different ob-
jects of the three kinds of knowledge require two different accesses to them:
a direct and an indirect one. That is, an epistemic subject can know some-
thing in a direct or an indirect way, depending on the three different kinds
of knowledge.
For if the object of knowledge is competence to do something or acquain-
tance with something, the knowledge is necessarily direct. If you have the
competence to ride a bicycle, then you, the epistemic subject, must really
have ridden a bicycle before. If not, you are only having the capability, not
the knowing how, the competence, to ride a bicycle. The same thing is true
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for acquaintance with something. You only know Paris in the sense of ac-
quaintance if once upon a time you really visited the city of Paris. If not,
you do not know Paris at all. Maybe you know exactly the degree of Paris’
longitude and latitude, that Notre Dame is a church near the river Seine,
etc. But this is only knowing propositions about Paris, not being acquainted
with the particular—i.e. the city—Paris.
If the object of knowing is a proposition, then the formal dimension of
knowledge changes its character: it is turning into an indirect mode. For,
like Edward Craig 1990 has pointed out, in order to know that something is
the case only one thing is needed: having access to a (good) informant. In
order to know that Notre Dame is a church in Paris near the river Seine, it is
not necessary to travel there and being vis-a`-vis the particular Notre Dame
itself. You can read the proposition, ‘that Notre Dame is a church near the
River Seine’, in a book, see it on TV, ask people who have already visited
it and so on. So the point at issue here is that propositions could easily be
acquired via descriptions. This notion turns the consideration back again
to a point we have already mentioned before: knowledge by description.
Remember Price’s notion that the essential character of the knowledge by
description is its indirectness:
Most frequently we get it [knowledge by description–jk] from
testimony, from reading what others have written, or hearing
what they tell us. (Price 2002: 65)
Again, knowledge by description has an abstract character,
by its very nature. (Price 2002: 66)
And indeed most of our propositional knowledge is as Price describes it: in-
direct. If you ask yourself from which sources you took the propositional
knowledge you are dealing with in your everyday life, say as a student at
the university, you will certainly find exactly those sources Price talks about:
testimony, writings and hearsay. A direct access to the particulars that are
represented in a propositional knowledge is not necessarily needed for having
a propositional knowledge inasmuch as there are informants available who
can give a description of those things we are interested in. And in fact there
are really a lot of (good) informants available for us to get a propositional
knowledge: books e.g., journal articles, experts and so on. But given that
the most of our propositional knowledge is indirect based upon a knowl-
edge by description and knowledge by description is merely a special kind of
the propositional knowledge as Price has pointed out, it follows as a direct
corollary to Price’s argument that if “for each of us there must be something
which is here and now, if either of us is known anything by description” there
must be something direct (or at least some kind of direct nucleus) within the
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kind of propositional knowledge and in addition to the indirect knowledge
by description: a kind of knowledge which provides a direct knowledge of
the particulars a knowledge by description is a description of. Otherwise, as
Price has argued above, there could not be a “first hand encounter” which is
necessary to get a knowledge by description. The consequence is: if there is
an indirect propositional knowledge, then there has to be some direct kind
of propositional knowledge as well; something the indirect knowledge by de-
scription is reducible to.
“When a piece of knowledge by description is analysed, it turns out to be
reducible”, as Price 2002: 65 has argued above, “to [...], knowledge of facts”.
In other words, the indirect propositional knowledge is reducible to another
kind of knowledge, a “knowledge of facts”, which means knowing directly
the particular a proposition talks about. Thus there is a dual character of
the propositional knowledge. The direct mode I will call ‘factual knowledge’
(or as Price said: “knowledge of facts”) and the indirect one I will call as
traditionally a ‘knowledge that’ (see as well Hetherington 2001).
Price also noticed this aspect and argues that if we do not recognize the
dual character of the propositional knowledge
[...], knowledge by description seems like a network or chain
which hangs unsupported in the air, each link described in terms
of another or several others, and that in turn described in terms
of another or several others. We seem to be in danger of a fallacy
which might be called circulus in describendo. (Price 2002: 67)
But if knowledge by description consisted just in ‘knowing
one’s way about’ through each system of interdependent descrip-
tions, it would not deserve the name of knowledge, not even of rea-
sonable belief. It would have no relation to reality, to what actu-
ally exists or happens, or what has actually existed or happened.
This whole conceptual structure of inter-connected descriptions
floats in the air until some item in it is related to something which
we know by acquaintance. (Price 2002: 68) [Italics from Price.]
Thus, he concludes:
Knowledge by description is only possible if some of the descrip-
tions mention entities known by acquaintance, for example, this
thing here, what I see happening now. We can then describe
entities remote in time or space by means of their relations to
what is here and now. And this is what we actually do. The
network of inter-connected geographical or historical descriptions
is ‘tied down’ at many different points to what we see and touch.
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[...] But for each of us there must be something which is here
and now, if either of us is known anything by description. (Price
2002: 69)
If the indirect kind of the propositional knowledge is knowledge at all, so
Price’s argument, there has to be some “relation to the reality” from which
it is a description of. That is, the indirect kind of the propositional knowledge
has to be reducible to the occurrence of actually existing particulars outside
the known proposition representing these particulars. Therefore each descrip-
tion of particulars is based up on a direct access of an epistemic subject “to
what actually exists or happens, or what has actually existed or happened”:
some epistemic subject must have seen, touched, etc. the particular a known
proposition is talking about. There can only be a description of anything,
and hence a proposition about something, if there is some epistemic subject
who was in touch with the occurrence of the particular represented in the
proposition. “But for each of us there must be something which is here and
now, if either of us is known anything by description.”, as Price notes. It
is indeed not possible to give a description of something (and in conclusion
having a knowledge based upon a description), if no one ever has seen or
touched or has another “first hand encounter” with that something. Hence,
it is necessary that somewhere in the beginning of every epistemic “chain”,
which is built out of propositions, there must be an epistemic subject, who
was in touch with the reality of the particular itself which is the content of
the proposition, or an indirect propositional knowledge is not possible.
This means, as another consequence, propositional knowledge could not
be a unitary concept. Talking about propositional knowledge—and of course
much more important: having such a kind of knowledge—does not mean one
and the same unitary thing. We have to think of the propositional knowledge
in two different ways: the fact, that something is the case, is actually known
in a direct or an indirect way as we have seen. Being actually confronted
with the reality of a particular and knowing a proposition describing that
particular is not the same thing. Hence we have to notice here a fundamental
difference concerning the object of knowledge in the two different ways of
having a propositional knowledge—factual knowledge and knowledge that.
Having a factual knowledge and knowing that something has happened are
entirely different ways of knowing something. Factual knowledge means that
the epistemic subject is actually confronted with the reality of the object
known—the occurrence of a particular: seeing it, touching it, smelling it
and so on. In short, being aware of the particular. However, knowing that
something has happened means having a description of the occurrence of a
particular which is expressed in a statement. In other words, the epistemic
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subject in the latter case is confronted with a logical object: a statement
which represents that something has happened. By contrast, in a factual
piece of knowledge the epistemic subject is confronted with an occurrence
of a particular itself which actually exists in front of the epistemic subject,
i.e. she is aware of its so-and-so existence. Thus Price is absolutely right in
saying:
The knowledge that there are lions in Africa, [...], is something
very different indeed from actually seeing or touching a lion, or
feeling it bite you. (Price 2002: 66)
This is the reason why I am inclined to call the direct way to the propositional
knowledge a factual knowledge, as opposed to the indirect knowledge that
in order to emphasise to this important difference between them: on the
one hand knowing something in the sense of being directly confronted with
the occurrence of a particular, which is an actually existing thing. On the
other hand, there is knowing something in the sense of being confronted
with a statement describing that something has happened which is being
confronted with a logical object. The latter is characterized by a process of
inference, whereas the first one is signified by direct awareness.
Thus, it is very important to note here that we are not dealing with one
unitary concept when we are talking about propositional knowledge. There
are indeed two different accesses to this kind of knowledge—direct aware-
ness of a real particular and the inference of logical objects—and therefore
propositional knowledge is a two-headed thing—factual knowledge of a real
thing on the one hand and knowledge that a proposition is true (or false) on
the other. The latter gives an evidence of a logical value: the truth or false-
hood of a proposition, whereas the former is the evidence of some existing
particular (or a particular that has existed), so that no further testimony as
inference is needed.
Given this difference between factual knowledge and knowledge that within
the propositional knowledge, it turns out to be that factual knowledge is in
effect a knowledge of objects. Remember Price’s argument that having a
factual knowledge really means being acquainted with the object known:
[the] conceptual structure of inter-connected descriptions floats
in the air until some item in it is related to something which we
know by acquaintance. (Price 2002: 68)
And Russell’s definition of knowledge by acquaintance of
which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any
process of inference or any knowledge of truth. (Marion 2000:
319)
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If this is true, it follows that the propositional knowledge could not be a
category of its own in the same sense as the other two—practical knowl-
edge and knowledge of objects—are irreducible kinds of knowledge. For if
knowledge that is based upon factual knowledge and having a factual knowl-
edge means the same thing as having a knowledge of objects, because both
methods of knowledge acquisition are based upon acquaintance, then it fol-
lows that the propositional knowledge could not be an irreducible, i.e. an
independent, category of knowledge. Indeed, it is derived from knowledge of
objects. But wouldn’t this notion mean that the category of propositional
knowledge would slip away without any substitution? How could this notion
be true, given the primacy of the propositional knowledge during 2000 years
of epistemic discussion since Plato (that this primacy could be seen as a mere
confusion, to which I agree, is argued in Nehamas 1984, Wieland 1999)?
Well, the good news is: of course, there is a knowledge that and I am not
denying its existence. What I am trying to do instead of denying its exis-
tence is to challenge the status of the propositional knowledge as a primary
category in the analysis of knowledge. Instead of that, I am denying, other
than the epistemic orthodoxy, the primacy of the propositional knowledge in
opposite to the other kinds of knowledge mentioned above. The propositional
knowledge, and this is bad news for the orthodoxy’s analysis, is not an inde-
pendent category, primary to any other kind of knowledge. In fact, we have
to correct our view of the propositional knowledge in that way: propositional
knowledge is a derivative kind; derived from the knowledge of objects which
is the ultimate or, say, first kind of knowledge. There is nothing more to say!
The argument supporting this notion runs as follows: As we have seen
there are three different kinds of knowledge and two different ways of ac-
quiring those: practical knowledge and knowledge of objects are acquired
in a direct way and propositional knowledge is acquired in an indirect way.
There are three different kinds of knowledge because three different kinds of
things could be known by an epistemic subject: competence, the occurrence
of a particular and propositions. While practical knowledge and knowledge
of objects requires a direct line between epistemic subject and its object be-
cause of the specific nature of the object known, this is not the case with
propositional knowledge. In the former kinds of knowledge there is some
kind of intimacy or individual tie happening between epistemic subject and
its object that is connecting them interdependently. For competence is al-
ways the competence of someone. There is no competence independent of
someone being competent of something. And acquaintance is always the ac-
quaintance with something. Here too, there is no acquaintance independent
from the relation that someone is acquainted with something. Now, turn-
ing to propositional knowledge, other than in the former mentioned kinds
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of knowledge where only the direct way of knowing something is possible,
two ways of knowing something is possible here: a direct and an indirect
way. The object of the indirect propositional knowledge is a proposition in
which the occurrence of something is represented via a description of the
occurring thing. Knowing something in this sense means knowing the truth
value of a given proposition. Therefore it is a knowledge that something is
the case. Different to this kind of knowing is the object of the direct kind of
propositional knowledge. Here the epistemic subject is confronted with the
known thing directly via seeing, touching, feeling it etc. Knowing something
in this sense does not mean knowing the truth value of a proposition but, as
we have seen above, being acquainted with the known thing. For its object
is the occurrence of a particular which characterizes it as factual knowledge.
And because the characteristic way of knowing something in the latter is the
relation of acquaintance with something which is defined as we have seen as
the “direct aware[ness], without the intermediary of any process of inference
or any knowledge of truth”, the same kind of intimacy between the epistemic
subject and its object must be given in the factual knowledge as in the knowl-
edge of objects, unlike its opposite brother, knowledge that. In knowledge
that there is no such intimacy happening between the epistemic subject and
its object, because the known object is truth, which is an abstract quality of
an abstract thing: a proposition.
Again, knowledge by description has an abstract character, by its
very nature (Price 2002: 66).
For the truth value of a proposition is independent of the situation that some-
one really knows that proposition. Having a truth value is an autonomous
quality of any proposition independent of any epistemic subject, whether she
has a propositional attitude towards the proposition or not. Rather than
that, it is a question of inference, and inference is a quality of a complex of
propositions which built an argument. Because of that independence of the
object of knowledge that from the epistemic subject, its acquisition is neces-
sarily indirect. But, as we have seen above, the indirectness of the knowledge
that causes some crucial problem: where does the description which is ex-
pressed in the known proposition come from, if nobody was at first acquainted
with the occurrence of the particular described in the proposition? As Price
notes, this is not possible. And his conclusion is that a knowledge that is
based on or reducible to a corresponding factual knowledge. But given the
latter conclusion and given the fact that factual knowledge is some kind of
knowledge of objects, then we have to conclude further that the knowledge
that is in the end reducible to the knowledge of objects.
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This is the notion I have opened the present paragraph with: proposi-
tional knowledge is a derivative kind; derived from the knowledge of objects
which is the ultimate or, say, first kind of knowledge. Insofar the proposi-
tional knowledge is not really an independent category, but some higher order
knowledge of objects—apart from apriori knowledge, of course. By contrast,
my notion of a ‘higher order knowledge’ means: higher order knowledge is
a mere abstraction of the knowledge of objects, which appears especially in
respect of the knowledge that.
Indeed, I think that the characteristic indiscernibility between factual
knowledge and knowledge of objects pushes the status of the propositional
knowledge concerning its importance in the analysis of the nature of knowl-
edge decisively backwards and helps to understand the existence of endur-
ing problems in the history of that analysis: e.g. the insolvable external-
ism/internalism dispute.
From my point of view the feigned unsolvability rests on the mistake of
misinterpreting the status of the propositional knowledge as fundamental
category in the analysis of knowledge. For, taking my just mentioned argu-
ment for granted, we have to correct the above analysis of knowledge in two
ways.
1. If the propositional knowledge is reducible to knowledge of objects,
then knowing propositions as an independent category of knowledge
is in no way reasonable and has to be removed in favour of the two
categories practical knowledge and knowledge of objects.
2. Now if only competence and particulars are left as the real objects of
knowledge and those two categories are necessarily acquired directly, as
we have argued above, then the indirect kind of acquiring knowledge
has to be removed as well in favour of the direct way of knowledge
acquisition. For the indirect (propositional) knowledge is in the end
reducible to the knowledge of objects, as I have argued above.
So the direct knowledge acquisition is the only remaining way for an epistemic
subject to acquire knowledge in general, and there is no other effective way
of knowledge acquisition. And this means, the answer to the question of
what the nature of knowledge is, is hidden somewhere in the categories of
practical knowledge and knowledge of objects (on whether factual knowledge,
and thus knowledge of objects as well, is in the end reducible to practical
knowledge, see Hetherington 2006a). Searching for an answer within the
propositional knowledge means following a wrong direction by virtue of a
partial and therefore misleading analysis of knowledge which leads necessarily
to the dead end that is known as externalism/internalism debate.
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2.3 Knowledge and the first person
But if knowledge that exists in some way, as I have claimed above, I should
offer now an answer to the question: in which way is knowledge that exist-
ing, if not as an irreducible and independent category? Even though I have
asserted that the status of the propositional knowledge is a mere abstraction
of the other two kinds of knowledge and therefore it could not be an inde-
pendent category in the same sense as the other two kinds are. My idea is
this: because practical knowledge and knowledge of objects are necessarily
acquired in a direct way, they are describing two different ways in which an
epistemic subject is able to acquire a knowledge in general. But propositional
knowledge, however, is not such a thing. Because of its indirectness, it has a
different function contrary to the two directly known kinds of knowledge.
Propositional knowledge rather describes the way in which knowledge ei-
ther acquired as practical knowledge or as knowledge of objects is memorized
by an epistemic subject. At the moment a direct knowledge is memorized
by the epistemic subject, the knowledge gets independent from the direct
knowledge situation and changes therefore its mode from knowing something
directly into knowing something indirectly, i.e. a proposition. In doing so,
a direct knowledge—having competence or being acquainted with something
which is necessarily bound to the epistemic subject who has acquired the
knowledge—could be turned into propositions, an indirect knowledge. And
from now on truth comes into play. With truth in her hands the epistemic
subject can ‘carry’ with her a direct knowledge in a propositional way in
order to generalise her knowledge so that (i) she can recall what she has
directly acquired someday without being in a direct knowledge situation and
(ii) other epistemic subjects could then get an access to what she knows with-
out being in the same direct knowledge situation she acquired her knowledge
from. This is so because truth is a communicable thing. Its existence is inde-
pendent of any epistemic subject holding it or not. Truth is a quality of the
object of knowledge, which is a proposition. Therefore, it has the ability to
be ‘stored’ independently of any epistemic subject who is actually manifest-
ing it. Further, truth is an objective thing. It is the quality of a proposition
in general, independent of any existing relationship of that proposition to an
epistemic subject. It does not make any difference if some epistemic subject
really ascertains the proposition ‘that the sun is shining’ or not, so that this
proposition is in fact true or not. The proposition is true or it is not whether
any epistemic subject has a propositional attitude concerning it or not.
To explain this notion, let us take a look back to the distinction we have
made in section 2.2.1. There we have distinguished between two senses of
knowledge: the dispositional sense and the mental state sense of the term
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knowledge. And remember my notion in this context that the essential char-
acteristic of the dispositional sense of knowledge is being “stored in the cor-
ners of our minds until we want to use it”, which is exactly the function of
the propositional knowledge.
We acquire [a] piece of knowledge many years ago [...]. We are
not always actually thinking of or attending to [it]. It actually
‘comes into our minds’ only occasionally [...]. Nevertheless we
have the capacity of recalling this proposition whenever we need
to, and of actually ‘realizing’ or ‘acknowledging’ that it is true.
But a disposition is something which we still have or possess
at times when it is not actually being manifested at all. (Price
2002: 42)
This is what I mean when I talk about communicability: the dispositional
sense of knowledge which makes knowledge available for every epistemic sub-
ject, independently of being in a direct knowledge situation. Thus, in the
range of the different kinds of knowledge only the propositional knowledge
exhibits the status of being a free-floating information independent of any
information carrier. Because of its communicability, it is in principle an un-
bound knowledge and every one could have free access to it. Hence, propo-
sitional knowledge is a subject-free, an objective knowledge, which means, as
we have seen in section 2.1, a third-person point of view perspective (see e.g.
Searle 1987: 145). In other words, we can identify the dispositional sense of
knowledge with the propositional knowledge which happens in a third-person
point of view. Hence, propositional knowledge has to be understood in the
dispositional sense of knowledge.
This is the actual reason why the propositional knowledge is the important
subject during the history of epistemological thinking: because it represents
an objective knowledge which every epistemic subject in principle has access
to, because of its independence of any direct knowledge situation. This is
the invention—and from my point of view its mere function or reason of
existence—of the third-person point of view. In this sense it is an “ideal
observer” perspective (see Zagzebski 2006). Maybe we could call it some kind
of epistemological ‘key currency’. But being the key currency of epistemology
doesn’t entail being the nature of knowledge as well. Again, the propositional
knowledge is not the key currency of epistemology because it is the nature
of knowledge.
To avoid such a confusion (which is, from my point of view, the foundation
of the unfruitful internalism/externalism debate), it is necessary to separate
two things: the nature of something and its convention. To give a suggestive
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analogy: with a currency we can buy and sell goods because it is the propor-
tion for the value of the goods we want to possess. But it is not that value
itself. But it is a representation of it: a coloured piece of paper which is used
as some kind of ‘exchange value’. And its only function is to help objectifying
our subjective needs into a communicable (and therefore for other subjects
understandable) form so that a mutual exchange of goods that satisfies our
needs is possible (see Aristotel’s chapter “On justice” in his “Nicomachean
ethics”). And the same thing is true for propositional knowledge; it has the
same function: objectifying knowledge in order to enable a mutual exchange
of knowledge between epistemic subjects.
However, the function of the direct kind of knowledge is to be the foun-
dation of the propositional knowledge as we have considered in the former
section. And what is the foundation of something we can call its nature, too.
Knowledge in the direct mode means some kind of experiencing something.
Hence direct knowledge is necessarily bound to the epistemic subject: it is
in no way communicable to other epistemic subjects if they are not in ex-
actly the same experience situation, because as Price 2002: 51 notes: “To
be acquainted with something A, you must have been aware of A itself”.
Awareness of something is the crucial point here. And awareness is a thing
which cannot be separated from the subject who is aware of something. Of
course, the epistemic subject could describe the awareness of something she
has. But the description of something and the awareness of that something
are not the same thing, as Price’s ‘lions-in-africa’ example shows.
For awareness is a thing which Price describes as “something ‘dawns in us’
in a particular moment” (Price 2002: 44) and certainly the dawning in us in
a particular moment—whatever that exactly is—is something substantially
different from a description of the dawning thing in us. Second and apart
from the latter point, if ‘something dawns in us ’ is the characteristic quality
of the direct knowledge, this kind of knowledge then could not exist outside
the subject in which it has dawned or is dawning. And this means it is
necessarily bound to the epistemic subject.
Therefore having an experience which happens in the case of competence
or acquaintance is a quality of the epistemic subject. And because of that it
couldn’t exist independently of that subject who actually has had such an
experience. And that means it is not possible to separate a practical knowl-
edge or a knowledge of objects from its subject: thus we can call the direct
knowledge a subjective knowledge. And because we have identified in section
2.2.1 the mental state sense of knowledge with the characteristic quality of
“something ‘dawns in us’ at a particular moment”, we can identify the men-
tal state sense of knowledge with the subjective knowledge. By contrast, a
subjective knowledge means, as we have seen in section 2.1, a first-person
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point of view (see e.g. Searle 1987: 145). Thus, the direct kind of knowledge
has to be understood in the mental state sense of knowledge which happens
in a first-person point of view.
It may be helpful to call the objective knowledge ‘information’ and the
subjective one ‘knowledge’ in order to emphasize the crucial difference—
communicability—between them. We can therefore conclude: we experi-
ence knowledge, but we communicate information. The generalisation from
a direct knowledge which is subjective to indirect propositional information
which is objective allows a mutual exchange of information between any epis-
temic subjects. And this mutual exchange of information is generally called
science which is objective and happens in the third-person point of view. But
the generalisation of knowledge as an information transfer, which is done in
sciences, necessitates a change of perspective: turning from a subjective, first-
person point of view into an objective, third-person point of view. And this
is one of the important insights we get from the present analysis of knowl-
edge: the foundation of knowledge—its nature—is the subjective knowledge,
something that happens in the first-person point of view. Or to put the same
thing in a variation of Searls 1987: 145 quote: The crucial fact in question
is that the nature of knowledge goes on at a level of an intrinsic first-person
point of view perspective.
But how does this work, changing knowledge into information? What
is the right instrument to eliminate the mental state sense of experiencing
something which characterises the subjective knowledge in favour of the dis-
positional sense of knowledge which is information? Giving reasons is the
answer. Reasons objectify a subjective knowledge in relation to other epis-
temic subjects and transform the subjective mental state sense of knowledge
into an objective and communicable proposition which has a dispositional
character. For reasons are instruments of justification. Justification always
(and we can add: only) takes place in cases where someone has to be con-
vinced of something she didn’t have a direct access to or an experience of.
If we are giving reasons for something, then we want someone to believe
that something. But in a subjective knowledge situation the epistemic sub-
ject does not believe what she is knowing because she does not have any
reasons but an experience of the object known by her. This whole justifica-
tion apparatus is not needed if the epistemic subject is directly confronted
with the object known by her. She does not need to believe that a thing
has happened in front of her now (or has other so-called propositional atti-
tudes towards the epistemic object) and therefore needs no justification for
believing it. She has the mental state sense of knowledge and because this
is a question of awareness, there is no need for justification; this would be
conceptually misleading.
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For, ‘believing’, ‘justification’ and so on are reasonable words only in
propositional contexts: this is why they are called ‘propositional attitudes’:
they are taking place in reference to propositions. Their application is nei-
ther necessary nor meaningful outside any propositional situation or context
as it is the case in the mental state sense of knowledge. It does not make any
sense to say: ‘I have the justified true belief that I am acquainted with ...’
or ‘I have the justified true belief that I have the competence of ...’. If you
are acquainted with something, then you know the object, and if you have
a competence, then you know how to ... or not. Why should any epistemic
subject believe an experience she is just aware of? Or have an experience and
believing it? These notions seem to me like some kind of Ryleian “category
mistake” (Ryle 1949). If the epistemic subject has awareness of something,
she knows it without having an additional propositional attitude towards it
(whatever it may be, a belief or disbelief). For it is the mental state sense
of knowledge she is possessing and this implies, as we have seen above, that
some intimacy must take place between epistemic subject and its object.
This intimacy is expressed in the MS thesis which occurs in the first-person
point of view perspective. Having a propositional attitude in addition to this
is neither necessary nor suggestive in any way. (See also Cook Wilson 1969
and Prichard 1950.)
In other words, the proper function of reasons is: telling someone, an
epistemic subject, why something, an occurrence that has not been expe-
rienced by the epistemic subject to which it is telling, has happened via a
proposition. Reasons are the transmission belt that transforms the subjective
knowledge into a free-floating information accessible to all epistemic subjects,
irrespective of whether they have had the corresponding experience or not.
So, dealing with reasons means to adopt a propositional attitude towards a
given occurrence in order to replace a lacking awareness of that occurrence.
In doing this, the epistemic subject then has some information—a justified
true belief—that something has happened without having any experience of
the object known. And this means she has a second-order knowledge, an
information of something she never experienced to actually happen.
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2.4 Fallible knowledge
The present discussion shows a structural, or more precisely, a substantial dif-
ference among subjective and objective knowledge. That difference poaches
a big gap between them that cannot be bridged. Objective knowledge is
propositional, subjective knowledge is manifested in a mental state. An epis-
temic subject can assert a proposition. But her asserting a proposition will
not realise a competence of or an acquaintance with the object of her asser-
tion. Thus, something gets lost during the change or the translation from
subjective knowledge into objective one which causes at least one unpleasant
effect: fallibilism and Gettier troubles.
The analogy of translating texts from one language into another shows
that the genuine meaning may get lost—e.g. jokes of “Monty Pythons Fly-
ing Circus” translated into German language don’t work any more, because
its funny effect rests on a play on (English) words which cannot be conveyed
in German language. Or as in the case of engines: the transformation of
energy into mechanical motion causes friction loss that decreases the degree
of efficiency of the engine. Now the same effect happens in the case of trans-
lating knowledge into information: there is some deficit happening while
processing that transmission from knowledge to information, changing from
the first-person point of view into the third-person point of view perspective.
The reason is that the transmission has the necessary and volitional effect of
dissociating the object known from its epistemic subject. At last it is a change
from the first-person point of view which is characterised by awareness into
the third-person point of view perspective which means having reasons. The
change from awareness to reasons dissociates the object known from its epis-
temic subject, because in the latter perspective the epistemic subject knows
something indirectly. But this indirect access to the known thing which is
caused by the change of perspective has the unpleasant effect of fallibilism
(see Hetherington 2002). The loss of the directness of the epistemic subject
to its epistemic object in objective knowledge causes a fuzziness which in-
cludes the possibility to fail. (I think scepticism is the result of the fuzziness
of the propositional knowledge). Without any awareness, i.e. a direct access,
to the thing known, there is no certainty any more of knowing an object for
the epistemic subject in an objective knowledge situation. Or in other words,
there is a change happening in the quality of knowing something, depending
on the different perspectives an epistemic subject could take: first-person or
third-person point of view.
If you know something directly, you can’t be wrong. Because as Price
has pointed out above: “To be acquainted with something A, you must
have been aware of A itself” (Price 2002: 51). Either you are aware of an
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actually existing thing being right in front of you or you are not. And if
you are aware of an occurring thing, certainty about the occurrence of that
thing is the result. But knowing the same thing indirectly means losing the
contact to the actually existing thing you have knowledge of by swapping
this contact for a description of the thing known. Now, you are not certain
of the occurrence or the thing, because you didn’t have any awareness of it.
Hence, you are dependent on the correctness of a second-hand report about
the real occurrence of an actually existing thing.
But a mere description of something could principally be wrong; for a
description is a linguistic object—a proposition—which is true or even false.
And in order to exclude the possible falsity of a proposition a criterion is
needed that tells you whether a described occurrence really has happened or
not. Criterions are reasons, as we have seen. But a criterion is necessarily
external, because you did not have direct access to the thing the description
talks about. In order to know a description which you got from a foreign
informant, you need now a criterion which tells you under which condition
this external description is a correct description of the occurring thing. Be-
cause you are not aware of that thing a proposition talks about, an external
justification is needed in order to give you a reason to believe that this thing
has happened and the informant’s description is correct.
In other words, a proof of the epistemic reliability of the informant is
needed in case of propositional knowledge. But how do you get such proof?
Remember, the point at issue is that you did not have direct access to the
occurrence that has happened and it is therefore only accessible for you via
its representation in a proposition. Of course, as we have seen, you need
reasons. Reasons are the instruments that will give you the required proof
whether a given proposition is true or false.
But how do you know that these reasons to prove the propositions are true
themselves? As the available reasons are external and also propositions, like
the proposition they ought to prove, you need more reasons: reasons that
will prove the reasons which should prove your primary proposition ... and
so on and so forth. We are entering an endless regress that is known as the
justification problem. That situation opens out into the well-known Gettier
cases (see Gettier 1963).
If I understand the Gettier cases right, then the point is, JTB could not
guarantee facts; i.e. the fact that something has really happened. So there
always remains a residual risk to be mistaken in my JTB. This justification
problem leads directly into scepticism. And that is the real reason for any
so-called Gettier case which is therefore principally unsolvable, insensible to
any kind of internalist or externalist answer to the Gettier problem.
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2.5 Summary
Before we are going to enter the next chapter with an analysis of my MS
thesis, it appears to be helpful to summarise the core results of the present
chapter.
We have considered three different things concerning knowledge. At first,
the meaning of the term ‘knowledge’ which is twofold: the dispositional sense
which means memorizing propositions, and the mental state sense which is
being aware of an actually existing object. Second, the different kinds of
knowledge: There are three different kinds of knowledge an epistemic subject
could have: practical knowledge, which is competence, knowledge of objects,
which is acquaintance with something, and propositional knowledge, which
is the knowledge of truth. And finally, the acquisition of knowledge which
is either direct or indirect. Thus we can conclude first: there are (at least)
three dimensions of knowledge, which means knowledge is a multidimensional
concept.
Now, practical knowledge and knowledge of objects are acquired directly
because these kinds of knowledge—having a competence and being acquainted
with something—are necessarily bound to a subject. For, in order to have a
competence and being acquainted with something, some kind of awareness
of the object is needed. Hence, direct knowledge is a subjective knowledge
which happens therefore in a first-person point of view. And because aware-
ness is the characteristic quality here, subjective knowledge means the men-
tal state sense of knowledge. By contrast, there is the propositional kind of
knowledge. Propositional knowledge is acquired in an indirect way because
this kind of knowledge means having true descriptions of occurrences. And
because truth is subject independent, the indirect knowledge is an objective
knowledge that happens in the third-person point of view. And because the
characteristic thing of a proposition is its ability to be memorized, the objec-
tive knowledge means the dispositional sense of knowledge. Second, we can
conclude: there is a subjective knowledge which is the mental state sense of
knowledge and an objective knowledge which is its dispositional counterpart.
But as the propositional knowledge is an indirect knowledge of objects,
objective knowledge is reducible to the subjective knowledge. And if the ob-
jective knowledge is reducible to the subjective knowledge it follows that sub-
jective knowledge is the ultimate kind of knowledge and objective knowledge
is merely a derivative knowledge. Taking this for granted, we can conclude,
third, that the mental state sense of knowledge is the nature of knowledge.
And fourth, from the primacy of the subjective knowledge it follows that
there is knowledge without truth because truth takes place only in the ob-
jective knowledge which is derivative.
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These are the reasons why I am inclined to reject the JTB thesis as an
appropriate analysis of knowledge: it does not describe the nature of knowl-
edge but reflects only a derivative. In order to get an access to the nature of
knowledge we need an inquiry of the MS thesis. We will look into this in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Knowledge as mental state
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3.1 John Cook Wilson
3.1.1 Introduction
After we have done some vindicatory work for the existence and especially
the appropriateness of the MS thesis concerning the analysis of knowledge
in the second chapter, we have to do now an inquiry into the nature of the
MS thesis itself. What is the content of the MS thesis and especially what
exactly is its analysis of knowledge? In the second chapter we have done
some negative argument against the appropriateness of the JTB thesis. But
in order to justify the MS thesis as an appropriate analysis of knowledge
superior to the JTB thesis, we now need some positive account in favour of
the MS thesis as well. The present chapter is an attempt to support this
purpose.
The MS thesis as an issue of the history of philosophy is intrinsically tied
to a particular movement called the ‘Oxford Realists’. This movement—
maybe we could call it a school—arose, as its name signifies, at Oxford
University during the late 19th until the end of the first part of the 20th
century. The founder of this philosophical school was John Cook Wilson
(1849–1915), Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford University; nowadays a
widely ignored philosopher, but with an outstanding conceptual influence
(especially concerning epistemological issues) on philosophers like Harold
A. Prichard (1871–1947), John L. Austin (1911–1960), Henry H. Price (1899–
1984) or nowadays John McDowell and Timothy Williamson (see e. g. Marion
2000, Travis 2005; for further biographical notes concerning his life and work
see Joseph 1916, Prichard 1919, Passmore 1966, Collingwood 1978, Marion
2000). That his “only important publication [i.e. Statement and Inference
in 1926–jk] is fragmentary”, as Passmore 1966: 242 notes, certainly is a rea-
son for this deplorable state. This situation is even more deplorable if we
take a look at Timothy Williamson’s “new conception of knowledge as a
fundamental kind of mental state”, as the note on the blurb of his highly
regarded Knowledge and its Limits maintains, a successor of Cook Wilson
on the Wykeham chair of Logic at Oxford, which is unfettered by any refer-
ences to his predecessor, the school of Oxford Realism or any historical roots
of the MS thesis. However, the time of Oxford Realism as an influential
epistemic school ended with the days of John L. Austin in 1960 (see Marion
2000, Travis 2005).
In order to understand the upcoming of the MS thesis in the epistemo-
logical thinking of Oxford Realism and especially in the thinking of Cook
Wilson himself, we have to mention some facts about the development of
Oxford Realism itself. The first thing we have to note in this context is that
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the existence of Oxford Realism and the MS thesis as its main epistemolog-
ical claim is considerably a backlash of the influential idealistic philosophy
of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) and Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924)
and their school of ‘British Idealists’—also attributed ‘Neo-Hegelianism’—
domiciled also at Oxford University:
Bradley and followers such as Green or Bosanquet believed that
there is in immediate experience no such thing as a direct appre-
hension of entities such as sense-data or physical objects whose
existence is independent of the subject and its cognitive activities.
(Marion 2000: 302)
In other words, there is no such thing as knowledge of a mind-independent
world. Therefore any kind of epistemic activity concerning a subject could
not be understood as some kind of relation between that subject and an
object distinct and separate of an epistemic process such as knowing. So
the central epistemological claim of the British Idealists is the notion that
any epistemic object in its existence is constituted by the epistemic process.
That is, the known thing could not be separated from knowing it. Thus,
[t]he battleground was, along with the doctrine of relations, pri-
marily immediate experience, where at least some form of Lock-
ean account of sensation had to be vindicated against idealism.
(Marion 2000: 302)
Marion 2000: 302 concludes further:
In short: ‘knowing in no way alters or modifies the thing known’.
This was the maxim of Oxford Realism.
Leaving now the theme of Oxford Realism in general and turning to the
discussion of Cook Wilson’s account of knowledge, what is Cook Wilson’s
‘realist’ account of knowledge? His central theses are the following (see Pass-
more 1966: 242-249, Laird 1972: 113-116, Marion 2000: 307-316, Travis
2005: 286-294):
1. Knowledge is a simple and ultimate state of mind. Therefore no def-
inition or even an analysis of knowledge especially in terms of belief,
opinion or judgement is possible.
2. Rather, belief, opinion and the like have to be defined in terms of knowl-
edge. This means, knowledge is the fundamental category with which
we have to analyse belief, opinion etc.: belief, opinion etc. includes
knowledge, but knowledge doesn’t include belief, opinion etc. Thus,
knowledge is the basis of thought in general.
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3. Because knowledge couldn’t be analysed in terms of belief or opinion
etc., which means having evidence for the occurrence of something,
there is no residual of failure possible in a knowing case: if you know
something, you can’t be wrong.
Now, according to the first and second theses Cook Wilson’s account of
knowledge is an anti-orthodox theory; i.e. it neglects the JTB thesis in a
fundamental way: the JTB thesis as an epistemological claim in fact means
confusing two different states of mind: belief and knowledge. Therefore, and
with reference to the third thesis, Cook Wilson’s understanding of knowledge
is not aﬄicted with any kind of Gettier cases. So, one of the epistemological
merits a Wilsonian approach would have, if it is correct, is its indefeasibility
of any kind of Gettier threats. (Please note: this is what I mean when I
am talking about the misinterpretation of the Gettier cases by the epistemic
orthodoxy. We could interpret the Gettier paper as exactly this: a consider-
ation that a definition of knowledge in terms of belief would be a confusion
of two distinct and separate things—belief and knowledge—which has the
effect when confusing them that there is per definitionem a ‘false knowledge’
occurring. Indeed, a ridiculous situation from a common sense point of view
and given the conditions that constitutes the JTB thesis self-contradictory.)
But if Cook Wilson is right with his thesis that knowledge cannot be
analysed, in which way could we get an answer to the what-is-knowledge-
question, if the answer could not be some kind of definition as we have seen
in the Wilsonian theses? The term “apprehension” is the key to the answer
that is not a definition (see Marion 2000: 308).
In short, according to Cook Wilson, “apprehension in general,”
not “judgement” or “thinking” is our true starting point. “This
includes knowledge and is the key to the activities called think-
ing”. Belief, judgment, and opinion rest on apprehension, not it
on them. He further maintained that the “ordinary idea of defini-
tion” is not applicable to the relations thus arising. (Laird 1972:
115)
So now we need to do some explanatory work on the term of apprehen-
sion and its meaning in order to get an access to Cook Wilson’s ‘theory’ of
knowledge.
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3.1.2 The notion of apprehension
As we have seen the term apprehension is “[a] key part of Cook Wilson’s
argumentation” (Marion 2000: 308). Even though apprehension is the key
to the kingdom, we have to face the problem that, as Marion 2000: 308
further wrote, “nowhere does he [Cook Wilson–jk] provide a definition” of
what he exactly means by the notion of apprehension (see as well Morris
1933: 228 and Laird 1972: 115/121). Nevertheless, we should get an idea
of what Cook Wilson has meant with the term ‘apprehension’ by carefully
examining chapter I, part II of his Statement and Inference.
For a first approach we will start our examination with a footnote of
the editor of Statement and Inference concerning the beginning of this first
chapter. The editor also confirms the unpleasant situation Marion 2000: 308
has already described and proceeds by noting:
For long he [Cook Wilson–jk] used ‘recognition’ to express the
immediate cognizance of the object and conviction of its being.
The difficulty latent in the word is its concealed metaphor and
the fact that since it became an English word it has tended more
and more to mean belief (subjective) in what may or may not
be real, e.g. apprehension of death and danger. In N.E.D. II. 5
it is defined as ‘the action of laying hold of with the senses’ and
ib. 7 ‘the action of grasping the intellect’. [...] Price uses it as a
technical term for ‘the soul’s power of surveying and examining
all things, in order to judge them; that is, a power conversant
about universals and actively discerning’ (British Moralists, Selby
Bigge, ii, § 593). (Cook Wilson 1969: 78n)
The central point in the editor’s notion concerning the problem of defining
apprehension seems to me the phrase “the immediate cognizance of the object
and conviction of its being”. If we remember section 2.2 the meaning of “the
immediate cognizance of the object and conviction of its being” is similar to
Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance. As Marion 2000: 308-309 maintains:
One may infer from his [Cook Wilson’s–jk] writings that he had in
mind a notion at the same time close to Aristotle’s noesis and to
Russell’s ‘acquaintance’. It is at least safe to say that, according
to him, ‘apprehension’ designates the immediate cognitive rela-
tion between a subject and an object, where the subject does not
doubt the existence of the object. [Italics from Marion]
But what kind of nature has this “immediate cognitive relation between
a subject and an object” Marion talks about? Cook Wilson begins his char-
acterisation of apprehension by considering thinking in general:
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[...] we at first looked naturally for a universal which might
embrace all thinking. But the various departments of thinking
have not the kind of unity which this search implies; they have
not a unity in the sense of a common universal of which they
are the different species. Nevertheless those of them which are
not knowledge depend upon knowledge; they exist only through
the impulse to know and are understood only through knowledge.
Their unity with knowledge or apprehension and their unity also
with one another both depend upon their relations to apprehen-
sion. We are led to the consideration of apprehension in general,
both that which is perceptual and that which is not, as the pri-
mary subject of investigation [...].
If then we make apprehension in general the starting-point,
this includes knowledge and is the key to the activities called
thinking. (Cook Wilson 1969: 78/79)
Now, Cook Wilson maintains in a first and general step that apprehension
is a concept which “includes knowledge” whereas its character is twofold:
perceptual and non-perceptual. The perceptual side of apprehension is char-
acterised by experience (see as well Morris 1933: 242, “Cook Wilson still
speaks as though ‘apprehending’ in his sense was a real experience”.). It is
subjective, but passive, because
we seem to be acted on by the object; something comes to us
without our making or seeking. (Cook Wilson 1969: 81)
But the non-perceptual side of apprehension
depend upon our own desire for knowledge and are not expe-
riencing (in the normal sense of the word), processes which we
originate and which we conduct, as distinct from the action of
the object upon us. (Cook Wilson 1969: 81)
Cook Wilson then identifies those “processes which we originate” with in-
ference as its characteristic principle (Cook Wilson 1969: 81). He further
continues:
The process of inference is seen to presuppose knowledge al-
ready gained or opinions already formed. The process itself con-
ceived, in effect, as the apprehending of what these previous ap-
prehensions or opinions necessitate in the way of other knowledge
or opinion. Hence it becomes evident that there must be appre-
hensions not got by inference or reasoning. This appears in the
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familiar statement that there must be undemonstrated premises
or there would be a never-ending process.
Certain apprehensions, then, are recognized as not being in-
ferences, and also as being material of inference. (Cook Wilson
1969: 84/85)
Therefore Cook Wilson finally concludes:
Starting now from the form of apprehension which is reasoning,
that is from our interest in the subjective side of thought as it
appears in reasoning, we observe that inference or reasoning de-
pends upon apprehensions which are not inferring. (Cook Wilson
1969: 90)
This means, inference, even though a constituent of the concept of appre-
hension in general in addition to experience, could not be an ultimate form
of apprehension because the concept of inference presupposes some previous
apprehension from which the process of inferring something could begin with.
(Please note the similarities between the conclusion of the present discussion
and the discussion of knowledge by description in subsection 2.2.2 that ends
in the conclusion that knowledge by description is reducible to knowledge
by acquaintance.) In order to avoid an infinite regress, those previous ap-
prehensions could not consist of previous inferences. Hence Cook Wilson’s
conclusion that “certain apprehensions, then, are recognized as not being
inferences” is consistent.
But because Cook Wilson has argued before that apprehension in general
consists of two parts—experience as the perceptual and inference as the non-
perceptual part—and inference presupposes the existence of some other ap-
prehension as its material, it follows that experience remains as the ultimate
constituent of apprehension which then provides the material of inference.
Now if, as Cook Wilson has argued above, “apprehension includes knowl-
edge”, it follows that any inference must be a derivative kind of knowledge
as well. In Cook Wilson’s case, inference is based upon experience as its ma-
terial. And that means experience is the ultimate kind of knowledge (insofar
Laird 1972: 120-121 is right in stating two senses of knowledge on Cook Wil-
son’s account of knowledge: “the first of these senses of “knowledge” meaning
the “final and completely evidenced truth” which is inference and the “other
sense of “knowledge” meaning “a fundamental [...] “acquaintance”” [Italics
from Laird]). Because Cook Wilson understands experience as “apprehen-
sion of the nature of the object” (Cook Wilson 1969: 97) which for him is the
essence of truth and the Wilsonian meaning of experience equals in this sense
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Russell’s notion of acquaintance, we can thus conclude finally that apprehen-
sion means something like our notion of direct knowledge in subsection 2.2.3
(see as well Prichard 1950: 89 and Laird 1972: 121). Cook Wilson concludes
then:
Apprehension seems to be a term proper only to those judgements
and experiences which are knowledge. (Cook Wilson 1969: 97)
3.1.3 Cook Wilson’s ‘theory’ of knowledge
Now, after having an idea what kind of thing Cook Wilson’s central notion of
apprehension is about—knowledge that is experience or in my notion direct
knowledge—, we can continue the consideration to explain his account of
knowledge. At first, if Cook Wilson’s central term concerning the nature of
knowledge is his notion of apprehension, and if apprehension is some kind
of direct knowledge, it is clear that his explanation of knowledge must be
necessarily in terms of the MS thesis: apprehension turns out to be some kind
of mental or cognitive activity which is indicated by the term ‘experience’
(see as well Cousin 1935: 255).
But this poses some problem concerning the explanation of knowledge
as a theory of knowledge. We can call this problem, which is a necessary
consequence of the MS thesis, the unanalysability problem of knowledge. To
put it in Passmore’s words, the question of what is knowledge,
is unanswerable, Cook Wilson would reply, if it is a request for a
definition of knowledge. Knowledge is simple, ultimate, indefin-
able; any attempt to define it, or to ‘justify’ it, or to ‘prove that it
is possible’, will inevitably be circular. The most the philosopher
can do is to exemplify it; [...]. (Passmore 1966: 243)
The point Passmore refers to is very simple. Knowledge is indefinable because
“apprehension includes knowledge”. As we have seen, apprehension is a
special kind of mental activity which is characterised by the term experience,
i.e. direct knowledge. But the question of what is experience, in the sense
of giving an explanatory definition, seems to be really an odd one. What
exactly could one answer in order to give a definition of experience?
Maybe one attempt could sound like this: ‘Experience means apprehension
and apprehension is apprehending an object. And apprehending something
means having experienced it. End.’ But this is neither an analysis nor a
convincing definition. It is a mere circular change of words. A non-circular
definition of apprehension seems in no way possible because apprehension is
an ultimate state of mind. One can be in such a state of mind (and you know
47
it, when you are in it), but there is no sufficient explanation available apart
from being in it.
Apprehension indeed is a relation. It cannot happen on its own and in-
dependently of apprehending something. Therefore “mere apprehension is
impossible—it is (1) apprehension (2) of the reality” (Cook Wilson 1969:
808). That is the reason why apprehension cannot be explained without the
notion of apprehending something which is circular. So, ultimate things—
and that is what the term “ultimate” means—are therefore unanalysible
things. The best Cook Wilson can do in the eyes of Morris 1933: 228-229
is to explain apprehension with our customary understanding of the term
apprehension in ordinary language:
[...] it would be disingenuous, I think, to say that we have no
idea what he [Cook Wilson–jk] means at the outset. He can le-
gitimately point out that though we may not be able to define
apprehension, we presumably know what we mean when we use
the term; and if he puts forward an account of it which is con-
sistent with the implications of our ordinary speech, our proper
reply is not that we cannot understand his account because it
does not amount to a definition [...]. [...] Cook Wilson is per-
fectly entitled, [...], to talk about apprehension without defining
it or describing it, and to take it that everybody understands
what he means.
Cook Wilson therefore maintains in a letter to H. A. Prichard:
The theory which is to explain subjective apprehension of the
object cannot, as one could predict, do anything but presuppose
the absolute ultimate fact of apprehension of an object, and so
explain apprehension of the object (unconsciously) as apprehend-
ing another object like it. Obviously neither can apprehension be
explained in terms of the object apprehended, nor the object in
terms of apprehension. In a way the distinction is not only ulti-
mate but of extreme simplicity—nothing can make it clearer than
itself. It is ‘simple’ because we absolutely must always presup-
pose it to know anything. Perhaps most fallacies in the theory of
knowledge are reduced to the primary one of trying to explain the
nature of knowing or apprehending. We cannot construct know-
ing—the act of apprehending—out of any elements. I remem-
ber quite early in my philosophic reflection having an instinctive
aversion to the very expression ‘theory of knowledge’. I felt the
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words themselves suggested a fallacy—an utterly fallacious in-
quiry, though I was not anxious to proclaim [it]. I felt that if we
don’t [know] what knowledge is, we know nothing; there could be
no help for us. [...] It’s no good—knowledge and apprehension
can only be described in terms which already mean knowledge
and apprehension. (Cook Wilson 1969: 803-804) [Italics from
Cook Wilson]
Knowing, therefore, is some kind of activity of the mind and the name of
that activity is apprehension. That means knowing something is the state
of mind in which the activity of apprehension takes place. That’s all we can
analyse about knowledge. To know something, to believe something, to doubt
something etc., even to actually think of anything requires the apprehension
of something at first because some content is needed in order to be able to
do any kind of mental activity. That’s the reason for the ultimate status of
apprehension and Cook Wilson’s claim that knowledge is unanalysable.
But taking this diagnosis about knowledge for granted, what then remains
to search for, if a theory of knowledge means “an utterly fallacious inquiry” in
the eyes of Cook Wilson? If we couldn’t get a positive account—a theory—of
what knowledge is apart from our ordinary understanding of apprehension,
we should try it the other way round. That is an inquiry of what is definitely
not knowledge. And this means for the further consideration an exclusion
of the usual suspects such as opinion, belief and the like concerning the
explanation of knowledge. In other words, what is needed now is a refutation
of the JTB thesis by the Wilsonian account.
Opinion
Why couldn’t opinion be a candidate for being an explanatory term in a
theory of knowledge? If we remember our analysis of knowledge in chapter
two, we already know the answer: opinion is something propositional and
therefore inappropriate to explain knowledge in Cook Wilson’s sense of the
term. But let’s face his arguments in detail.
What is an opinion?
It is characteristic of the cases where we form an opinion that
we noticed a certain quality in the evidence, in virtue of which
we say the evidence known to us is stronger for one alternative
than for the other. We know, that is, that certain facts are in
favour of A’s being B, but either that they do not prove it or that
there are facts against, though not decisively against, A’s being
B. But this estimate is not the opinion. We are affected by it
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so as to form the opinion, yet the opinion is neither the knowing
which constitutes the estimate nor any kind of knowledge. It is
a peculiar thing—the result of the estimate—and we call it by a
peculiar name, opinion. (Cook Wilson 1969: 99)
In other words, an opinion is an expression of an uncertainty whether
some state of affairs has happen or not. The characteristic uncertainty is
a result of insufficient evidence concerning the truth of the state of affairs
we have an opinion of. Opinion therefore expresses that lack of evidence
which would turn our uncertainty whether a state of affairs is true or not
into the knowledge of a fact. Thus having an opinion means: the uncertainty
concerning whether an epistemological state of mind is really true or false.
For, though I am not sure that A is B (and therefore, though
inclined to it as probable, I have not decided), I may decide to
act as if A were B. I may have to make up my mind between
two alternative courses of action and, knowing neither, I may
choose all A is B as the more probable and the one therefore
I shall act upon (although probability is not the sole ground of
such decision). There is then a mental decision, which may be
said to be of all A is B, a practical decision, getting it is true
greater definiteness by the fact that we act upon it, but not the
judgement (or decision) that A is B. (Cook Wilson 1969:100)
[Italics from Cook Wilson–jk]
The point is that someone who opines that a state of affairs is true, i.e.
acts upon as if the state of affairs were true, doesn’t know whether she is
thinking the right thing. So the opining subject is in a lack-of-knowledge
situation in which she couldn’t really decide whether she is right or wrong.
For the opinion that A is B is founded on evidence we know
to be insufficient, whereas it is of the very nature of knowledge
not to take its statements at all on grounds recognized to be
insufficient, nor to come to any decision except that the grounds
are insufficient; for it is here that in the knowing activity we stop.
(Cook Wilson 1969: 99-100)
Because she didn’t have enough evidence about her epistemic object, she is
rather dealing with probabilities which lead her to accept the state of affairs
as if it were true.
But clear enough, this epistemic situation is not a case of knowledge as
we would understand and use this term in ordinary language. Hence opinion
could neither be an explanation nor any kind of explanatory term within a
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theory of knowledge (see as well Morris 1933: 224-227; Prichard 1950: 87-89;
Laird 1972: 113-114; Marion 2000: 309; Travis 2005: 287).
In knowing, we can have nothing to do with the so-called ‘greater
strength’ of evidence on which the opinion is grounded; simply
because we know that this ‘greater strength’ of evidence of A’s
being B is compatible with A’s not being B after all. (Cook
Wilson 1969: 100)
Belief
Now the difference between opinion and belief is merely a gradual one. Belief
seems to be something with “ ‘superior’ certainty” in comparison to opinion
(Cook Wilson 1969: 101). Whereas this “ ‘superior’ certainty” consists in “a
high degree of [...] confidence” and Cook Wilson maintains further,
where it naturally exists, is attached the word belief, and lan-
guage here, as not infrequently, is true to distinctions which have
value in our consciousness. It [belief–jk] is not opinion, it is not
knowledge, it is not properly even judgement. (CookWilson 1969:
101)
Hence, belief seems to be distinguished from opinion through “a high
degree of confidence”. But confidence of what? Better evidence? Did we
have better evidence—“a greater strength of the evidence”—in belief than in
opinion? The answer is: no. The point Cook Wilson is referring to is in fact
a psychological one rather than an epistemological case (see Marion 2000:
312).
This idea of strength involves an illusion. It is only of evidence
which is not sufficient that we use the word ‘strong’ at all. [...]
However strong evidence may be, it is not anything which can
influence reality; yet in that feeling of increased confidence with
increased strength of evidence, we are unconsciously treating it as
if it could. The strength of evidence is merely something for us;
indeed we never speak of the strength of evidence except where we
suppose that it doesn’t prove what is stated, that is when the ev-
idence is not sufficient. [...] We know, that is, that the existence
of the facts which constitute the evidence is not something physi-
cally stronger which overpowers the sets of facts constituting the
weaker evidence on the other side, and so necessitating A’s being
B; yet in opinion and belief, we at least behave as if this were
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so and that, although the strongest cases of circumstantial evi-
dence get refuted by the facts. The illusion is almost irresistible
and is the rule, not the exception, [...] in any department where
probable reasoning is found. This fallacy is often illustrated in
the treatment of probability by its mathematical measure, and in
argument from statistic.
The illusion is reflected in language and subserved thereby.
Thus we say A is probably B, where the adverb which refers solely
to our subjective inclination is made to qualify grammatically the
verb of objective existence. (Cook Wilson 1969: 103-104) [Italics
from Cook Wilson]
This means the difference concerning opinion and belief is not an epistem-
ical one—a greater strength of evidence—not even an objective matter: in
fact, in belief we want something to be true because of our personal interest
in the subject matter of our belief. This in fact is the characteristic quality of
belief in contrast to opinion. ‘I believe the Lord above exists because I don’t
want to rot in hell.’ Or, ‘I believe I am going to win next Saturday’s lottery
because I want to be a millionaire’. Or, ‘I believe the girl next door wants to
marry me because I am in love with her’ etc. The decision to believe some-
thing instead of opining it is “a decision of the will” as CookWilson 1969: 103
wrote and is therefore unwarranted by any kind of (epistemological) facts.
For, as Cook Wilson further concludes:
We have further a certain degree of the feeling of confidence (an
ultimate and irreducible feeling) about A’s being B, depending
on our estimate of the evidence and frequently influenced by our
wishes or fears. In consequence of this, we risk a decision, not
intellectual, but practical, by resolving to act in a certain case as
if A were B. (Cook Wilson 1969: 102) [Italics from Cook Wilson]
Having seen that opinion is the intellectual decision as if a state of affairs
were true, and seeing now that belief is the practical “decision of the will
influenced by our wishes or fears” as if a state of affairs were true, we couldn’t
be surprised any more about Cook Wilson’s refutation of belief (and opinion)
as explanatory terms of knowledge like the JTB thesis declares it is.
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Consequences for Cook Wilson’s account of knowledge
Neglecting opinion and belief as explanatory terms of knowledge, what still
remains instead of them as some account of knowledge? It is merely the act
of apprehension itself. But what does that notion exactly mean concerning
the nature of knowledge?
Indeed Cook Wilson’s answer is ambiguous. All that he maintains (aside
from the explanation of apprehension we already have given in subsection
3.1.2) is that one knows if one is in a knowledge state of mind (Cook Wilson
1969: 107; see as well Prichard 1950: 88-89 or Travis 2005: 287). And the
reason for that knowing that oneself knows, as Prichard 1950: 89 explaining
Cook Wilson notes, is its directness:
When knowing, for example, that the noise we are hearing is
loud, we do or can know that we are knowing this and cannot be
mistaken [...]. The knowledge, however, is [...] direct; we do not
know, for example that our state is one of knowing that the noise
we hear is loud indirectly; [...]; we know directly that it is of the
sort which knowing is; [...].
As we have seen in subsection 3.1.2, apprehension means direct knowledge
and direct knowledge is characterised by being in the first person point of
view. And being in the first person point of view is the proper reason why
an epistemic subject “does or can know that” she is in the knowing process.
But
the phrase ‘know that we know’ may again mislead, because
it rather tends to imply that we could conduct a process, for
instance proving that A is B, and then decide otherwise that
it was a knowing process. But the decision itself would be a
knowing process and so we should get into an unending series of
knowings. Moreover if we could so decide, in a new attitude of
thought, about the given process, we should not decide that A is
B until this second process and this second decision, namely the
decision that the process of arriving at ‘A is B’ was a knowing
process, had taken place.
But in the first process, just because it is a knowing process
(by hypothesis), we have already decided that A is B; indeed, it is
by this process alone that we can so decide and not by any deci-
sion about the process itself. The consciousness that the knowing
process is a knowing process must be contained within the know-
ing process itself. (Cook Wilson 1969: 107)
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So knowing that oneself is in a knowing process is not a question of a
further external justification process with which the epistemic subject would
prove whether she is in a knowing process or not (a major point in which
Cook Wilson’s account of the MS thesis differs from the contemporary ac-
count of Williamson 2001 which is explicit an externalist approach). For this
would cause an infinite regress in the knowing process with the result that no
one at all would know whether oneself is in a knowing process which seems
ridiculous. That means as Travis 2005: 287 correctly maintains:
If there were such a condition, or frame, of mind—one which
itself might or might not count as knowing, depending on further
factors—then knowing would not as such involve recognition that
those further factors were present. That is how things are on so-
called ‘externalist’ accounts of knowledge. So it is part of the
view here that no form of externalism is correct.
But if there is no external justification concerning the fact that oneself can
correctly decide that she is in a knowing process, what kind of “factor”, as
Travis would say, can then guarantee the certainty of being in a knowing
process?
Cook Wilson’s ambiguous notion that “indeed, it is by this process alone
that we can so decide and not by any decision about the process itself” and
his resume that “[t]he consciousness that the knowing process is a knowing
process must be contained within the knowing process itself” doesn’t explain
what is really going on instead. This problem of ambiguity in Cook Wilson’s
point of view is enforced by a further notion of his that it is a
fallacy that there could be a general criterion of knowledge by
which we should know what was knowing and what was not.
(Cook Wilson 1969: 107)
But our notion of direct knowledge and its mode of being in the first
person point of view explicated in chapter 2 and accordingly in subsection
2.3 is an appropriate account, I think, to solve Cook Wilson’s ambiguity in
this point and an appropriate approach of the phenomenon which is meant
by Cook Wilson’s notion that the “knowing process must be contained within
the knowing process itself”. And this is the reason why it is true that
[k]nowing is absolutely different from what is called indifferently
believing or being convinced or being persuaded or having an
opinion or thinking, in the sense in which we oppose thinking to
knowing, as when we say ‘I think so but I am not sure’. (Prichard
1950: 87)
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The consciousness of absolute certainty in the knowing process in contrast
to the lack of it in opinion and belief is due to the quality of directness in
knowing something which leaves no room for epistemic doubts and even its
possibility (remember my notion of fallible knowledge in section 2.4; because
opinion and belief are aﬄicted with uncertainty, every account of knowledge
which is based upon them as explanatory terms means the incorporation of
fallible knowledge and that leads with necessity in the end to Gettier cases).
The epistemic doubtlessness of the first person point of view leads us
straight to a further major point of Cook Wilson’s account of knowledge:
“the idea that knowledge is unmistakable” (Travis 2005: 288, see as well
Prichard 1950):
if N knows that p, then what he sees as to whether p leaves no
possibility (for him) that p is not so. To see enough of how things
are to qualify as knowing that p, one must see no less than p itself.
(Travis 2005: 288)
Of course, the unmistakability claim of knowledge is a necessary corollary of
Cook Wilson’s notion that the “knowing process must be contained within
the knowing process itself”. Because, if it is true that unquestionably the
epistemic subject knows that she is in a knowing process when this know-
ing process really happens to her through the special quality of the process
itself—i.e. its directness or being in the first person point of view—, then
she cannot be wrong about knowing that something.
But in this context Cook Wilson discusses an example which leaves, at
least, some room for doubt that his unmistakability claim of knowledge is
true, as for the epistemic subject in a given epistemic situation a knowing
process and other mental processes such as belief or opinion and the like
appear to be necessarily connected, Wilson’s claim of a clear and distinct
distuinguishability of these processes seems contradictory.
Now, consider the following everyday situation:
For example, we see at a little distance a person whom ‘we mis-
take for an acquaintance’ and without hesitation perform some
act which it would be a liberty to take with any one but an ac-
quaintance, do something in fact which we rightly say we should
not have done if we had ever suspected he was not an acquain-
tance. We did not act on an opinion that it was our friend; for, in
forming an opinion, we are aware that the evidence is sufficient
and, if we had thought that, we should never have done the act.
It seems more like belief; but, if we had consciously made it a
matter of belief, we should have distinguished it from knowledge,
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and then again, ex hypothesi, we should not have done the act.
Probably one answer offered would be that, though we didn’t
know, we thought we knew. But this will not suffice. Apart
from the criticism we have already passed on this phrase itself,
if we really thought we knew, we must have reflected and must
have thought the evidence conclusive, whereas, ex hypothesi, any
reflection shows it could not be conclusive.
For the kind of consciousness we are contemplating, a mo-
mentous practical decision is not necessary, but we take the case
where there is such, because it serves to bring out the essential
feature, the absence of any sense of uncertainty or doubt, the ac-
tion being one which would not be done if we felt the slightest
uncertainty. (Cook Wilson 1969: 109-110)
Cook Wilson then runs through the possible consequences of his example
and concludes: the epistemic subject in the example (i) couldn’t be in a
knowledge state of mind, because ex hypothesi knowledge is unmistakable,
and (ii) because there was no residue of uncertainty in the state of mind
of the epistemic subject belief and opinion either, it couldn’t explain the
mistake that occurred.
The truth is, as will be admitted, that in the given case, when I
perceive the familiar characteristics of my friend, it never ‘enters
into my head’ that they could belong to any one else. I don’t
think about that at all, and so the process of judgement, belief,
and opinion are impossible. (Cook Wilson 1969: 110)
But if such situations in which ‘fallacious certainty’ could take place are
indeed possible, two questions arise: (i) what kind of state of mind is this, if
it is neither knowledge nor belief or opinion? And (ii) in which way could an
epistemic subject be able to distinguish between the fallacious certainty state
of mind which causes mistake and the knowledge state of mind, if there is any
such distinction available? If the latter question couldn’t be answered pos-
itively, then Cook Wilson’s previous two theses—the unmistakability thesis
and its companion, the knowing to be in a knowing process thesis—seem to
be false. And this means that his apprehension account of knowledge would
be in some of its major parts not conclusive at all.
Now, Cook Wilson’s answer to the first question is “a special and distinct
usage of ordinary speech, ‘We are under the impression that [...]’ ” (Cook
Wilson 1969:113).
This is perhaps the one of the ordinary non-philosophic answers
which is most adequate, for it seems chosen from a feeling that
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the ordinary activity of thought was not there: the metaphorical
word ‘impression’ being used to suggest a certain passivity and
helplessness. (Cook Wilson 1969: 113)
That means, the state of mind we are trying to recognise here regarding
an answer to question (i) is something Cook Wilson calls “being under the
impression that”. And the reason why it is not in any way alike belief or
opinion or even knowledge is its absence of thinking which is indicated by the
term “impression” and characterised by the passivity of the conscious mind
while it happens: there is a feeling happening unwarranted by any reason or
fact (see as well Marion 2000: 314).
Perception, then, and judgement, apprehension, opinion and be-
lief, seem all alike excluded. It is true that, if asked, we might say
‘I thought it was my friend’—‘I believed it was my friend’—‘I was
sure it was my friend’, but these expressions are all inaccurate.
(Cook Wilson 1969: 110)
In the above discussion concerning belief we have argued that the charac-
teristic aspect which separates belief from opinion was the fact that in belief
we want something to be the case. In other words, in belief the epistemic
subject has unwarranted confidence in the evidence underlying the believed
something. In the case of “being under the impression that” this aspect of
having confidence, even though unwarranted, in existing evidence is lacking
at all. The only thing that remains in the “being under the impression that”
state of mind is now an unwarranted confidence in the existence of a special
state of affairs. Or to put the same thing in a different manner, if “I perceive
the familiar characteristics of my friend”, to recall Cook Wilson’s example
again, I want to see in the physiognomy of the stranger in front of me the
physiognomy of my friend. And because I want that to happen now—maybe
because I would like to meet him again after so many years—“it never ‘enters
into my head’ that [those characteristics] could belong to any one else”. And
“it never ‘enters into my head’ ” because the coincidence of the situation—
my wanting to see my friend and my seeing some characteristics of him in
front of me—switches off the epistemic carefulness of deliberation on evidence
which means thinking in general in favour of a desired imagination which is
“being under the impression that” this guy is the friend of mine. So we can
say “being under the impression that” means creating an imagination on the
basis of an unwarranted confidence which is supplied by an existing desire
and not by evidence as in the case of belief.
Now, to answer the second question, if we take a look at the epistemo-
logical sequence from apprehension to “being under the impression that” we
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can say that the last one is no epistemological state of mind at all. But,
and that is a real problem for Cook Wilson’s account, it feels as if it were
some! And hence, there seems to be no possibility for the epistemic subject
to know whether she is in a knowledge state of mind or in a “being under
the impression that” state of mind which is indeed unsatisfactory. For the
latter is aﬄicted with error.
But this consequence contradicts Cook Wilson’s thesis of a clear and dis-
tinct distinguishability of the knowing process from other mental processes.
Or to put it with Marion 2000: 314:
It [“being under the impression that”–jk] is a form of conscious-
ness which is undistinguishable from knowledge—so it is neither
judgement nor belief nor opinion—but it leaves room for error.
There is, however, an obvious difficulty with this further position:
what guarantees then that all cases of knowledge are not really
cases of ‘being under the impression that’?
Marion’s question, indeed, is worthwhile to be asked. But is it also a real
pitfall for the consistency of Cook Wilson’s account of knowledge? I don’t
think so. Because if we take a closer look at the argument in question here, it
turns out to be a mere psychological rather than a (epistemo)logical problem.
For, this argument shows indeed that it could be very difficult for an epistemic
subject to distinguish between real apprehension and the fallacious certainty
of “being under the impression that” because the latter feels as if it were an
apprehension. But does it show as well that an epistemic subject therefore
would never be able to distinguish both states of mind?—The answer is
definitely no.
The fact or the mere possibility that two states of mind look as if they
feel alike (or even they would really feel alike, whatever “feels alike” exactly
means) could never be an argument to show a logical (!) impossibility to dis-
tinguish between them successfully. In order to avoid the inappropriateness
of such an impossibility argument, Cook Wilson has left a backdoor open:
for willing and desiring, [...] are not thinking. (Cook Wilson
1969: 38)
As we have seen above “being under the impression that” means creating
an imagination on the basis of an unwarranted confidence which is supplied
by an existing desire. So, this state of mind is in fact a matter of desire
which means for Cook Wilson that it could therefore not be a part of the
area of thinking. Within the area of thinking only reality and not imagina-
tion is the matter of consciousness. Thus, if an epistemic subject learned to
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desist from her desires in cases of epistemological matters or detected them
when happening—which is neither unthinkable nor does it entail any logical
impossibilities—no problems of indiscernability between those two states of
mind—apprehension and “being under the impression that”—could happen.
If someone is able to reflect rationally on her desires, I don’t see any problems
in distinguishing apprehension from “being under the impression that” suc-
cessfully. (However, in fact, I don’t think that an epistemological state really
could feel the same as a state of desire. Everyone knows how a state of desire
feels like. But who knows—and could explain—how an epistemological state
feels like?—How does it feel to know that it is raining? Maybe “to feel” is
the wrong word, but what could be an appropriate one?)
But there is a second and more precise refutation available, too. A case
Austin 1962b noticed in his Sense and Sensibilia: his refutation of the “ar-
gument from illusion” introduced by Ayer and others in order to justify
“sense-data” as the real objects of our perceptions because “at least [some]
of our perceptions are delusive” (Austin 1962b: 20-32). Austin argues here
that “the argument trades on confusion at just this point” that “illusion and
delusion are the same thing” (Austin 1962b: 22). But there is an important
difference between them. So it would be a fallacy to conclude that the delu-
sions of an epistemic subject are the effects of an occurring illusion which
means confusing two different things.
An illusion is an ‘optical disorder’ everyone is able to see; i.e. perceiving
some (real) existing thing in a nonfactual way. ‘Perceiving some (real) exist-
ing thing in a nonfactual way’ means, those perceptions which do not reflect
the perceived thing in the way it really is, like
two lines of equal length, one is made to look longer than the
other. [...] illusions produced by professional ‘illusionists’, conju-
rors—for instance the Headless Woman on the stage, who is made
to look headless, or the ventriloquist’s dummy which is made to
appear to be talking. (Austin 1962b: 22/23)
In other words, illusions are nonfactual perceptions of real occurrences.
Delusions, on the other hand, are something altogether differ-
ent from this. Typical cases would be delusions of persecution,
delusions of grandeur. These are primarily a matter of grossly
disordered beliefs (and so, probably, behaviour) and may well
have nothing in particular to do with perception. (Austin 1962b:
23)
In other words, a delusion is some kind of mental disorder, like seeing pink
rats on the wall. Here, no factual perception of any kind of real existing
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thing takes place, rather some kind of ‘imagination’ or in more serious cases
a ‘crazy fantasy’.
Austin concludes therefore, that
[t]he most important differences here are that the term ‘an illu-
sion’ (in a perceptual context) does not suggest that something
totally unreal is conjured up [...]; whereas the term ‘delusion’ does
suggest something totally unreal, not really there at all. [Italics
from Austin] (Austin 1962b: 23)
Now, let’s turn back to our problem of “being under the impression that”
and remember that we have characterized this state of mind as creating an
imagination on the basis of an unwarranted confidence which is supplied by
an existing desire. So, taking Austin’s differentiation of illusion—a real but
nonfactual perception—from delusion—an unreal imagination—for granted,
then it seems clear to me that “being under the impression that” is a case
of delusion rather than of illusion. And if this is true then “being under the
impression that” as a mental state has no epistemological warranty, because
as a ‘delusive imagination’ it is not a case of a real perception of an existing
thing. If someone is in such a “being under the impression that” state of mind
there is no problem going on with her perception concerning the being there
of a real thing which would in fact mean an epistemic lack. Here there is no
epistemic problem happening (just a “behaviour”, as Austin maintains), but
a problem concerning the self of the subject which means that the subject
imagines the reality of those things she merely believes to perceive.
Thus, that an epistemic subject could be sometimes in the mental state of
“being under the impression that” means no indiscernability between those
two states of mind—apprehension and “being under the impression that”—
like there is no indiscernability between illusion and delusion. For apprehen-
sion is an epistemological state of mind whereas “being under the impression
that” is a psycho-pathological one.
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3.1.4 Some criticism’s
Of course, the main point of criticism concerning Cook Wilson’s account of
knowledge is directed to his indefinability thesis of knowledge (see Cousin
1935 or Laird 1972). Indeed, an understandable point of view particularly
with regard to various attempts of a definition of knowledge through the
whole history of philosophy from Plato to Gettier.
Laird 1972: 117-121 for instance focuses in his criticism on the subject
of the meaning of the term “indefinability”. If knowledge is indefinable at
all, what exactly does such a statement mean? In what way is knowledge an
indefinable something? In order to answer that question, Laird distinguishes
between three meanings of “indefinable”:
1. “Firstly, then, when anything is said to be indefinable, what may be
meant is only that the distinctive features of the thing in question
cannot be made characteristically manifest in terms of anything else.”
(Laird 1972: 117) [Italics from Laird–jk]
2. “Hence, secondly, [...] what is indefinable is, quite precisely, what is
unanalysable, definition being understood to mean the resolution of a
complex notion into its simple notional elements.” (Laird 1972: 118)
3. “What Cook Wilson explicitly maintained, then, was that what are fre-
quently called the various “modes of cognition” were improperly called
so, because this way of speaking implied that cognition is a unity spec-
ified in various “modes” according to a single intelligible principle, just
as closed rectilinear figures may be subdivided into three-sided, and so
forth, or again into regular and irregular. [...] Per contra, according
to Cook Wilson, a merely general term like “cognition” makes no such
demand, and, if it did, would demand what could not conceivably be
fulfilled.” (Laird 1972: 119-120)
To turn to Laird’s first notion, in this sense “indefinable” means the im-
possibility of giving an explanation of knowledge without committing a tau-
tology. As we have seen above, there is no other phenomenon available apart
from apprehension, of course, to explain knowledge. But with regard to Cook
Wilson, apprehension is knowledge. Hence, if the explanans “apprehension”
entails its explanandum “knowledge”, knowledge is indefinable. We cannot
explain knowledge “in terms of anything else”; we need an experience of it
in order to understand what knowledge is about. But given this version of
Cook Wilson’s indefinability thesis
[...] it does not immediately follow that those who have had such
experience do know what knowing is; and no conclusion follows
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concerning the important question whether knowledge is or is not
“ultimate” and is or is not “analyzable.” All that follows is that
there is something unique and quite distinctive in the specific
experience called knowing. (Laird 1972: 118) [Italics from Laird–
jk]
In other words, is having an experience of something equivalent with knowing
what that something is? And the answer is apparently no. As experience is
a matter of degree, the questions of intensity and frequency of an experience
arises. How many experiences of a given phenomenon must one have in order
to ensure a knowledge of that phenomenon? One time, ten times or at least a
hundred times? And what degree of intensity must the experience of a given
phenomenon have in order to ensure a knowledge of that phenomenon? A
lower or a high one?
Because there is so much vagueness in experience as epistemological cat-
egory, Laird concludes that even if we cannot explain knowledge “in terms
of anything else”, this could not be a convincing reason to argue the inde-
finability thesis of knowledge. Therefore, Cook Wilson’s indefinability thesis
could not be taken in this first sense of indefinability.
While the first sense of “indefinable” has to do with the phenomenological
side of knowledge, the second sense of “indefinable” refers to the logical side
of the concept of knowledge. “Indefinable” here means the impossibility of
analysing knowledge as a species of another concept such as belief or opinion
and the like. But,
[i]n this second sense of “indefinable,” it would appear that
Cook Wilson held that knowledge, and even apprehension, were
not completely unanalysable. For up to a point he did analyse
them. They are instances, he said, of consciousness, or (perhaps
we might say) of awareness. (Laird 1972: 118) [Italics from Laird–
jk]
The possibility of a certain degree of analysis, however, seems
quite beyond dispute. (Laird 1972: 119)
To put it briefly, it would be self-contradictory if we understood the second
sense of “indefinable” in a strict sense of unanalysability of knowledge. In-
deed, Cook Wilson gave us an analysis of knowledge as a mental state distinct
from other states of mind such as belief or opinion. But even though Cook
Wilson did some analysis of knowledge, the question arises: what is such an
‘analysis’—a “little more than a broad and sweeping classification” (Laird
1972: 119)—worth of?
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The answer to this question seems plainly to be that, directly,
we could learn very little. (Laird 1972: 119)
[...] the negative “unanalyzable” could only be known and
recognized to be what it is if we already possessed positive insight
into the nature of what, verbally, is described by negation. (Laird
1972: 119)
This means, having only a negative access to knowledge—an analysis ex
negativo, we know what knowledge is definitely not: belief, opinion and the
like—requires some positive insight of it, too: there is some material the
inquiry is based on and from which we infer a positive statement about the
nature of knowledge, for instance that knowledge is apprehension.
Thus, the second sense of “indefinable” cannot be understood in a strict
negative sense either.
Finally, the third sense of “indefinable” means the empirical fallacy (and
as a necessary result of this an improper mode of speaking) that all kinds of
cognition such as knowing, opining, believing, wondering, taking for granted
and so on and so forth would share some common feature. And therefore
knowledge could be understood in terms of that common feature with which
then one could give a definition of knowledge.
Nevertheless, it seems, in the end, to be most doubtful whether
this reasoned argument concerning the indefinability of knowl-
edge does actually enable every candid observer to discover what
knowledge essentially is. Moreover, it seems clear that the term
“knowledge” in Cook Wilson’s pages is employed in two senses
which appear to be and (I think) really are essentially distinct.
For he seems to speak of “knowledge” both of something differ-
ent from “thinking” or wondering or believing, and as something
presupposed in the very foundations of all “thinking,” judging,
wondering, and believing. (Laird 1972: 120) [Italics from Laird]
Now, the point Laird considers here is that even if Cook Wilson’s argument in
favour of the third version of his indefinability thesis is true, i.e. the empirical
fallacy that all kinds of cognition must have something in common which
would explain them, this argument would not necessitate his conclusion of
the indefinability of knowledge in general. For, as Laird argues, Cook Wilson
doesn’t use the term “knowledge” in every utterance of it equivalent.
In fact there are two ways of using the term “knowledge” in Cook Wilson’s
approach: (i) “evidenced truth” and (ii) the meaning of apprehension.
In the first of these senses of “knowledge” we deal with the
discernment of final and completely evidenced truth. Indeed,
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when we speak (in this sense) of our knowledge of principles or
even of our “knowledge” of matter of fact, we are speaking of
something that is known to be capable of withstanding critical
assault; [...]. (Laird 1972: 121)
In Cook Wilson’s other sense of “knowledge,” however, we are
dealing with a fundamental “apprehension” or “acquaintance”
[...]. (Laird 1972: 121) [Italics from Laird]
Taking Laird’s last notion for granted—there is an occurrence of those
two senses of “knowledge” in Cook Wilson’s notion—why should this cause
a problem for his indefinability thesis of knowledge? Laird’s first argument
is: the most of our knowledge isn’t as such—evidenced truth and therefore
it would surely be preposterous to maintain that all, or even
very many, of our beliefs, questions, and opinions are based upon
“knowledge” of this type, even according to the extreme hypoth-
esis that some or all of these beliefs, questions and opinions are
tinged or affected by such “knowledge.” (Laird 1972: 121)
But, the question must be allowed, where in his approach does Cook Wilson
use “knowledge” as equivalent to “evidenced truth”? Laird himself gives
neither a quote nor a reference which would show an “evidenced truth” of
his claim concerning that first sense of “knowledge”.
Further, as we have seen above, “evidence” is a term that takes place only
in belief or opinion. Because evidence is needed to eliminate doubts and
doubts are the characteristic features of belief and opinion; not of knowl-
edge. Second, if Cook Wilson talks about truth in reference to knowledge
he doesn’t mean “evidenced truth”. Cook Wilson rather talks about the
“essence of a thing” (Cook Wilson 1969; Prichard 1950) as the truth hap-
pening in knowledge which is not equivalent to “evidenced truth”. So we can
conclude that there is no sense of knowledge in Cook Wilson’s approach that
corresponds to Laird’s “evidence truth” sense of knowledge.
Concerning the second sense of knowledge—apprehension—we know from
the above said that Laird is claiming that this is the sense of knowledge
Cook Wilson is concerned with. But the question remains: why is this sense
of knowledge so problematic in reference to the indefinability thesis? And
Laird’s answer is that he has shown in a preceding paragraph
that any such “apprehension” was not, in any ordinary sense,
“knowledge,” although it might be a necessary part of the foun-
dation of much that is “knowledge” and also of much that is not
“knowledge.” (Laird 1972: 121)
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Laird’s argument there goes as follows:
[...] it is plain that presentation [apprehension is meant—
jk] [...] must be different from knowledge (as understood in any
ordinary sense). For anything known is known to be true; and
presentation is neither true nor false, in the sense of truth accord-
ing to which we may know a proposition to be true. (Laird 1972:
112)
Accordingly, if knowledge must be true, the kind of apprehen-
sion, or acquaintance [...] that is here referred to, can not strictly
be knowledge. (Laird 1972: 112) [Italics by Laird]
If we take a quick look at Laird’s argument as it is presented here, it is con-
spicuous that his whole argument rests, first, on the unwarranted assertion
that “it is plain that presentation must be different from knowledge (as un-
derstood in any ordinary sense)”. Why should that be “plain”? “Plain” to
whom—to philosophers? And what is the “ordinary sense” of knowledge?—
“The sense of truth according to which we may know a proposition to be
true”, really? Laird doesn’t give an argument in favour of his claimed differ-
ence between knowledge and acquaintance.
Second, of course, Laird is right in claiming that “if knowledge must be
true, the kind of apprehension, or acquaintance that is here referred to, can-
not strictly be knowledge”. But why must knowledge be true? As we have
seen in the second chapter, there is indeed no necessity at all to believe that
this is true, and we have elaborated there some arguments against the cor-
rectness of such a notion. And again, there is an argument missing in Laird’s
claim. He only asserts that it must be so. But again, why? And as well as
in Laird’s argument concerning the assumed first sense of knowledge, Laird’s
argument concerning the acquaintance sense of knowledge is not conclusive
and hence must be rejected, too.
Now, we are turning to some other kind of criticism which D.R. Cousin
has given in his 1935 paper Some doubts about knowledge. There he argues
against Cook Wilson’s central claim—the existence of apprehension as an
appropriate approach to understand what kind of thing knowledge is—that
there is no direct knowledge existing in the sense of “direct presence to the
mind” (Cousin 1935: 272), because such a Wilsonian notion would belong “to
the pre-analytic, generalizing level of philosophical reflection” (Cousin 1935:
272). In other words, Cook Wilson’s approach of knowledge lacks being a
proper philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of knowledge at all.
His argument runs as follows:
I have tried to show that the term “knowledge” is used in two
different senses. In one of these senses what is meant is that
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something is certainly true, i.e., we are not mistaken about it;
while in the other all that is meant is that something is present to
the mind, i.e., we are not sheerly ignorant of it. I have maintained
that certainty consists in the tautology of propositions, and not in
the presence to the mind, however direct, of facts or particulars.
(Cousin 1935: 272).
Now, if we undertake a quick examination of Cousin’s quote, we see that
the first part of his claim against Cook Wilson’s approach of knowledge is
a notion we have already discussed in Laird’s criticism above: the popular
thesis that knowledge must be ‘true’ in some way. And as we have seen in
the case of Laird, there is no conclusive reason why one should accept this
as a successful objection against Cook Wilson.
Thus, putting this point aside, we can turn to Cousin’s central conclusion
“that certainty consists in the tautology of propositions, and not in the pres-
ence to the mind, however direct, of facts or particulars” - is that really true?
Note that because of the unsuccessful ‘knowledge-includes-truth’ objection
Cousin’s use of “certainty” here couldn’t mean “truth” in what sense so ever!
In favour of his notion Cousin argues,
that the kind of knowledge which is infallible involves propositions
which are (a) present to the mind and (b) certain. And their
being present to the mind is not the same as their being certain.
(Cousin 1935: 261)
He continues then with an examination “wherein the certainty of a proposi-
tion consists” (Cousin 1935: 261) and concludes supported by “the tradition”
and without any further argument that being certain means being tautolo-
gous (Cousin 1935: 262). Then he asked “whether there really is any other
certainty” in the sense of “certainty which is intuitive” (Cousin 1935: 262).
And Cousin
agree[s] that if they [facts or propositions—jk] are certain at all,
their certainty is not analytic or tautologous, but intuitive. That
means, I take it, that the truth of the proposition is guaranteed,
not by something belonging to it as a proposition, but by the
presence in the mind of the person propounding it of the intuitive
apprehension of some fact or particular. (Cousin 1935: 263)
Thus, he takes it for granted—“in general” and without any references—that
by a “fact” it is meant “the manifestation in a particular of a universal, or
the realization of a universal in a particular” (Cousin 1935: 264). If that is
the meaning of “fact” in general, he continues, and we are searching for the
possibility of “the intuitive certainty” of those facts,
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it seems to me that its being as a fact isolated from or within the
continuous process (or whatever it may be) which is the universe
is simply the reflection or projection of the act by which we “ap-
prehend” it. And I cannot see that this act of apprehension is
either metaphysically or psychologically possible apart from the
act of judgement which Bradley rightly insisted on—an act of
symbolic reference. (Cousin 1935: 264)
In other words, what we may call “intuitive certainty of a fact” or the Wilso-
nian “apprehension” is not the apprehension of the being-there of some occur-
rence itself but only the identification of the mental process of apprehension:
we simply recognize that we have an apprehension at a given moment. And
this act of apprehension takes place necessarily in a propositional way—as
“symbolic reference”.
So, Cousin’s objection against Cook Wilson is that apprehension doesn’t
really describe the confirmation of the existence of a fact or particular as the
meaning of direct knowledge seems to imply, but the certainty that a process
or act of apprehension has taken place just now which is a much weaker
position than Cook Wilson has in mind with his approach. Furthermore,
Cousin argues that apprehension proper is only possible in propositional
terms. So that, even if the term apprehension is a proper access to knowledge,
knowledge is (i) necessarily propositional and (ii) apprehension is not an
unanalysable state of mind but could be analysed in terms of propositions.
Hence, Cousin
conclude[s], then, that intuitive certainty of synthetic propo-
sitions does not exist. There is certainty, but it is confined within
the limits of tautology. Beyond these limits, where thought first
becomes fruitful in association with action, there is no certainty,
but only a probability governed by the criterion of coherence.
Further, certainty has nothing to do with presence to the
mind, however direct. The things which can be certain are all
acts of symbolic reference, and these are not intuitive. There is,
in fact, no intuition of facts, but, if at all, only of particulars.
(Cousin 1935: 264)
Now, Laird’s objection against Cook Wilson’s approach was not really
a successful undertaking, as we have seen above; and what about Cousin’s
attempt? Could he strike Cook Wilson’s ‘analysis’ of knowledge as appre-
hension? In fact, I have to maintain that his reasons are really weak and in
no way conclusive as a striking objection should be.
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First, Cousin’s understanding of “fact in general”—“the manifestation in
a particular of a universal, or the realization of a universal in a particular”—
lacks any references. From whom did Mr. Cousin borrow this general mean-
ing of “fact”? From Cook Wilson himself? I don’t think so. As we have
seen above in subsection 3.1.2, Cook Wilson never talked about facts in con-
junction with apprehension, especially not of facts in Cousin’s sense, but of
particulars. For direct knowledge, as we have pointed out above, is the appre-
hension of a concrete thing and not of “the manifestation in a particular of a
universal, or the realization of a universal in a particular”. Whereas Cousin’s
stating his conclusion seems to have no fundamental objections against “the
intuitive certainty of particulars”, if there is no misinterpretation of mine in
his notion that “there is, in fact, no intuition of facts, but, if at all, only of
particulars”. There is no such statement in Cook Wilson’s argument. Hence,
the stated ambiguity (Cousin 1935: 256) here happens on Cousin’s side and
couldn’t be declared as a fallacy within Cook Wilson’s approach of appre-
hension. And because Cousin has agreed with the existence of “intuitive
certainty” as a non-tautologous certainty, we can conclude that there is no
convincing objection against the possibility of the apprehension of particulars
as Cook Wilson understands them.
Second, Cousin argues further that given his meaning of “fact in general”
it “seems” to him that then Cook Wilson’s term apprehension cannot mean
the direct knowledge of the being-there of an occurrence but only the iden-
tification of the mental act of apprehension being there. And, yes, maybe
Cousin is right here in arguing so. But again, as we have seen in the last
paragraph, there really is no meaning such as that of “fact in general” in
Cook Wilson’s argument! And if there is no such meaning of “fact in gen-
eral” in Cook Wilson’s notion, then there are no reasons given in favour of
that objection. If there are no such reasons existing, it couldn’t be true that
it seems as if “apprehension” doesn’t mean apprehension in the Wilsonian
sense of the word.
And lastly, if there is no such objection, there are no reasons either for
Cousin not to see the possibility of apprehension “apart from symbolic ref-
erence”. Why should the notion of direct knowledge necessarily require a
propositional representation at all? Here too, Cousin doesn’t really offer us
any kind of argument in order to support his objection without a vague “I
cannot see” statement. But what could such an impossibility to see the non-
propositional nature of apprehension substantiate? Cousin didn’t have any
satisfying answer in favour of that.
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3.1.5 Conclusion
After having discussed Cook Wilson’s approach of knowledge, what should
we conclude from the discussion concerning a positive account of the MS
thesis as an (appropriate) account of knowledge? A quick summary of the
results concerning the Wilsonian conception of knowledge might help to draw
the necessary conclusions.
At first we have discussed Cook Wilson’s central term—apprehension—
concerning the nature of knowledge. And we have seen that Cook Wilson’s
notion of apprehension equals our notion of direct knowledge in subsection
2.2.3. So we can conclude as a result that the Wilsonian apprehension could
be explained in terms of the direct knowledge and therefore the nature of
knowledge is direct knowledge.
Second, because apprehension as the nature of knowledge is an ultimate—
thus unanalysable and fundamental—category in the Wilsonian approach, it
was necessary to do some kind of ‘negative definition’ of knowledge. That
is an explanation why knowledge neither entails opinion nor belief as its
conditio sine qua non as it is maintained in the JTB thesis. The result
of this analysis of the JTB thesis was that (i) opinion is the intellectual
decision as if a state of affairs were true. Thus opinion expresses a lack of
evidence concerning the truth of a given state of affairs so that the epistemic
subject is rather dealing with probabilities which is not having knowledge.
(ii) Belief, on the contrary, couldn’t constitute knowledge either. Although
it differs from opinion by “a high degree of confidence”, this “high degree
of confidence” is not of more or even better evidence. It’s the “decision
of the will influenced by our wishes or fears” as if a state of affairs were
true. And this means the “high degree of confidence” is that of behaviour
and doesn’t refer to any epistemic reasons. Hence neither belief nor opinion
could be a reasonable constituent of knowledge. As a result, we can therefore
conclude: the JTB thesis is an inappropriate analysis of knowledge, there is
no constituent of knowledge so that we can analyse knowledge in terms of
other, more fundamental constituents.
Third, the discussion of some criticisms concerning the Wilsonian con-
ception of knowledge has shown that neither the objections of Laird, nor
the objection of Cousin were in any case convincing objections against Cook
Wilson’s view of apprehension. We have seen also that the existence of a
state of mind such as ‘being under the impression that’, which seems at
first glance to resemble the knowledge state of mind but constitutes error,
is not an objection against Cook Wilson’s apprehension view of knowledge,
because it is not a proper epistemological state of mind at all. For ‘being
under the impression that’ means creating an imagination on the basis of an
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unwarranted confidence which is supplied by an existing desire and therefore
consists in having a delusion. But having a delusion is some kind of mental
disorder and thus no epistemological state of mind.
Given the results of the present chapter, we can conclude that Cook Wil-
son’s apprehension account of knowledge is a consistent approach of knowl-
edge which shows with its concise analysis of opinion and belief the failure
of the JTB thesis. And given that, we can conclude further that the MS
thesis as an epistemological claim is consistent, too, and provides a serious
alternative to the orthodox JTB thesis in order to explain the nature of
knowledge.
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3.2 Harold A. Prichard
3.2.1 Introduction
Let’s turn now to the second protagonist of the ‘Oxford Realists’: Harold
Arthur Prichard (1871–1947). As in the case of Cook Wilson, Prichard was
also Professor at the Oxford University. But there he holds the White’s Chair
of Moral Philosophy from 1928 to 1937. Indeed, Prichard was most notably
known as a Moral Philosopher rather than an epistemologist. As Price in his
memorial on the occasion of Prichard’s death notes (see as well Price 1951:
103):
In moral philosophy he was one of the leaders of the school of
thought which is sometimes called ‘Oxford Intuitionism’. Indeed,
he might fairly be called its founder. (Price 1947: 337)
Outside his own university, and even to some extent within
it, Prichard came to be thought of mainly as a moralist. This
was because nearly all his published work after 1918 was con-
cerned with moral philosophy. It came to be forgotten that he
had been one of the founders of the epistemological school known
as ‘Realism’. (Price 1947: 343)
As epistemologist Prichard was a disciple of Cook Wilson (see Marion
2000: 305; for further biographical information on Prichard see Price 1947;
Carritt 1948; Passmore 1966: 249-254; Urmson 1988 and Marion 2000). And
being a good disciple of his master, Prichard also inherits a Wilsonian point
of view concerning the nature of knowledge; i.e. the MS thesis as developed
in the section before. Hence he “shall for the most part only be trying to state
Cook Wilson’s view” (Prichard 1950: 87). A few quotes from Prichard’s sole
book Kant’s Theory of Knowledge will reveal this point (see as well Price
1951; Passmore 1966: 249-254; Urmson 1988 and Marion 2000):
Belief is not knowledge and the man who knows does not
believe at all what he knows; he knows it. (Prichard 1976: 100)
Knowledge is sui generis, and, as such, cannot be explained.
(Prichard 1976: 124)
Knowledge is sui generis and therefore a ‘theory’ of it is im-
possible. Knowledge is simply knowledge, and an attempt to state
it in terms of something else must end in describing something
which is not knowledge. (Prichard 1976: 245)
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Even though Prichard indeed shares the main issues of Cook Wilson con-
cerning the nature of knowledge—the rejection of the JTB thesis and the
assertion of the unanalysability of knowledge—Prichard differs in one, and
we can add, the crucial point from the Wilsonian heritage: knowledge could
not be understood in terms of the Wilsonian meaning of apprehension! For,
other than Cook Wilson’s understanding of apprehension as stated in subsec-
tion 3.1.2 ,“Prichard concludes that perception is not knowledge” (Marion
2000: 488). Or to put it with Price 1951: 107 who quotes from Prichard’s
posthumously published book Knowledge and Perception:
Moreover, ‘the very question “What do we really see when we
are said to see a Body moving?” involves a fallacy—the fallacy
of thinking that to see something is to know or apprehend it in
a particular’. In other words, to alter Prichard’s terminology
slightly, having sensations is not a form of knowing, our ordinary
everyday perceptual consciousness is a form of mistaking. These
are the two central theses of Prichard’s later theory. [Italics from
Price]
Now, two questions arise: (i) if knowledge couldn’t be understood in terms
of the Wilsonian meaning of apprehension and if is not a species of belief, as
the JTB thesis maintains, what kind of positive account remains for Prichard
concerning a non-Wilsonian MS thesis of knowledge? Or to put the same
thing in a slightly different manner, what would a non-Wilsonian MS thesis
look like? And (ii) what kind of argument had shocked Prichard so much
that he backslid from the cornerstone of his master Cook Wilson without
abandoning the whole MS thesis? (Note that Prichard was an advocate of
the Wilsonian apprehension thesis in his early writings! See Marion 2000:
325-332. So the question is: what kind of argument made him change his
mind later?) And especially what are his reasons for his defection from his
master? Or, in other words: if the MS thesis is true and apprehension in
the Wilsonian sense is not knowledge, what remains from the MS thesis in
Prichard’s ‘theory of knowledge’?
We begin to analyse the second point in the following subsection.
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3.2.2 Apprehension reviewed
Now, indeed, the question to be answered here is: what kind of argument
underlies Prichard’s denial of Cook Wilson’s crucial claim that perception en-
tails an apprehension of the object perceived?—And the answer is a revenant
from subsection 3.1.3, the argument from illusion:
Citing typical cases of illusion such as the ‘field on the slope of
a distant hill that looks vertical’, he [Prichard–jk] argues that
‘if we press this question home to ourselves we can only answer,
as before, that it cannot’. Whatever the weakness of such argu-
ments, it seems that they forced Prichard to give up his theory of
appearing. Prichard was in the end convinced by the argument
from illusion. Worse, he made the typical move of assuming that
if in some cases (those of illusion) what one is seeing is not a
material object: ‘I, of course, take it for granted that if it can be
shown in certain cases that what we see cannot be a body, the
same thing must be true of all cases’. (Marion 2000: 487)
Let’s examine Prichard’s argument in detail. We find it in a paper entitled
Perception, which is chapter 4 of Prichard’s posthumously published collected
papers: Knowledge and Perception. There Prichard opens his discussion on
perception with the two major claims concerning his topic:
The first is that perceiving is not a special way or kind of know-
ing, as we seem usually to imply that it is; and the second is that
in the special cases of seeing and feeling or touching, what is or-
dinarily called perception consists in taking, i.e. really mistaking,
something that we see or feel for something else. (Prichard 1950:
52) [Italics from Prichard]
Now, the reason why Prichard rejects Cook Wilson’s central claim that
perception entails apprehension rests in his different conception of perception
in general. Perception, in Prichard’s view, is a process of generally mistak-
ing things for something else. In other words, perception per se is always
wrong concerning the real nature of its object (see as well Prichard 1950: 45;
Price 1951: 107 and Marion 2000: 485-490). This is so, because Prichard
argues that if we are perceiving some object, what happens is the gather-
ing of a false character concerning the object perceived (see as well Price
1951: 110 and Marion 2000: 486/488). So, in perception there is necessarily
no apprehension of the real nature of an object; the real thing, so to say.
Because,
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there is the possibility that we can perceive something without
apprehending its character at all, and if so it might be possible
that when seeing something we, so to say, straight off mistake it
for something else [...]. (Prichard 1950: 61) [Italics from Prichard]
If this is true, apprehension in the Wilsonian sense—i.e. the identification of
apprehension with perception—couldn’t be any kind of knowledge at all (see
as well Marion 2000: 488).
[...] we have to admit that it at once follows that to perceive
something is not to know it. (Prichard 1950: 10) [Italics from
Prichard]
Remember that Cook Wilson also mentioned a similar point in the case of
apprehension (see section 3.1.3): the ‘being-under-the-impression-that’ state
of mind which seems to resemble the apprehension state of mind, but was in
fact no such thing. So the same problem arises there for Cook Wilson as for
Prichard here (see also Marion 2000: 489): “it might be possible that when
seeing something we, so to say, straight off mistake it for something else”.
This sounds like the already noted argument from illusion in subsection 3.1.3
that concludes: if there are some exceptional cases of nonfactual perception
happening, it might also be possible that one is deluded in every case of
perception concerning the reality of the object perceived. But other than
Prichard, we have avoided with the support of Austin’s distinction between
illusion—a nonfactual perception of a real existing thing—and delusion—
the imagination of something unreal—the conclusion Prichard made: “that
to perceive something is not to know it” because in some exceptional cases
there is a nonfactual perception going on.
Indeed, if we take under consideration the Austinian solution of the stated
problem in the argument from illusion, viz. that it is impossible to be de-
luded by an illusion, because in fact delusion is a non-perceptual conjuring
up of unreal objects, the question arises, why then should it be true that
perception in general “is not a form of knowing, and our ordinary everyday
perceptual consciousness is a form of mistaking” something for something
else (Price 1951: 107; Italics from Price)? (Note that an interesting fact con-
cerning illusions and actually the real nature of what we call an illusion, e.g.
seeing mirages, is that we know that a nonfactual perception has happened
right now. This means in an illusionary perception we are aware that some-
thing is wrong with the object perceived, which doesn’t happen in a case
of delusion: “[...] the term ‘an illusion’ (in a perceptual context) does not
suggest something totally unreal is conjured up—on the contrary there just
is the arrangement of lines and arrows on the page, the woman on the stage
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with her head in a black bag, the rotating wheels; whereas the term ‘delusion’
does suggest something totally unreal, not really there at all.” Austin 1964:
23 [Italics from Austin]. This is the reason why we are able to distinguish
illusions from delusions and the reason why we know that we are confronted
with a Fata Morgana and not with an oasis if we perceive some. But if
there is knowledge of the nonfactual quality in perceiving an illusion, there is
no crucial point left concerning the exceptional cases of illusions that would
make the conclusion of the argument from illusion a necessary consequence.
See as well Austin’s 1962b: 11-12 1 and Austin 1979: 87 2 and Marion 2000:
511)
As Prichard himself notes, his way of understanding perception seems to
be very questionable; at least from a common sense point of view:
It goes without saying that anyone who has not been, so to say,
sophisticated by philosophical questioning, if he is asked what
he sees or touches, answers in effect ‘chairs and tables, boats
going down stream’, and so forth; in other words bodies having
various shapes, sizes, and positions relatively to one another and
to his own body. This answer also expresses what is implied
in the everyday attitude of mind of those who are philosophers.
(Prichard 1950: 52)
But,
[i]t need hardly be said that this view, much as we should all like
to be able to vindicate it, will not stand examination. (Prichard
1950: 53)
Let us have a look now at Prichard’s main argument, why perceiving
something is straight off mistaking it and thus perception is not any kind
of apprehension at all. There are two points that have convinced Prichard
in favour of arguing that perception in general “is not a form of knowing,
1“[i]t is important to remember that talk of deception only makes sense against a
background of general non-deception (You can’t fool all of the people all of the time). It
must be possible to recognize a case of deception by checking the odd case against more
normal ones. If I say, ‘Our petrol-gauge sometimes deceives us’, I am understood: though
usually what it indicates squares with what we have in the tank, sometimes it doesn’t—it
points out to two gallons when the tank turns out to be nearly empty.” [Italics from
Austin]
2“These doubts are all to be allayed by means of recognized procedures (more or less
roughly recognized, of course), appropriate to the particular type of case. There are
recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (how otherwise should
we know how to use and to contrast the words?), and of deciding whether a thing is stuffed
or live, and so forth.”
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and our ordinary everyday perceptual consciousness is a form of mistaking”.
I will merely mention the first point without discussing it here, because we
have already done this in section 3.1.3 in the course of our consideration of
Austin. Now entering into the discussion, those two points are:
First, consideration of any so-called illusion of sight or touch [...].
The second [...] is that some cases even of seeing, in which we
should not ordinarily to be said to be subject to any illusion,
preclude our holding that what we see is bodies. (Prichard 1950:
53/54)
We have seen with Austin that this first kind of argument is a weak one
and hence not very convincing at all. It is possible to handle this problem
with the Austinian solution stated in section 3.1.3. This is the first reason for
not discussing it here again. Further, as we will see in the end of the upcom-
ing discussion, Prichard also holds that the argument from illusion in fact
fails to show the delusive character of illusions in general. Here, Price 1951
and Marion 2000 are mistaken in their interpretation of Prichard’s account.
I will later explain in detail why this is so. And the second reason for disre-
garding Prichard’s first point is that it is not really essential to his argument
concerning the question why perception doesn’t entail the apprehension of
the object perceived. As the quote above shows, the second point presents
an argument distinct and separate from any occurring illusion: “cases even
of seeing, in which we should not ordinarily to be said to be subject to any
illusion”. This is a reference also for the misinterpretation of Prichard con-
cerning the nature of the argument from illusion as a main reason for his
account of perception.
Hence, in the following I am going to concentrate on a detailed discussion
of the second point. In fact, it is Prichard’s essential argument because here
he is going to argue why perception in general is a process of mistaking
things for something else and thus couldn’t entail apprehension. Remember
that this was the point of departure we began the present section with:
why couldn’t knowledge be understood in terms of the Wilsonian sense of
apprehension, given that Prichard is an apologist of the MS thesis?
As we will see in the following, Prichard’s answer to this question is:
because in perception there is no apprehension of bodies, i.e. physical objects,
at all! (Note that Prichard uses the term ‘body’ synonymously for ‘physical
objects’, see Price 1951.) Whatever is given in perception, it is not that of
seeing, touching etc. physical objects. This is the ‘straight off mistake’ in
perception Prichard talks about: taking some object perceived ex hypothesi
for some physical object. And that mistake abandons perception to be any
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kind of knowledge (see as well Price 1951: 107/109 and Marion 2000: 487-
488). Hence, the argument from illusion has a mere supportive character
concerning Prichard’s understanding of perception in general. That is to say
that Prichard’s point of statement here is his general denial of an occurring
apprehension in the process of perception.
Now, the question must arise what perception really is all about, if it is
not an apprehension of physical objects? Or to put it in Prichard’s own
words:
But if, as I shall now assume, it has to be granted that what we
see is never a body, and that for similar reasons what we feel is
also never a body, we are at once faced by the questions ‘Then
what do we see?’ and ‘What do we feel?’ (Prichard 1950: 54)
[Italics from Prichard]
The first (and obvious) candidate for an answer is that the object of per-
ception is appearances or, in more contemporary terms, in perception we are
perceiving sense-data (see as well Price 1951, or Marion 2000: 485-490):
The most obvious answer is ‘an appearance’, or more fully, ‘a
visible appearance’, or perhaps, ‘certain appearances’. (Prichard
1950: 54)
But from Prichard’s point of view this answer is fully mistaken:
This answer, which, of course, goes back at least as far as Locke,
and goes through Berkeley and Reid to modern writers, ought,
it seems to me, to be ruled out, not only as false, but as so
misleading as to involve anyone who gives it in almost hopeless
confusion. (Prichard 1950: 54)
He gives three reasons for his denial of the existence of appearances as the
real objects of perception. The first reason is that the term ‘appearance’ is
a term from the ordinary language and its usage is determined by a mere
metaphorical meaning concerning the occurrence of physical objects:
[...] when we speak of ‘an appearance’ or use the verb ‘appear’, as
when we say that the moon is appearing just over the horizon, we
always imply that what we see is not an appearance, but a body
of which the appearance is the appearance, or which is appearing
to us and which in doing so presents the appearance in question.
Thus, when in ordinary life we should be said to be looking at
brown oblong box a foot off, we should say that we are seeing the
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box, and that in being seen, the box necessarily presents a certain
appearance to us, determined by its character and position, but
that, though this is so, it is the box which is appearing to us, and
not its appearance, that we see. (Prichard 1950: 55)
Hence, Prichard concludes if the proper meaning of the term ‘appearance’
is determined by a metaphorical circumlocution of the appearing of some
physical object to us (“the box necessarily presents a certain appearance to
us, determined by its character and position, but that, though this is so, it
is the box which is appearing to us, and not its appearance, that we see”),
then ‘appearance’ couldn’t be an appropriate candidate for answering the
question, ‘what do we see?’, if we had denied that the object of perception
is any physical kind of object.
He then continues with the second argument against appearances as the
real objects of perception. And his main point here is that
it is a peculiarity of what we call an appearance that we cannot
describe its character in detail directly, i.e. by terms directly
applicable to it, but only by reference to the special character of
that which, as we say, presents it. (Prichard 1950: 55) [Italics
from Prichard]
In other words, if we really perceived appearances, then those terms would
also be solely related to the special character of an appearance in order
to describe them. That means, an appropriate description of appearances
(perceived or not) would be distinct and separate from those characteristics
of physical objects. But in fact we describe appearances in terms of or with
relation to some characteristics of physical objects:
To describe to someone else the appearance presented to us by
the box, we have to state the character of the box and its po-
sition relatively to our body, and to leave the character of the
appearance to be gathered from this. So completely is this true,
that we cannot truly be said to gather for ourselfs, or infer, or
discover the character of the body seen from the character of the
appearance which it presents. (Prichard 1950: 55) [Italics from
Prichard]
If we indeed describe the objects perceived by us in physical terms, then
it could hardly be true that we apprehend appearances in perception. For
an appearance is ex hypothesi an object without any physical characteristics
and hence couldn’t be apprehended—and thus appropriately described—in
terms of physical objects. Thus Prichard concludes:
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Any definite apprehension of the appearance is inseparable from
an apprehension of some character of that of which it is the
appearance—it is an apprehension of it as the appearance pre-
sented by a certain kind of body. (Prichard 1950: 55)
So talking about appearances is literally talking about the thing that ap-
pears to us and not of some special perceptive entity called appearance. If
we are not able to describe appearances without any kind of reference to the
characteristics of the thing that appears to us, then there is no suggestive
meaning of the term ‘appearance’ autonomously of the context of physical
characteristics. But if there is no suggestive meaning of ‘appearance’ au-
tonomously of some characteristics of the physical object which appears to
us, then appearance is not any real object of perception at all.
And the third reason to refuse appearances as the real objects of percep-
tion, closely related to the first two ones, is the artificial character of the
term ‘appearances’ concerning its application of what we perceive:
There is a further disadvantage in the use of the term. A term
used to describe what we see ought to designate its intrinsic na-
ture, and this is just what the term ‘appearance’ does not do.
And, just for this reason, any attempt to use special terms to
designate a particular kind of something called an appearance
strikes us quite artificial; e.g. a bent appearance. (Prichard 1950:
56) [Italics from Prichard]
The point Prichard is talking about here seems quite clear and comprehen-
sible. If we are talking about the perception of a refraction, e.g. “a straight
stick half immersed in water which we see that it is bent”, it seems to be
some kind of oddity to point out that what we really see is a bent appearance
rather than a bent stick. How could an appearance, ex hypothesi something
non-physical, be bent, which is a physical characteristic (see as well Austin
1964)?
Now, having argued against appearances as the real object of perception,
the issue of what we do perceive then, if it is not physical objects, still remains
unanswered. Prichard’s attempt to answer this question is this:
The only obvious answer is to say that it consists of colours, and
to add, to prevent misunderstanding, that a colour is as such
extended, or at least through and through involves extension.
(Prichard 1950: 56)
That is, the successful candidate to answer the question, ‘what do we really
perceive instead of physical objects or appearances?’ is colours. So, the real
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object of perception is colour and nothing but colour. ‘Colour’ as the real
object of perception means in the Prichardian sense something
that involves extension or, if you prefer it, an extension or a space,
and also, for that matter, time or a time, just as much as a sound
involves time or a time. Here by ‘a space’ I mean a portion of
that one space parts of which are occupied by bodies, if there are
bodies, and which forms the only space that there is. (Prichard
1950: 56) [Italics from Prichard]
It seems that the concept of colour as the real object of perception in the
Prichardian sense looks like a hybrid, or so to say an in-between, of some
characteristics of physical objects and appearances: colours are existing as
extended in space similar to physical objects (“Here by ‘a space’ I mean a
portion of that one space parts of which are occupied by bodies”). But,
nevertheless, their existence in time is akin to non-physical objects, such as
sounds (“just as much as a sound involves time or a time”) (see as well Price
1951: 111).
Obviously, as Prichard notes himself, there is a set of objections against
his view. In his further discussion he mentions two of them:
We feel two objections: the first is that to maintain this is really
to attribute to colours properties which can belong only to bodies,
and that for instance it is just as impossible for a colour to move
as it is for a ray of light or a wave front to move or to have a
velocity ; the second is that unquestionably we ordinarily think
we see bodies and not colours, and here we cannot be mistaken,
since at least there is one sphere in which we are beyond the
reach of error; viz. in respect of what we actually perceive. And
we naturally add that if per impossibile we maintain that we
really see colours, it will be impossible to account for our actually
thinking, as we do, that we see something else. (Prichard 1950:
57) [Italics from Prichard]
In order to admit a solution for the present problem—the usual suspects,
physical objects or appearances, couldn’t be the real objects of perception
and the ‘colours’ offered by Prichard as the real objects of perception also
seems as questionable as the usual suspects, but nevertheless it cannot be
denied that there is a perception of something in perceiving something—
Prichard supposes that this problem literally arises from false assumptions
concerning the process of perception in general. That is, right from the
start there went something fundamentally wrong with the everyday thinking
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of what perception really consists in. In other words, thinking ordinarily
on perception means dealing with unwarranted stereotypes which necessar-
ily leads into those contradictions such as the consequences from Prichard’s
current discussion: in perception we would straight off mistake colours for
physical objects. And that seems ridiculous. For, colours and physical ob-
jects are such different in nature that it seems impossible to mix them up
every time we perceive some object.
And so we are led to ask whether the difficulty has not arisen
from our tendency to think that when we perceive something we
are necessarily apprehending the character of what we perceive,
the perception either being or at least involving a particular kind
of apprehension of what we perceive. (Prichard 1950: 61)
So, for the sake of argument, if we take it for granted that neither phys-
ical objects nor appearances could be the real objects of perception on the
grounds Prichard had mentioned in his discussion of that subject, the only
way to justify his ‘colours’ as the real object of perception—and even more
important: to understand what those ‘colours’ are—is to abandon the every-
day view of perception; that is perceiving something consists in apprehend-
ing the character of the thing perceived. Of course, it is impossible to make
any sense at all of Prichard’s understanding of the process of perception in
general—straight off mistaking something for something else—if it is pre-
supposed that there is some gathering of the nature of the object perceived
in the process of perception. In this context, and that is the crucial point
here, ‘gathering some nature of the object’ means the apprehension of those
characteristics of an object which are necessarily distinct and separate from
the process of perceiving that object.
Presupposing that the latter is true, there is indeed no room for mistaking—
at least no straight off mistaking—something for something else in perception
or even to understand the process of perception in general as a straight off
mistaking something for something else. For, in that latter sense of percep-
tion perceiving an object—whatever that object may be: a physical one or an
appearance—means the apprehension, i.e. the knowledge, of some character
of the object perceived distinct and separate from the process of perceiving
it. And that means, even if I am wrong in my perception about some quality
of the object perceived, I am never mistaking the nature of the object per-
ceived: if I perceive a physical object, then I might be wrong of, for instance,
its colour or shape or other so-called secondary qualities. But I will never be
wrong about its nature that I gathered through the process of perception;
that is its being there as a physical object. That is the reason why Prichard’s
conception of perception in general—a straight off mistaking of something
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for something else—seems so unacceptable for the common sense point of
view.
Of course, sometimes it happens that I mistake Smith for Jones, but it
never happened—and seems impossible that it could ever happen—that I
mistake, say, a ‘colour’, however extended, for Jones, or some puppet for
Jones or something like that.
For if to to (sic!) see a colour is to apprehend that colour, in
seeing a colour we shall be apprehending it as a colour, and if we
are doing this we cannot possibly think of it as being, i.e. mistake
it for, something which it cannot possibly be, viz. a body. To do
so will no more be possible to mistake a piece of modern brass for
an ancient coin, if we apprehend it as a piece of modern brass. A
similar argument, of course, applies whatever else that be said to
be which we mistake for a body. (Prichard 1950: 62)
However I may be mistaken in my perception of this guy as Jones, I am
always apprehending that guy as a human being while perceiving it, which
is the nature of the thing perceived. So, the only way for Prichard to justify
his position upon perception, i.e. the real objects of perception are colours
which we mistake for something else while perceiving them, is to argue that
there is the possibility we can perceive something without ap-
prehending its character at all, and if so it might be possible
that when seeing something we, so to say, straight off mistake it
for something else, that in particular what we call seeing bodies,
instead of consisting in seeing colours and judging them to be
bodies on the strength of the apprehension of them as colours
involved in seeing them, consists in seeing colours and without
apprehending them as colours at all mistaking them for bodies.
(Prichard 1950: 61) [Italics from Prichard]
In other words, perception in Prichard’s terms goes like this: perceiving
some thing is perceiving some extended colour but while perceiving those
colours there is no apprehension occurring of what the object really is; i.e.
an extended colour. There is perception but without any knowledge about
the object perceived. So it could happen that while we perceive an object—
an extended colour—we mistake the extended colour for something else, say
a physical object. This is so because instead of apprehending the nature of
the object perceived, viz. the extended colour, we are merely gathering a
way extended colours are appearing to us in our perception of them. (Note:
it is not any apprehension of the appearances of extended colours!)
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But under what condition could there be a perception without any ap-
prehension of the object perceived so that it is possible to mistake an object
for something else while perceiving that object? Remember our discussion
of the nature of apprehension in section 3.1 and “the maxim of Oxford Real-
ism” that “ ‘knowing in no way alters or modifies the thing known” (Marion
2000: 302). That is, the object known must be something distinct and
separate from the knowing process: “any object of knowledge must be inde-
pendent of the knowledge of it” (Prichard 1950: 63). So the obvious answer
is that Prichard has to reject the ordinary view that the object perceived
has any existence distinct and separate from perceiving it; that is rejecting
a perceptual realism. For if we deny an independent existence of the object
of perception from the process of perceiving it, apprehension couldn’t take
place in perception, given the maxim of Oxford Realism. Thus, if Prichard
maintains that there is no apprehension happening in perception, the object
perceived couldn’t be something distinct and separate from the process of
perception. In other words, if we did not naturally presuppose that the ob-
jects of perception exist separately from perceiving them, i.e. independently
of any perception of them at all, there is no reason left to believe that there
is any apprehension of an object happening while perceiving that object.
But now some crucial problem arises for Prichard: if we grant that he
is right in arguing that there is no apprehension happening in perception,
then it follows that we know and can know nothing about any object of our
perception—including the perception of our own body or mental states. This
seems simply untrue and beyond our everyday experience as mentioned above
in the second objection: “the second is that unquestionably we ordinarily
think we see bodies and not colours, and here we cannot be mistaken, since
at least there is one sphere in which we are beyond the reach of error; viz.
in respect of what we actually perceive.” Thus some solution is needed here
and Prichard continues to argue that
[i]f, however, we are to make good this account of seeing we shall
have to show that though the mistake is one which we habitually
make it is not inevitable. For on this view, when as the result of
reflecting we have found out our mistake, we ought to be able to
avoid making it. (Prichard 1950: 64)
Of course, Prichard’s back door to solve the present problem is reflection.
(Note that it is the same process of reflecting upon our perception which
helps us to identify an illusion—for instance a Fata Morgana—from a non-
illusionary perception, for instance an oasis, which means knowing that we
are confronted with an illusion if there is one occurring.) If one would do
first some reflection on the process of perception before she takes naively
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for granted that what she sees is what it looks like, then she would not
straight off mistake something for something else. And this means that
the whole process of perception needs to be criticized by reflection in order
to get any kind of valid information from perceiving an object apart from
the tautology that perceiving an object is having perceived an object. So
there is indeed the possibility of perceiving something in a non-naive way
but only with the assistance of reflection. Reflection is necessary to avoid
our disposition to confuse the way an object appears to us with the real
nature of the object perceived. Doing so is understanding that in perception
there is no reality given distinct and separate from the process of perception.
Or in other words: avoiding those habitually mistakes by means of critical
reflection on perception before taking for granted what is given in perception
as independently existing of perception is the process of excluding those
mistakes caused by a naive mind concerning the object of perception.
In order to explain the process of such an ‘avoidance strategy’ and what
kind of reflection is needed to avoid the straight off mistake of naive percep-
tion
we have to distinguish three things.
1. The process of perception proper, what is perceived being
temporally and, in the case of seeing and feeling, spatially related
sensations, the process not being a process of knowing anything,
though often spoken and thought of as if it were.
2. What is ordinarily called the act or process of seeing and
feeling, this really consisting in seeing or feeling certain sensations
and mistaking them for a certain body. This act or process will
necessarily be complicated and will include the first process.
3. A purely inferential process by which, on discovering that
in the second process we are not really perceiving bodies, we infer
what system of bodies, including our own, is implied by process
(1) as the cause of this process. (Prichard 1950: 64-65)
Prichard distinguishes here between three constituents that determine per-
ception in general (see also Price 1951: 112). The first constituent, and the
basis of perception in general, is some gathering of “temporally and spatially
related sensations”. Those “sensations” are of course unspecified objects of
perception because they are occurring in perception without any apprehen-
sion of them, i.e. without any knowledge of what the nature of those sensa-
tions really is. So the meaning of the term ‘sensation’ is just some unspecified
issue, say a determinable, which is given in perception (concerning the dis-
cussion of determinates/determinables see Kohne 2005a and 2005b). Note
that Prichard’s term ‘sensation’ thus is in no way an equivalent of Locke’s or
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Hume’s ‘sensation’ or the terms ‘sense-data’ or ‘appearances’ in more con-
temporary discussions which are specified objects, i.e. determinates. Hence
the real objects of perception—Prichard’s so-called ‘extended colours’—are
sensations but are connected with each other in space and time.
Given that the object of perception—sensations—is unspecified, the sec-
ond constituent of perception is the identification of the object of perception
as a “certain body” which is necessarily misleading. For during the process
of “perception proper” there is no apprehension happening of the object per-
ceived. Therefore a knowledge of the nature of those sensations within the
process of perception is impossible and leads necessarily to an epistemolog-
ical error. This error consists in just believing that the object perceived is
more than a mere sensation, i.e. a “certain body”. Here ‘believing’ has to be
understood in the sense of the Wilsonian meaning of ‘belief’—wanting some-
thing to be true without sufficient evidence—which is exactly what Prichard
maintains in the second objection above. Thus, he maintains:
I assume that it is in the end self-evident that the so-called ideas
of secondary qualities, tastes, smells, colours, and so forth are
as Berkeley held, dependent on perception. But in ordinary life
we undoubtedly presuppose the contrary as regards smells, tastes,
and sounds. We think in a vague way of noises, smells, and tastes
as existing somehow in nature, although not as qualities of bodies,
like hardness, capacity of movement, and so on. Correspondingly
with this we think of the perception of these things, i.e. the
hearing a sound, the smelling a smell, and so on, as a way of
apprehending these somethings, the thought of these somethings
as existing in nature, and therefore independently of us, being
what leads us to think of the perception of them as being an
apprehension of them. (Prichard 1950: 63) [Italics from Prichard]
Seeing this we know now the reason for the difference between master and
disciple concerning perception: Cook Wilson includes apprehension in the
process of perception as its essential part because he conveys his realism on
the subject of perception; i.e. the existence of the object perceived is distinct
and separate from perceiving it. Whereas Prichard criticised the naivite´ of
an application of any realist point of view on perceptual cases as unwarranted
by the facts as explained in ‘his’ argument from illusion (see as well Prichard
1950: 200-214 and Price 1951: 113-114).
We have to admit that Berkeley and his modern opponents are
right in thinking that what we perceive in the case of each kind of
perception is a secondary quality of the corresponding sort. We
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have also to admit that Berkeley is right in contending that the
various secondary qualities which we perceive are by their very
nature dependent on our perceiving them. For instance, we must
admit in the end that it is self-evident that some sound which we
are hearing depends on our hearing it. This being so, we have to
admit that it at once follows that to perceive something is not to
know it in a special kind of way, as it were, the thing perceived
could not depend on our perceiving it, as in fact it does. The
argument is simple enough: ‘What we perceive is always some
secondary quality or qualities. Any secondary quality which we
perceive depends on our perceiving it. Consequently to perceive
something cannot be to know it, because if it were, the thing
perceived would be independent of our perceiving it, and yet,
being a secondary quality, it is not’. To this argument another
can be added which also is conclusive. This is if perceiving were
a kind of knowing, mistakes about what we perceive would be
impossible, and yet they are constantly being made, since at any
rate in the case of seeing or feeling or touching we are almost
always in a state of thinking that what we are perceiving is various
bodies, although we need only reflect to discover that in thinking
this we are mistaken. (Prichard 1950: 207/208) [Italics from
Prichard]
This, too, is a reason why Prichard was so much challenged by the ar-
gument from illusion, whereas Cook Wilson was not. But in the case of
Prichard, contrary to the other proponents of the argument from illusion,
this challenge is a question of the reality of the object perceived instead of
asking what kind of object it is in perceiving something (see Price 1951:
113/114). This means it is answering the question whether the object of
perception has any existence distinct and separate of perceiving it regardless
of what kind of thing this object really is—a physical one or an appear-
ance. Hence Prichard rejects a ‘perceptual’ realism and holds an idealist
position concerning perception in general: the object perceived isn’t distinct
and separate from perceiving it. Nevertheless, both of them, Cook Wilson
and Prichard, are epistemological realists: the object known is distinct and
separate from the knowing process itself. But their differences arise con-
cerning the scope of knowledge in general, whereas Cook Wilson extended
the scope of knowledge into the area of perception because he is a realist
concerning perception as well: the object perceived is something distinct
and separate existing from perceiving it. On the other hand, Prichard is an
idealist concerning perception—there is no such thing as an object of per-
86
ception distinct and separate from perceiving it—and consequently he denies
that perception could be a realm of knowledge at all. And that means, if
there is no knowledge possible of the object perceived in perception, we can
never know anything about those things we perceive except that we perceive
them.
As in the case of Cook Wilson the topic of refusing the JTB thesis comes
up again in Prichard’s argument: because in perception we merely believe
that we perceive an object distinct and separate from perceiving it, which
leads to the discussed straight off mistake concerning epistemological cases.
In other words, propositional attitudes are in principle misleading epistemo-
logical states. It is important to understand here that this failure of the naive
mind diagnosed by Prichard is an epistemological error and not a perceptual
one. It is about the nature of the sensation occurring in perception and
not whether there was really some sensation happening in perception or not,
which is a question of the existence of that sensation. For the failure of the
misleading naive mind consists in being polluted by propositional attitudes
while perceiving an object. That is believing what we perceive instead of
just perceiving it. So if there was merely perceiving in perception without
‘supporting’ that perception by any propositional attitudes concerning per-
ception in general, no misleading about the nature of the object perceived
could ever happen. Understanding perception in this Prichardian way then
means: some gathering of bare sensations, nothing more, nothing left. This
is what perception, literally speaking, is all about.
In fact Prichard’s point concerning the argument from illusion is not chal-
lenging the question whether there is a real existence of some sensation hap-
pening in perceiving something—note that this was the point at Austin 1964
discussing why the argument from illusion doesn’t work: confusing illusion
with delusion. Instead, Prichard challenges here the epistemological status,
or more precisely, the epistemological value of having perceived some thing.
Prichard’s answer is strict: without the clearance of perception proper from
propositional attitudes there is no epistemological value at all in percep-
tion. This is the meaning of classifying perception as a straight off mistaking
something for something else.
To abolish now the epistemological mistake of the second constituent,
Prichard needs some element of revision which he found in the process of
reflection: “a purely inferential process”. This inferential process is needed
to justify our everyday experiences of a world with physical objects in it.
Remember, as I have argued above, that the straight off mistake of naive
perception was taking for granted that there is an apprehension of phys-
ical objects happening in perception. But, as we have seen in discussing
Prichard’s argument, in perception proper there is nothing but some gather-
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ing of bare sensations. As a bare sensation doesn’t tell us anything about its
nature, viz. what kind of object one is really perceiving, we have to face the
problem, taking Prichard’s view for granted, that we didn’t have any access
to, i.e. knowledge of, the things we are perceiving, that is the physical world
we are apparently living in and which we are unwilling to deny. Hence, if we
are confronted undeniably with physical objects as our everyday experience
seems to show, but in perception proper there is no such apprehension possi-
ble of those things, then there must be some other access available concerning
the existence of physical objects and that is inference, according to Prichard.
In other words, we are not perceiving any physical object at all but we infer
that there must be some. Otherwise, where should those pure sensations
perceived come from, if not from real existing objects, viz. physical ones?
Since as ex hypothesi we have never perceived a body, we have
not in the first instance known the existence of any bodies by
perceiving them and therefore, so far, we do not know that any
such bodies exist. Now the view in question does enable us to
make the distinction; for, if the view be right, the second process,
which is what is ordinarily called seeing or feeling bodies and
which includes taking certain other things for bodies, will be the
process by which in the first instance we acquire the thought—or
whatever the activity should be called—that there are bodies, and
the third process will be that by which we seek—and, it will have
in the end to be allowed, rightly seek—to justify it. (Prichard
1950: 65)
In summary, understanding perception in general, i.e. our everyday expe-
rience of the existence of a physical world, in an appropriate way means a
threefold process: (i) gathering bare sensations, (ii) coming to believing (in
the Wilsonian sense of ‘believe’) unwarranted by the perceptual facts that
those bare sensations are perceptions of physical objects and (iii) justifying
the mere belief of the second process, that means turning that belief into
an opinion (again in the Wilsonian sense of ‘opinion’), by the inference that
having sensations implies necessarily the existence of some objects being the
cause of my perceiving those sensations. In other words, having bare sensa-
tions is the evidence justifying the existence of physical objects as inferred
causes of those bare sensations.
Because the existence of physical objects is a matter of evidence, Prichard
can conclude first that there is no direct knowledge possible, i.e. apprehen-
sion, of physical objects, and second, because our access to physical objects
is indirect, i.e. inferential, we are sometimes wrong not in having (bare) sen-
sations but in inferring from the existence of those bare sensations states of
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affairs concerning the physical world. So, the argument from illusion used by
Prichard is not a perceptual but an epistemological argument concerning the
impossibility of having knowledge of the external, i.e. physical, world (see as
well Price 1951).
3.2.3 Knowledge
As we have seen in the latter section there is no knowledge in perception. But
if so, what remains then as the area of knowledge? Inference?—Inference as
well as perception has to be omitted for the same reason: because in inference,
as we have seen, there is no apprehension of the epistemic object happening:
it is opining on the grounds of evidence. Thus, Prichard maintains that
there are two things which we absolutely must do first.
1. We must first recognize the fundamental nature of the
difference between knowing and believing.
2. We must recognize that whenever we know something we
either do, or at least can, by reflecting, directly know that we are
knowing it, and that whenever we believe something, we similarly
either do or can directly know that we are believing it and not
knowing it. (Prichard 1950: 86)
Prichard states those principles concerning the nature of knowledge with
reference to Cook Wilson “dogmatically”, this means, without offering any
further reasons for maintaining them (Prichard 1950: 86-89). And we can
accept those in their dogmatic way here because we already know the reasons
for maintaining them from discussing Cook Wilson in section 3.1.
Now, as we already know from the above consideration, there is some
difficulty in explaining knowledge in the Wilsonian approach because here
knowledge is something ultimate and thus indefinable. So if we want to
know what the nature of knowledge is all about concerning Prichard’s ap-
proach, we have to deal with some examples of knowledge he states. But
there is a further possibility of trying to approach the indefinable nature of
knowledge. The second point of Prichard’s last quote contains some detour
to his understanding of knowledge. For if there is knowledge existing and
we are in a state of knowing something, there must be some way for us to
recognize that we are at a time in a knowledge state of mind, i.e. a criterion
to distinguish knowledge from other states of mind which are not knowledge.
And describing this criterion of being in a knowledge state of mind gives
some access to what knowledge is without defining knowledge itself.
On the basis of a discussion on Descartes’ doubt whether there is or ever
could be the possibility of really knowing something, Prichard argues:
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Now with this considerations in mind [the two points from the
last quote–jk] return to Descartes’ doubt whether he was not mis-
taken in some past state in which he was following the proof that
the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; and consider
what we can say about it. The first thing to do is obviously to an-
swer the question ‘Was the condition of mind on which Descartes
was reflecting one of knowledge, or was it one of believing, or (as
we say) of being convinced, as when we say we are convinced it
was X who killed Y ?’ And, obviously, only one answer is possible.
Descartes was knowing ; it was not the case of being convinced.
This is something that we know, and to know this all we have
to do is to follow the argument ourselves and then ask ourselves
‘Is this condition in which, as Descartes would say, we perceive
clearly for certain reasons that the angles are equal to two right
angles one of knowing, or is it only one of being convinced?’ We
can only answer ‘Whatever may be our state on other occasions,
here we are knowing this’. And this statement is an expression of
our knowing that we are knowing this; for we do not believe that
we are knowing this, we know that we are. (Prichard 1950: 89)
[Italics from Prichard]
So we come to know something by clearly perceiving the object known.
In clearly perceiving something we are not believing anything but knowing
what we have clearly perceived. This means clearly perceiving something is
the proper way to know something. But now we are facing some problem.
In arguing this way, Prichard seems at first glance to contradict himself.
For he has argued before, as we have seen in subsection 3.2.2, that there is
no apprehension possible in perception and thus there is no knowledge in
perceiving something either. Prichard tries to get out of the impasse in the
following way discussing further Descartes’ case:
Descartes himself is just on the verge of discovering the truth
when he says that at the time, i.e. when following the argument,
he finds it impossible to believe otherwise, and finds himself say-
ing ‘Here no one can be deceiving me’, and that it is only after-
wards he can think that he may have been wrong. Plainly, this
is just on the verge of saying ‘If I consider my state at the time,
I know that it is one of knowing’. And plainly also he afterwards
only comes in fact to doubt whether even in such a state he may
not have been mistaken, because he has somehow in the interval
come to misrepresent to himself the character of his past state.
[...]
90
And an indication that there is misrepresentation is to be
found in the fact that he has to give different accounts of his state
while following the demonstration, according as he describes it as
it presented itself to him at the time, and as he describes it as it
presented itself afterwards. As it presented itself at the time, he
describes it as one of perceiving clearly that the angles are equal
to two right angles; as it presented itself afterwards, he describes
it in which he only thought he perceived clearly; [...].
On Descartes’ own showing, therefore, he is thinking of the
state differently at the time and afterwards.
We therefore can get Descartes out of the impasse, provided
we allow, as we can, that the state to which he referred as one of
perceiving clearly was in fact one of knowing, and one which he
could have known at the time to be one of knowing. (Prichard
1950: 90) [Italics from Prichard]
The point which avoids the apparent contradiction is this. First Prichard
distinguishes between two states of mind concerning an epistemic object A:
(i) “at the time” and (ii) “afterwards” which means the already established
distinction between direct and indirect knowledge. (i) If the epistemic subject
is at the time, i.e. directly, confronted with A, then the epistemic subject
is undoubtedly knowing A. But (ii) if the epistemic subject is afterwards,
i.e. in absence of A, thinking whether she really knows A, she would have to
represent reasons for knowing A because she is now missing a direct chain
or confrontation with A. The only access for her now to know A are reasons.
For she now recalls the existence of A rather than perceiving it, and that
means she merely thinks that she knows A.
The first state of mind is described by Prichard with reference to Descartes
as ‘clearly perceiving’ A, whereas the second state of mind is mere thinking
of A by means of reasons. For reasons given in the second chapter and in
the discussion of Cook Wilson, thinking is not knowing, and propositional
attitudes towards an object could be mistaken “because [s]he has somehow
in the interval come to misrepresent to h[er]self the character of h[er] past
state.” And it is this misrepresentation we should remember as the crucial
problem of subsection 3.2.2. There Prichard has argued that the epistemic
subject is polluting perception proper with propositional attitudes about
having perceptions and what kind of object its content really is, which leads
to the ‘straight off mistake’ of perception, this occurring ‘straight off mistake’
being the reason why there is no knowledge in perception.
But as we have also seen there, this ‘straight off mistake’ could be avoided
by just perceiving bare sensations without having any propositional atti-
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tudes concerning their nature. And what else should this ‘clearly perceiv-
ing’ mean unless this having bare sensations, if we take under consideration
Prichard’s distinction between at-time-perceiving of A, which is knowing A
and afterwards-thinking that A, which is often misleading? In this sense we
have to understand Prichard’s phrase that “perceiving clearly was in fact one
[state] of knowing, and one which he could have known at the time to be one
of knowing.” In fact, taking this for granted, there is indeed no knowledge in
perception taken as the threefold process which we have analysed in subsec-
tion 3.2.2. But there is knowledge in having bare sensations, which means
‘perception proper’ using Prichard’s terms. So we can conclude that there is
actually no contradiction in maintaining that “perceiving clearly was in fact
one [state] of knowing”, if we separate having bare sensations from the whole
process of perception.
But note: arguing this way doesn’t mean any neutralisation of the core
difference between Prichard and Cook Wilson concerning the scope of ap-
prehension, i.e. knowledge. In fact the gap between them increases. For if
Cook Wilson is talking about apprehension, he means perceiving clearly, so
to speak, physical objects and that is having knowledge of the physical world.
Contrary to this, Prichard means by perceiving clearly the apprehension of
bare sensations and nothing more. So concerning Prichard’s view there is
no knowledge possible of any physical objects in particular or the physical
world in general. The physical world, hence, is no object of knowledge at
all but of thinking, i.e. inference, and that could be misleading. Speaking
in terms of the second chapter, concerning the physical world there is only
fallible knowledge possible. And that is the unbridgeable difference between
Prichard and Cook Wilson, or in other words, the philosophical development
of the MS thesis (maybe a necessary one?!): the decrease of the scope of
knowledge to its apparently indubitable core: having bare sensations.
The interesting thing is that this decrease of the scope of knowledge from
Cook Wilson to Prichard could be understood as a necessary consequence
of the application of the concept of apprehension being the nature of knowl-
edge, i.e. the foundation of the MS thesis. This is the reason why Prichard
is so much concerned with the analysis of perception regarding the ques-
tion what knowledge is all about. As we have seen, Prichard has argued
that there is no knowledge in perception. But as a proponent of the MS
thesis for him apprehension is knowledge. Now, if apprehension has to be
understood as a form of perception as shown in subsection 3.1.2, Prichard
either has to abandon the concept of apprehension as an appropriate way
to understand knowledge. For he maintains that there is no knowledge, and
hence no apprehension, in perception. Or he has to explicate the object of
apprehension. And this is what Prichard does in his whole argument. He
92
uses the argument from illusion to show that we are not apprehending the
nature of a thing in the process of perception because sometimes we mistake
something for something else. And insofar we are not knowing anything in
perceiving something. But this is so because we misrepresent the real object
of perception. The real objects of perception are bare sensations, but because
they are bare they don’t have any nature to apprehend. So the only ‘thing’
that remains to ‘perceive clearly’, i.e. to apprehend, is the bare existence
of having a perception. And insofar there is knowledge in perception, so to
speak, not of a concrete thing, viz. a physical object, but of bare sensations
which are necessarily ‘natureless’. And this is all there is to know in the
sense of apprehension: having bare sensations. This is the reason for misrep-
resenting what we are already knowing: we are conjuring up a nature of the
known bare sensation because we are not able to apprehend any nature—in
a bare ‘thing’ there is none to apprehend—but the bare existence of having
a sensation. But then, afterwards, we are, of course, unable to represent
the existence of something bare and natureless and therefore we conjure the
missing nature “habitually”, which then is necessarily misrepresenting a bare
something for something else, viz. a concrete physical object. Not “at the
time” but “afterwards”. And because we cannot recall something bare, we
are doubting afterwards, as Descartes did, if we ever have ‘perceived clearly’,
i.e. known, anything. That’s the whole problem of Descartes and the basis
of modern doubt up to Gettier.
Now, let’s discuss the criterion I mentioned above. How do we know that
we are knowing? Or to put the same thing differently, how does one know
that she is perceiving something clearly?—And Prichard’s answer is as simple
as it could be: certainty.
To be certain of something is to know it. (Prichard 1950: 96)
For we should never think of ourselves as knowing something
unless we thought of ourselves as certain. (Prichard 1950: 97)
In fact, in the end it seems impossible to distinguish the mean-
ing of knowing and being certain; any reluctance to admit this
comes from a failure to distinguish being certain from what we
may call thinking without question. (Prichard 1950: 98)
So if Prichard’s point is certainty or being certain, there must be something
that makes us certain or necessitates the certainty Prichard is talking about.
What is it that makes us certain of something and thus we become to know
it (see Prichard 1950: 101-102)? And, again, the obvious answer, reasons,
must be rejected. For
[...] in the certainties [...] there is something which makes us
certain, i.e. renders it necessary or inevitable that we are certain.
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Now this something is what we should call our reason for being
certain. And, as consideration of instances will show, we mean by
our reason for being certain that A is B, another certainty, and a
certainty of something of a special kind, viz. our certainty that a
certain characteristic of an A requires or necessitates that an A
is B. [...] To say this, is only to give our reason for being certain,
in the same way we might give our reasons for thinking so and
so, in the sense of believing so and so. (Prichard 1950: 102)
This means, the first reason for rejecting reasons as the criterion that makes
us certain and therefore let us know something is the already noted funda-
mental difference between knowing and believing. As we have seen above,
having reasons means having evidence and evidence is a characteristic fea-
ture of the realm of believing, not of knowledge. Further, as argued above,
there is no guarantee of the factuality in having evidence. If having reasons
meant being certain then
we [have to] ask, ‘Must the things about which we are certain
correspond with our certainty by really having the property which
we are certain they have?’, we have to answer ‘No’. For even
though there is something which renders it necessary that we are
certain that the thing has that property and not another, our
being certain that it has it does not require or necessitate that
it has it. For its possession or non-possession of the property
depends on its nature and not on the nature of any attitude of
ours towards its possession or non-possession of it. (Prichard
1950: 101) [Italics from Prichard]
So having reasons couldn’t make us certain in the sense of knowing.
The second reason for rejecting reasons as the criterion that makes us
certain is the problem of establishing an infinite regress (see as well Urmson
1988: 13):
But to this the answer is, as we shall see if we think it out, that
there cannot be such a thing as a reason for a reason, or more
fully our having a reason for having a reason [...] (Prichard 1950:
103)
So, Prichard concludes
that the certainty that one thing necessitates another is in one
respect analogous to such a certainty as that now our condition
is one of perplexity, viz. in being simple, in the sense that our
certainty does not depend on a reason. (Prichard 1950: 103)
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Bearing in mind that being certain is not a matter of having any reasons
because, as Prichard said, it is a question of “the nature” of a thing, we can
conclude that the basis of being certain according to Prichard’s argument is
“that we know a certain fact in nature” (Prichard 1950: 103/104). Whereas
this “certain fact in nature” means
that anyone who said that he was certain that the sun moved
would, when the difference between being certain and thinking
without question had been pointed out to him, end by saying
that what really he was certain of was that he had had certain
perceptions. (Prichard 1950: 98) [Italics from Prichard]
And as we have seen in the discussion above, those “certain perceptions” are
bare sensations which then completes the circle: having bare sensations is
the only thing we can be certain of, i.e. we have any knowledge of, because
as the argument from illusion had shown
[...] so far as knowledge of things in the physical world is con-
cerned, as soon as we discover, as sooner or later we must, that
we do not observe, i.e. perceive, physical things at all. (Prichard
1950: 102)
3.2.4 Some criticisms
After knowing now Prichard’s version of the MS thesis, i.e. his approach to
knowledge, some criticisms arise. In general we can distinguish two main
criticisms:
1. Criticisms concerning Prichard’s concept of certainty.
2. Criticisms concerning the scope of Prichard’s understanding of knowl-
edge.
We begin with the first criticisms: Prichard’s concept of certainty. As we
have seen above, Prichard maintains that if one is certain of something, she
knows this something, i.e. being certain means knowing and vice versa. But
[i]t will be urged that it is preposterous to maintain that, when we
are certain, we know, since obviously we and others have often
been certain, and yet afterwards found that we were mistaken.
Men, for example, were at one time certain that the sun goes
round the earth, or that local spirits interfered with the course of
nature; again two men are frequently certain of contrary things,
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e.g. that motion is absolute and that it is relative, that space
might have a fourth dimension and that it could not, that space
is infinite and that it is not. But in such cases only one can be
right, and as both are in the same kind of state, even the one who
is right cannot know. (Prichard 1950: 96) [Italics from Prichard]
So we are undoubtedly confronted with two problems that seem to object
Prichard’s assertion that being certain means knowing. The first is that
there are many instances of, so to speak, mistaken certainties throughout
history: somewhere along the way one was “certain that the sun goes round
the earth” or that thunderstorms were caused by angry gods, and so on and
so forth. But if those people were really certain of the sun going round
the earth or angry gods causing thunderstorms, how could those certainties,
that is knowledge, turn out as non-factual? Or in other words, how could
something known turn out to be false? As Prichard himself had argued above,
false knowledge is impossible. That is the reason why “we must recognize the
fundamental difference between knowing and believing”. For the possibility
of failure is the characteristic feature of belief.
The second problem that seems to object Prichard’s assertion that being
certain means knowing is the mere fact that at the same time two people
maintain to be certain of contradictory things. Witness A asserts to be cer-
tain that it was Jones who left the crime scene, whereas witness B asserts to
be certain that it was Smith who left the crime scene. The law of contradic-
tion tells us that one of them must be wrong but how could that be true if
both of them are certain, i.e. knowing what they have just asserted?
Now, what could Prichard reply to this? We already know his answer if
we remember the last subsection. There Prichard has argued:
And we should add [...] that anyone who said that he was certain
that the sun moved would, when the difference between being
certain and thinking without question had been pointed out to
him, end by saying that what really he was certain of was that
he had had certain perceptions. (Prichard 1950: 98) [Italics by
Prichard]
As we have seen in the last subsection, being certain means having per-
ceived something directly. And perceiving directly is apprehending some-
thing. The only thing which we are able to apprehend in perception is bare
sensations. So concerning the problem of certainty in Prichard’s approach we
have to notice that we are certain if and only if there was the apprehension of
a fact in nature, which is having bare sensations. That means we could never
be certain of things like the sun going round the earth or that it was Jones
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who left the crime scene, because those ‘certainties’ are referring to concrete,
i.e. physical, objects. And for reasons stated above, physical objects are
not a matter of perception at all. At best we are only thinking that we are
certain of those things and that is, as Prichard has argued, the ‘straight off
mistake’ of perception. In this sense, i.e. the ordinary sense, of perception
there is no knowledge and hence no certainty except an imaginary one. But,
indeed, as Prichard notes this being so:
The objection is of course serious [...]. And its seriousness is
increased so far as knowledge of things in the physical world is
concerned, as soon as we discover, as sooner or later we must, that
we do not observe, i.e. perceive, physical things at all. (Prichard
1950: 102)
For, bearing this in mind, it follows that there is very, very little which we
are able to know at all. And this tiny remainder is much smaller than we
think we would or could know, which enters the second criticism: taking
for granted that the scope of knowledge is bare sensations, then knowing
something equals knowing nothing. For perceiving, i.e. apprehending, bare
sensations means knowing nothing but having some natureless sensation.
Now, this objection seems to be really serious because it contradicts all
our everyday experiences and plain intuitions about knowledge. But, think,
is this Prichardian result really so futile? Strictly speaking, it is in the end a
matter of clarity: if we claim knowledge to be infallible concerning the facts,
what in the end is the only thing that we can undoubtedly know in this sense
of knowledge?—Having bare sensations! This is the only ‘real’ fact that could
never be mistaken. Further, ‘knowledge’ understood as propositional atti-
tude, as the JTB thesis does, is necessarily fallible, as the discussion of Cook
Wilson had shown. The only way to get out of this and to enlarge the scope
of knowledge from the naked bare sensations to the plain physical objects of
our everyday experience is to accept the existence of fallible knowledge. But
Prichard as well as the opposite proponents of the JTB thesis doesn’t want
to go that way. This is the reason why the latter is confronted with the Get-
tier challenge as an unsolvable problem and Prichard with the insuperable
frontier of having bare sensations as the only things one could be certain of.
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3.2.5 Conclusion
Now, in what terms could we summarize the bottom line of the Prichardian
approach of the MS thesis in contrast to Wilson’s?—The Prichardian quintes-
sence concerning the nature of knowledge is this: there is no knowledge out-
side having bare sensations and the whole so-called external world is merely
a matter of belief—at best a case of opinion.
Now, the interesting thing to note is that Prichard began his argument
with a thesis against Cook Wilson: there is no apprehension in perception.
And he ends up, as we have seen in the last subsection, with the thesis that
perceiving clearly is the only way to be certain that a state of mind is really a
knowledge state of mind; that is ‘perceiving clearly’ means apprehension. In
other words, for Prichard perception is also the fundamentum relationis con-
cerning the nature of knowledge as in the case of Cook Wilson. And insofar
Prichard as well as Cook Wilson understands knowledge necessarily as an ul-
timate kind—for what could be more ultimate than having bare sensations?
This is why in the Prichardian approach of the MS thesis knowledge—having
bare sensations—couldn’t be defined in terms of other things. But the differ-
ence between the Prichardian approach of the MS thesis and the Wilsonian
one is their different understanding of what perception really is; i.e. its
scope and limits. To put the same thing in a slightly different manner, what
things do we really, i.e. clearly as Prichard would say, perceive, that means
indubitable and certain?
While Cook Wilson was generous in that point in applying his realism,
naively as Prichard has argued, on every perceptual case, Prichard on the
contrary recognizes that doing so would lead to serious epistemological prob-
lems concerning the success of the MS thesis, as the whole discussion of the
argument from illusion had shown. For if there is no apprehension possible
in perception, as the argument from illusion seems to imply, what would be
the epistemic value of apprehension in explaining knowledge if there is any?
(Remember that apprehension was defined in terms of direct knowledge!)
So for Prichard the answer to the question was clear: in order to justify
apprehension as the nature of knowledge, an object of perception is needed
which is of indubitable certainty: and this is having bare sensations. This
is the ultimate and pure level of perceiving something which is necessarily
unpolluted by any propositional attitude towards it because of the bareness
of its pure existence.
But as sophisticated as it may seem, Prichard’s solution is associated with
a rigorous consequence: in order to isolate the idea of apprehension as the
nature of knowledge from its greatest enemy—the argument from illusion—
Prichard had lost contact to the concrete world; i.e. there is no knowledge of
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the physical world any more. Now the possibility of knowledge is reduced to
some abstract relation: the apprehension of bare sensations—a result which
doesn’t really satisfy.
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3.3 John L. Austin
3.3.1 Introduction
Our next—and last—stop on the road to knowledge in Oxford Realism’s
company is John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960). And, of course, he too was
an Oxford Professor, but, as luck would have it, Austin was appointed to
the White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1952 which he held until his early
death in February 1960. Thus, as in the present philosophical consideration
in real life, he was the successor of Prichard—and this in a quite formally
way (for further biographical information and some description of Austin’s
favoured ‘method’ of doing philosophy, see for example Berlin 1973, Pitcher
1973, Warnock 1973a/b and Marion 2000).
Before entering into an analysis of Austin’s core view concerning knowl-
edge, I have to state first some difficulties concerning such an analysis. The
first thing to say is that, akin to Prichard and Cook Wilson, Austin was more
a teacher than a writer, so to speak. His two books—Sense and Sensibilia,
edited by G.F. Warnock, and How to do things with words, edited by J.O.
Urmson, both in 1962—were published posthumously and basically consisted
of unfinished lecture notes—the last one the so-called William James Lec-
tures delivered at Harvard University in 1955, the former recurring lectures
at Oxford University—“reconstructed from the manuscript notes” as it is to
be read on the cover of Sense and Sensibilia. Austin’s further publications
during his lifetime, some dozen papers edited in Philosophical Papers 1961,
could be characterized as a widespread engagement over the whole array of
philosophy: from Plato’s Republic and the ethics of Aristotle to topics such
as Other Minds and Pretending. Hence, in Austin’s philosophy we do not
find an elaborated core issue he would argue for in a systematic way through
his whole work—except from a recurring effort for clarity in language and
speech, of course.
It seems as if Austin was more interested in asking (the right) questions
than in giving answers to philosophical problems. And his favoured method
here to explicate the ‘real’ problem within a philosophical challenge often
looks like putting the cart before the horse, so to speak, by pointing out in
what way things easily went wrong by applying definite solutions to philo-
sophical challenges—often attended by vigorous criticisms against ‘school
philosophy’ (see for example Berlin 1973, Pitcher 1973, Warnock 1973a/b).
In this sense a second difficulty in discussing the Austinian conception
of knowledge is that we often—mostly in the crucial cases—get merely (the
right) questions where one would, naturally, expect (conclusive) answers.
So one has to read carefully between the lines more than it would be usual
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practice to get an idea of what Austin’s approach concerning knowledge really
is. Maybe this is the reason why Austin’s epistemological approach is so little
received in the literature, contrary to his famous ‘speech act theory’.
However, regarding our present purpose of answering the question what
the nature of knowledge is, two publications of Austin’s complete works are
of interest: the already mentioned Sense and Sensibilia and his Other Minds
[1979] “a contribution in 1946 to another symposion” as Warnock 1973a:
32 in his book on Austin’s life and work mentioned. As we already are
acquainted with the point of substance in Sense and Sensibilia from the dis-
cussion in section 3.1 and 3.2, I will concentrate in the following investigation
mainly on Austin’s argument in his Other Minds. If it turns out to be useful
during the discussion of Austin’s point of view, I will switch to Sense and
Sensibilia as well in order to elucidate ambiguous points if necessary.
We should begin our consideration on Austin’s approach of knowledge
with the proof of the affiliation of his thinking to the MS thesis, and hence
to Oxford Realism. In reference to this we can state two points of substance
in the Austinian approach that corresponds to the already known claims of
CookWilson and Prichard, which identifies Austin as a member of the Oxford
Realists. In chapter X of his Sense and Sensibilia Austin argues concerning
the question of evidence as an indicator for having knowledge that (see also
Marion 2000: 510-512)
[t]he situation in which I would properly be said to have evidence
for the statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example,
in which the beast itself is not actually on view, but I can see
plenty of pig-like marks on the ground outside its retreat. If I
find a few buckets of pig-food, that’s a bit more evidence, and
the noises and the smell may provide better evidence still. But if
the animal then emerges and stands there plainly in view, there is
no longer any question of collecting evidence; its coming into view
doesn’t provide me with more evidence that it’s a pig, I can now
just see that it is, the question is settled. And of course I might,
in different circumstances, have just seen this in the first place,
and not have to bother with collecting evidence at all. Again,
if I actually see one man shoot another, I may give evidence, as
an eye-witness, to those less favourably placed; but I don’t have
evidence for my own statement that the shooting took place, I
actually saw it. (Austin 1962b: 115/116) [Italics from Austin]
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Therefore Austin concludes in his further discussion
that the general doctrine about knowledge3 which I sketched at
the beginning of this section, [...], is radically and in principle
misconceived. For even if we were to make the very risky and
gratuitous assumption that what some particular person knows
at some particular place and time could systematically be sorted
out into an arrangement of foundations and super-structure, it
would be a mistake in principle to suppose that the same thing
could be done for knowledge in general. And this is because there
could be no general answer to the questions what is the evidence
for what, what is certain, what is doubtful, what needs or does
not need evidence, can or can’t be verified. If the Theory of
Knowledge consists in finding grounds for such answer, there is
no such thing. (Austin 1962b: 123/124) [Italics from Austin]
The latter quote is the denial of a ‘theory’ of knowledge as we can find it in
the discussion of Cook Wilson and Prichard in section 3.1 and 3.2. Whereas
the first quote means the well known claim in the tradition of Cook Wilson
and Prichard that there is a substantial distinction between knowledge on
the one hand and opinion and belief on the other, insofar as knowledge is a
matter of apprehension (“but I don’t have evidence for my own statement
that the shooting took place, I actually saw it”) and opinion and belief are
a case of evidence (see as well a passage and the footnote in Other Minds,
Austin 1979: 107-108, to prove that point). Austin propounds an interesting
argument in order to prove that claim—it is a linguistic one.
At first he noticed that there is a fundamental difference concerning the
interrogative between questioning a knowledge case and questioning a belief
case: (i) “ ‘How do you know?’ ” contrary to (ii) “ ‘Why do you believe?’
”. And he asserts that it would be some kind of oddity in doing it the other
way around: “We seem never to ask ‘Why do you know?’ or ‘How do you
believe?’ ” (see Austin 1979: 78) [Italics from Austin]. And Austin therefore
asserts that
3“In a nutshell, the doctrine about knowledge, ‘empirical’ knowledge, is that it has
foundations. It is a structure the upper tiers of which are reached by inferences, and the
foundations are the data on which these inferences are based. [...] Now the trouble with
inferences is that they may be mistaken; whenever we take a step, we may put a foot
wrong. Thus—so the doctrine runs—the way to identify the upper tiers of the structure
of knowledge is to ask whether one might be mistaken, whether there is something that
one can doubt [...].” (Austin 1962b: 105) [Italics from Austin] See as well chapter 2 of this
book and the interesting analogy to the JTB thesis and the Gettier problem.
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[s]ome of the answers to the question ‘How do you know?’ are,
oddly enough, described as ‘reasons for knowing’ or ‘reasons to
know’, or even sometimes as ‘reasons why I know’, despite the
fact that we do not ask ‘Why do you know?’ But now surely,
according to the Dictionary, ‘reasons’ should be given in answer
to the question ‘Why?’ just as we do in fact give reasons for
believing in answer to the question ‘Why do you believe?’ (Austin
1979: 81)
So, of course, giving ‘reasons’ is the appropriate answer to why-questions
and ‘Why’ is the adequate interrogative concerning a question of belief, as
we have seen. Therefore Austin concludes that it must be belief rather than
knowledge that is a matter of having reasons or giving those because as a
matter of fact there is no suggestive meaning of asking ‘Why do you know’.
Talking about ‘reasons’ in a suggestive way concerning knowledge, if there
is any, would then mean as Austin notes: “stating how I come to be in a
position to know.” (Austin 1979: 81) But,
[r]easons for believing on the other hand are normally quite a
different affair (a recital of symptoms, arguments in support, and
so forth), though there are cases where we do give as reasons for
believing our having been in a position in which we could get good
evidence: ‘Why do you believe he was lying?’ ‘I was watching him
very closely.’ (Austin 1979: 81) [Italics from Austin]
The point Austin refers to here is clear: there is a significant difference
between having evidence and merely giving those. For, as Austin had noted
in a quote above,
if I actually see one man shoot another, I may give evidence, as
an eye-witness, to those less favourably placed; but I don’t have
evidence for my own statement that the shooting took place, I
actually saw it. (Austin 1979: 115/116) [Italics from Austin]
Of course, I—the knowing subject—am able to give evidence for those who
were not present at a given occurrence that this occurrence really has hap-
pened and that I have apprehended it, so that they—the absentees—first,
could receive a propositional attitude concerning a given occurrence, i.e. giv-
ing them reasons to believe so, and, second, that they believe in me that
I—the attendee—really know what I have reported to them, i.e. giving them
reasons why I am in a position to know. Indeed this is “quite a different
affair”. So, giving reasons doesn’t entail having reasons in order to know a
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given occurrence. Therefore Austin concludes that having reasons is a mat-
ter of belief. That assigns the difference between knowing something and
believing something: in the case of believing something you have evidence
for believing so because you actually did not see it happen. But if there are
no reasons, and, hence, no evidence for knowing something, what is it then
instead of having evidence that characterizes a knowledge case?
Even though Austin never uses the term ‘apprehension’ to indicate his
point, we are nevertheless justified in concluding so, because of his vigorous
italics in the quote from Austin 1962b: 115/116, if we remember the passage:
“its coming into view doesn’t provide me with more evidence that it’s a pig,
I can now just see that it is, the question is settled.” Or as Austin argues in
Other Minds:
Our claim, in saying we know (i.e. that we can tell) is to recognize:
and recognizing, at least in this sort of case, consists in seeing,
or otherwise sensing, a feature or features which we are sure are
similar to something noted (and usually named) before, on some
earlier occasion in our experience. (Austin 1979: 84) [Italics from
Austin]
And further, Austin 1979: 106, again:
When the cheese is not to be found or seen, then there may be
traces of it: but not when it’s there in front of us (though of
course, there aren’t, then, ‘no traces’ of it either).
The matter of fact here seems to me an evident case, if we remember that
‘apprehension’ was defined in terms of direct knowledge, i.e. perception, (see
as well subsection 3.1.2 of this book). Thus Marion 2000: 512 notes:
To speak in the manner of Cook Wilson, the opinion that a pig
is living in the immediate surroundings (although it is not seen)
is ‘founded on evidence we know to be insufficient’, since the
evidence is compatible with the fact that another animal is about,
whereas ‘it is of the very nature of knowledge not to make its
statements at all on grounds recognized to be insufficient’ and
knowledge has ‘nothing to do with the so-called ‘greater strength’
of the evidence on which the opinion is grounded’. This is the
view that has set Realists apart from the whole of the empiricist
tradition and twentieth-century epistemology and, bearing it in
mind, we see that Austin’s argument relies on it.
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And he continues to maintain that
[f]or Austin simply says that the seeing of the pig settles the
question because he is assuming that one therefore knows that the
animal dwelling in the surroundings is a pig. He also clearly states
that when one sees or knows that it is a pig, one does not need
to collect further evidence—the grounds are obviously sufficient.
Furthermore Austin is implying that collecting evidence is needed
in order to form the opinion that it is a pig that lives around
(again, this being compatible with the case that it was not in the
end a pig that was living about). It is therefore implied that the
case of opinion and knowledge are two and that in the latter case
‘greater strength’ of the evidence does not intervene (otherwise
the question would not be settled). (Marion 2000: 512) [Italics
from Marion]
Thus it is clear for Marion that
[t]his example shows how Austin is surreptitiously relying on
Cook Wilsonian arguments and that arguments where he does
are, however witty, in the end worth no more and no less than
Cook Wilson’s. (Marion 2000: 512)
And insofar we can conclude further that Austin as well as Cook Wilson
and Prichard objects the JTB thesis as an appropriate notion of knowledge.
So far Austin’s involvement with the school of Oxford Realism and his iden-
tification as a successor of Cook Wilson and Prichard. But now let’s turn to
the substantial core of Austin’s knowledge claim: what does his ‘theory’ of
knowledge look like?
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3.3.2 Austin’s theory of knowledge
As Cook Wilson and Prichard before, Austin denies the possibility of a the-
ory of knowledge as we have seen above. But he does so with an essential
difference to Cook Wilson and Prichard. Cook Wilson and Prichard have
denied a ‘theory of knowledge’ because of the ultimate epistemological sta-
tus of apprehension (Cook Wilson), respectively because of the apprehension
of bare sensations (Prichard). So for them it is, on logical grounds, impos-
sible to define something ultimate—knowledge—in terms of something else.
Austin denies a theory of knowledge on quite other reasons: As Austin 1979:
123/124 claims in the above noted quote, there is “no general answer to the
questions what is the evidence for what, what is certain, what is doubtful,
what needs or does not need evidence, can or can’t be verified” and if these
are the questions a ‘theory of knowledge’ is concerned with, there is no such
thing as a theory of knowledge. So Austin’s main theme concerning the im-
possibility of a theory of knowledge is that there is a misconceived notion of
what a theory of knowledge ought to consist in (Austin 1979: 123/124 calls
it “the general doctrine of knowledge”); viz. the core issue of the JTB thesis:
knowledge consists in having evidence. Thus, the answer is to change the
general doctrine of knowledge in order to explicate an appropriate ‘theory of
knowledge’.
But why should the general notion of knowledge be misconceived (note
that Prichard also uses such an argument concerning the notion of perception
as we have seen in section 3.2) and in what way exactly? Now, to answer
that question, the first thing to note is that, as we have already said, there is
no evidence in having knowledge, and thus, it would be indeed misconceived
if a theory of knowledge consisted in asking questions of evidence. But a
second and more interesting point in Austin’s claim is that he challenges the
assumption—the assumption of those who hold that knowledge is a matter
of evidence, i.e. the JTB theorists—that knowledge could be in any way
systematized “into an arrangement of foundations and super-structure”. A
fortiori, even if we assume so for the knowledge of “some particular person at
some particular time and place”, which is “risky and gratuitous”, “it would
be a mistake in principle to suppose that the same thing could be done for
knowledge in general” (Austin 1962b: 124). In other words, knowledge is
in no way an object of systematisation, i.e. it couldn’t be understood as
abstracted from the knowledge situation—“some particular person at some
particular time and place”—as something general.
That is the difference I explained above between CookWilson and Prichard
on the one hand and Austin on the other concerning the impossibility of
a theory of knowledge. Cook Wilson and Prichard argue that knowledge
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couldn’t be defined, i.e. explained, in terms of other categories, because it is
an ultimate category with reference to apprehension as its core characteristic,
whereas Austin maintains that knowledge is no object of systematisation at
all, not because it is an ultimate thing and thus undefinable, but because
it couldn’t be dissociated from a concrete knowledge case. In other words,
there is no such thing as a knowledge in general which means something to-
tally different from Cook Wilson’s and Prichard’s claim. They didn’t deny
that there is or could be a knowledge in general. Their point is that there is
no explanation of it because of its ultimate status; except for the notion of
apprehension, of course. Austin, however, radicalises his point: there is no
such thing called ‘knowledge in general’ because it is not possible to dissoci-
ate it from its happening. In this sense, I think, we cannot enter the realm
of a forceful MS thesis without considering this essential aspect of Austin. I
will come back to this in the last chapter, summarizing the general line of
argument. For the time being, let us concentrate on how Austin’s argument
runs in detail.
Now, what are Austin’s reasons for arguing in the way just mentioned?
Why is there no such thing as ‘knowledge in general’ and, thus, knowledge is
bound to the concrete knowledge case, as I have argued above? In his charac-
teristic way of arguing—putting the cart before the horse—Austin approaches
his main theme—why is “the general doctrine about knowledge radically and
in principle misconceived”—by examining the way a knowledge claim could
go wrong in the sense of the general doctrine of knowledge, i.e. examining
those cases in which a knowledge claim turns out to be false and hence, then,
the knowledge claim turns out to be as no knowledge at all. In other words,
Austin considers the conclusiveness of the statement “If I know I can’t be
wrong”. And his answer is: No, you can be wrong and nevertheless your
knowledge claim therefore is neither defeated nor challenged!
Certainly, if what has so far been said is correct, then we
are often right to say we know, even in cases where we turn out
subsequently to have been mistaken—and indeed we seem always,
or practically always, liable to be mistaken.
Now we are perfectly, and should be candidly, aware of this
liability, which does not, however, transpire to be so very onerous
in practice. The human intellect and senses are, indeed, inher-
ently fallible and delusive, but not by any means inveterately so.
Machines are inherently liable to break down, but good machines
don’t (often). It is futile to embark on a ‘theory of knowledge’
which denies this liability after all, and denying the existence of
‘knowledge’. (Austin 1979: 98) [Italics from Austin]
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In arguing so, Austin mentions two classical cases of how a knowledge
claim concerning the general doctrine, i.e. the JTB thesis, could go wrong
and thus the epistemic subject doesn’t know anything at all:
These are the worries about ‘reality’ and about being ‘sure
and certain’. [...]
It is this further sort of challenge that may now be made, a
challenge as to the reliability of our alleged ‘credentials’ and our
alleged ‘facts’. You may ask:
(1) But do you know it’s a real goldfinch? How do you know
you’re not dreaming? [...]
(2) But are you certain it’s the right red for a goldfinch?
(Austin 1979: 86)
Reality
Let’s turn at first to the cases concerning the “reality” of the knowledge
claim, i.e. for example seeing an oasis and in reality it turns out to be a
mirage:
In various special, recognized ways, depending essentially upon
the nature of the matter which I have announced myself to know,
either my current experiencing or the item currently under con-
sideration (or uncertain which) may be abnormal, phoney. Either
I myself may be dreaming, or in delirium, or under the influence
of mescal, &c.: or else the item may be stuffed, painted, dummy,
artificial, trick, freak, toy, assumed, feigned, &c.: or else again
there’s an uncertainty (it’s left open) whether I am to blame or
it is—mirages, mirror images, odd lighting effects, &c. (Austin
1979: 87) [Italics from Austin]
If we remember some sections ago, we can assume what kind of argument
Austin is discussing here: it is an old acquaintance of ours—‘the argument
from illusion’. It is the well-known worry that if we build our knowledge
claims on the grounds of perception, then there would be an open range
of deception. Therefore, so the argument concludes for reasons already ex-
plained above, the reliability of such knowledge claims is negligible.
Now, as we have seen from the discussion above, Austin denies the con-
clusiveness of the argument of illusion. But here in this context he adds
one further interesting point concerning the inappropriateness of such an
argument. He maintains that even
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‘[b]eing sure it’s real’ is no more proof against miracles or outrages
of nature than anything else is or, sub species humanitatis, can
be. [...] When I have made sure it’s a real goldfinch (not stuffed,
corroborated by the disinterested, &c.) then I am not ‘predicting’
in saying it’s a real goldfinch, and in a very good sense I can’t
be proved wrong whatever happens. It seems a serious mistake
to suppose that language (or most language, language about real
things) is ‘predictive’ in such a way that the future can always
prove it wrong. (Austin 1979: 88) [Italics from Austin]
To put it briefly, knowledge claims are in no way “predictive”, i.e. knowing
something would entail a commitment regarding future occurrences of the
same sort to happen in almost the same manner as done in the knowledge
case (see as well Austin 1979: 101 “meaning by predictions claims to know the
future”). Of course, taken for granted that a knowledge claim is not predic-
tive at all, knowledge in no way “can’t be proved wrong whatever happens”.
This Austinian idea of the ‘non-predictiveness’ of knowledge claims necessar-
ily follows from the conception of knowledge as MS thesis. Remember that
knowledge in this sense is bound to a situation in which the apprehension of
some thing takes place. And, indeed, any future case is thereby defined that
it has not yet happened and hence no apprehension of it could have taken
place. So Austin maintains that,
it is overlooked that the conditions which must be satisfied if I am
to show that a thing is within my cognisance or within my power
are conditions, not about the future, but about the present and
the past : it is not demanded that I do more than believe about
the future. (Austin 1979: 101) [Italics from Austin]
This is the reason why a knowledge claim according to the MS thesis never
could be predictive and therefore these arguments only show a misconceived
understanding of a theory of knowledge as Austin has claimed. Reasonable
questions about the ‘reality’ of what is claimed to be known therefore must
be related directly to a situation of apprehension, i.e. some situation “present
or past”.
Certainty
Austin mentions a second worry concerning knowledge, i.e. a second way
in which a knowledge claim could go wrong, that would be adduced by the
general doctrine of knowledge: the “certainty” of a given knowledge claim,
i.e. the view of “ ‘the peculiarity of a man’s knowledge of his own sensations’
” (Austin 1979: 90). Austin explains this view as follows:
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I can ‘say what I see (or otherwise sense)’ almost quite literally.
On this view, if I were to say ‘Here is something red’, then I
might be held to imply or to state it is really a red thing, a thing
which would appear red in a standard light, or to other people, or
tomorrow too, and perhaps even more besides: all of which ‘in-
volves prediction’ (if not also a metaphysical substratum). Even
if I were to say ‘Here is something which looks red’, I might still
be held to imply or state that it looks red to others also, and so
forth. If, however, I confine myself to stating ‘Here is something
that looks red to me now’, then at last I can’t be wrong (in the
most favoured sense). (Austin 1979: 90/91)
So what is maintained here is an inevitable certainty of any kind of knowledge
concerning sensations (or “ ‘sense-statements’ ” as Austin quotes his oppo-
nent, Mr. Wisdom (Austin 1979: 90)). That is, if I have had a sensation
of something I never could be wrong, i.e. I am perceiving something in the
right (real) way, and insofar I am necessarily knowing what I have sensed.
Austin doesn’t agree with that notion:
This seems to me mistaken, though it is a view that, in more
or less subtle forms, has been the basis of a very great deal of
philosophy. It is perhaps the original sin (Berkeley’s apple, the
tree in the quad) by which the philosopher casts himself out from
the garden of the world we live in. (Austin 1979: 90)
He doesn’t agree, first, because here again as has been noted in the case of
‘reality’, the notion of certainty entails a predictive quality of knowledge—
“and perhaps even more besides: all of which ‘involves prediction’ ”—which
Austin has already criticised as false.
And the second reason for Austin to reject this notion of certainty is the
artificial character of understanding certainty in this way. For
[t]ake tastes, or take sounds: these are so much better as examples
than colours, because we never feel so happy with our other senses
as with our eyesight. Any description of a taste or sound or smell
(or colour) or of a feeling, involves (is) saying that it is like one
or some that we have experienced before: any descriptive word is
classificatory, involves recognition and in that sense memory, and
only when we use such words (or names or descriptions, which
come down to the same) are we knowing anything, or believing
anything. But memory and recognition are often uncertain and
unreliable. (Austin 1979: 91/92)
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So Austin’s point is that such requests concerning the certainty of having
sensed something as the general doctrine of knowledge maintains are simply
inappropriate. There is no such thing existing in “the world we live in” as
an absolute, an unchallengeable certainty in having sensations. The truth is
that certainty is a ‘backward’ concept—“Any description of a taste or sound
or smell (or colour) or of a feeling, involves (is) saying that it is like one or
some that we have experienced before”—and not a prospective one. Claiming
the latter, as the general doctrine of knowledge does,
leads to the view that (or to talking as though) sensa, that is
things, colours, noises, and the rest, speak or are labelled by na-
ture, so that I can literally say what (that which) I see: it pipes
up, or I read it off. It is as if sensa were literally to ‘announce
themselves’ or to ‘identify themselves’, in the way we indicate
when we say ‘It presently identified itself as a particularly fine
white rhinoceros’. But surely this is only a manner of speaking,
a reflexive idiom in which the French, for example, indulge more
freely than the English: sensa are dumb, and only previous ex-
perience enables us to identify them. (Austin 1979: 97) [Italics
from Austin]
There is no such thing as a direct realism that would tell me right that what
I have actually sensed is this and that thing. It is not the senses that would
tell me what kind of thing something is but my memory: I am recognizing
that what I have just now sensed equals some sensation in the past, therefore
I am identifying the sensed thing as that thing I have sensed before.
Our claim, in saying we know (i.e. that we can tell) is to recognize:
and recognizing, at least in this sort of case, consists of seeing,
or otherwise sensing, a feature or features which we are sure are
similar to something noted (and usually named) before, on some
earlier occasion in our experience. (Austin 1979: 84) [Italics from
Austin]
So this identification, i.e. the ‘certainty’ that I have sensed this and that,
comes from comparing my memories and not from any sensation itself. This
is the reason why “sensa are dumb, and only previous experience enables us
to identify them”.
If we remember the discussion of Prichard’s approach, we already know
this point: there Prichard maintains that we never perceive concrete things
but only bare sensations. Austin here argues in the same way: there is no
identification of a thing through sensing it. What something is, or rather
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what we call it to be, is a matter of resemblance, the resemblance of what
we actually sense, the bare or “dumb” sensation, with what we have sensed
before. If those resemblances between actually and past sensations take place
often, then we name ‘it’ a ‘so-and-so’. This is the way concrete things ‘came
into existence’ (see as well Kohne 2005a and 2005b). Note that I don’t think
that Marion 2000: 513 is right in arguing “while Prichard moved away from
direct realism (...), I should like to claim that Austin defended a more radical
form of realism than ever any propounded by his predecessors.” Rather than
that I would like to claim that Austin moved even more away from direct
realism. For Austin considers the necessary consequences from Prichard’s
moving away from direct realism.
But as a matter of fact, in comparing my present sensation with those
I have had in the past, i.e. with my memory, it often happens that I have
remembered wrong. What happens then is that I ‘identify’ the perceived
sensa with the false name. For, as Austin had said, “memory and recogni-
tion are often uncertain and unreliable” (see for example the discussion on
perception in subsection 3.2.2 with which Prichard was so much concerned).
In this sense there is, indeed, no place for a notion of certainty as the general
doctrine of knowledge assumes it. Disregarding this is “the original sin by
which the philosopher casts himself out from the garden of the world we live
in”.
Some consequences
So if we summarize now Austin’s criticism concerning the general doctrine
of knowledge, we can conclude with Austin that
[s]urely, if what has so far been said is correct, then we are
often right to say we know even in cases where we turn out sub-
sequently to have been mistaken—and indeed we seem always, or
practically, liable to be mistaken.
It is futile to embark on a ‘theory of knowledge’ which de-
nies this liability: such theories constantly end up by admitting
the liability after all, and denying the existence of ‘knowledge’.
(Austin 1979: 98) [Italics from Austin]
After being aware now of Austin’s criticism concerning the general doc-
trine of knowledge, we are entitled to ask whether he has some positive thing
to say about knowledge. That is, what is Austin’s alternative approach to
knowledge? Did he have any?—Yes, I think he had. But his effort seems to
be more radical than Cook Wilson and Prichard would ever have been. We
already know from the discussion just done that knowledge, as Austin sees
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things, is fundamentally fallible. But now how to deal with this diagnosis in a
positive way? Note that the sceptic would agree with Austin in this point fre-
netically, but draw from that a negative consequence: if any knowledge claim
turns out to be necessarily fallible, then there is no such thing as knowledge.
Why doesn’t Austin turn into the same direction as the sceptic?—Because
doing so would mean to slip up in the same way as the proponent of the
general doctrine of knowledge does: misconceiving knowledge!
[i]t is naturally always possible (‘humanly’ possible) that I may be
mistaken or may break my word, but that itself is no bar against
using the expressions ‘I know’ (...) as we do in fact use them.
(Austin 1979: 98) [Italics from Austin]
Far from it! For Austin notes that:
‘When you know you can’t be wrong’ is perfectly good sense. You
are prohibited from saying ‘I know it is so, but I may be wrong’,
just as you are prohibited from saying ‘I promise I will, but I may
fail’. If you are aware you may be mistaken, you ought not to
say you know, just as, if you are aware you may break your word,
you have no business to promise. But of course, being aware that
you may be mistaken doesn’t mean merely being aware that you
are a fallible human being: it means that you have some concrete
reasons to suppose that you may be mistaken in this case. Just
as ‘but I may fail’ does not mean merely ‘but I am a weak human
being’ (...): it means that there is some concrete reason for me
to suppose that I shall break may word. (Austin 1979: 98)
This is so because the question is not whether some abstract possibilities
exist that might prove you wrong (of course there are, you are only a fallible
human being), but if you are in fact wrong, i.e. whether “you have concrete
reasons to suppose” so. But if you recognize “that further evidence or further
circumstances are liable to make [you] change your mind” (Austin 1979: 99),
you couldn’t be in a knowledge state of mind because evidence, as we have
seen, is a matter of belief and not a case of knowledge. Thus Austin argues
that
‘I know’ is taking a new plunge. But it is not saying ‘I have
performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the
same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite
sure’: for there is nothing in that scale superior to being quite
sure. (...) When I say ‘I know’, I give other my word : I give
others my authority for saying that ‘S is P’. When I have said
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only that I am sure, and prove to have been mistaken, I am not
liable to be rounded on by others in the same way as when I have
said ‘I know’. I am sure for my part, you can take it or leave it:
accept it if you think I’m an acute and careful person, that’s your
responsibility. But I don’t know ‘for my part’, and when I say ‘I
know’ I don’t mean you can take it or leave it (though of course
you can take it or leave it). (Austin 1979: 99/100) [Italics from
Austin]
So, this is to conceive knowledge in the right way. Contrary to Cook
Wilson and Prichard, Austin radicalises the MS thesis insofar as he maintains
that knowledge has to be understood literally as a performative act. In this
sense knowledge claims don’t describe or correspond to any facts ‘in the
world’, but are performing some special action (for the whole ‘theory of
performative acts’ see Austin 1962a):
To suppose that ‘I know’ is a descriptive phrase, is only one ex-
ample of the descriptive fallacy, so common in philosophy. Even
if some language is now purely descriptive, language was not in
origin so, and much of it is still not so. Utterance of obvious
ritual phrases, in the appropriate circumstances, are not describ-
ing the action we are doing, but doing it (‘I do’): in other cases
it functions, like tone and expression, or again like punctuation
and mood, as an intimation that we are employing language in
some special way (‘I warn’, ‘I ask’, ‘I define’). Such phrases can-
not, strictly, be lies, though they can ‘imply’ lies, as ‘I promise’
implies that I fully intend, which may be untrue. (Austin 1979:
103) [Italics from Austin]
In saying ‘I know’, following Austin, we are by no means giving some
description of some fact in the world, say reporting some “specially striking
feat of cognition”—for example indicating that I am ‘possessing’ the fact
that 1+1=2 or just referring to some fact in the world—but indeed doing
something in that world which is in fact something completely different. So
taking this for granted, ‘I know’ equals ‘I promise’. But other than in the
case of ‘I promise’ the question arises: what are we doing by saying ‘I know’
if ‘I know’ really is a performative?
Now, the problem is that Austin doesn’t really answer this question but
only compares ‘I know’ with its suggested companion ‘I promise’ and in doing
so reveals some resemblances between ‘I know’ and ‘I promise’ and, hence,
educes some consequences for the notion of knowledge. He considers:
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In the same way, when I say I fully intend to, I do so for my
part, and according as you think highly or poorly of my resolution
and chances, you will elect to act on it or not to act on it: but if
I say I promise, you are entitled to act on it, whether or not you
choose to do so. If I have said I know or I promise, you insult
me in a special way by refusing to accept it. We all feel the very
great difference between saying ‘I’m absolutely sure’ and saying ‘I
know’: it is like the difference between saying even ‘I firmly and
irrevocably intend’ and ‘I promise’. If someone has promised me
to do A, then I am entitled to rely on it, and can myself make
promises on the strength of it: and so, where someone has said
to me ‘I know’, I am entitled to say I know too, at second hand.
The right to say ‘I know’ is transmissible, in the sort of way that
other authority is transmissible. Hence, if I say it lightly, I may
be responsible for getting you into trouble.
If you say you know something, the most immediate challenge
takes the form of asking ‘Are you in a position to know?’: that is,
you must undertake to show, not merely that you are sure of it,
but that it is within your cognisance. There is a similar form of
challenge in the case of promising: fully intending is not enough—
you must also undertake to show that ‘you are in a position to
promise’, that is, that it is within your power. (Austin 1979: 100)
[Italics from Austin]
In arguing so, Austin mentions here three features of ‘I know’ that would
characterise a knowledge claim as performative:
1. I must have the authority to say ‘I know’, “it is within your cognisance”
and “not merely that you are sure of it”. In other words, as stated in the
discussion above, having mere evidence is not enough to be authorized
to say ‘I know’. More than that it is required to “see that it is” so that
“the question is settled” and hence I am “in a position to know”, i.e. I
now have the right to say ‘I know’.
2. Because having authority means having a high degree of reliance con-
cerning the one who has an authority in the field of which she is an
authority, i.e. being competent in something,—in the end this is the
reason for distinguishing between those who are authorities regarding
a given realm and those who are not; some are competent in a continu-
able way others are not—others are entitled to rely on in. Not in an
arbitrary way, but “whether or not you choose to do so”, so that “you
insult me in a special way by refusing to accept it”. For, challenging
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the knowledge claim of an authorized person is equal to challenging
his authority to do so. This means having the authority entails nec-
essarily the reliance of the accurateness of my knowledge claim to be
uncontradictable.
3. Because of the status of having an authority, just as mentioned above,
someone who is not in charge could now ‘borrow’ this authority for his
own purposes, i.e. for his own knowledge claim, by merely referring to
that authority. Not only that he can do so, a fortiori he is entitled
to do so. For, being an authority entails being generally accepted as
reliable. In this sense “ ‘I know’ is transmissible, in the sort of way that
other authority is transmissible”, too. Then even a ‘non-authority’ can
do a knowledge claim by reference to an authority. She can now claim
a ‘second hand knowledge’ which is bound to the authority of the ‘first
hand bearer’.
That is, having knowledge is, then, characterized by having authority,
having competence in a special realm and the capacity to deliver knowledge
to others. We can therefore conclude that the act we are performing in
saying ‘I know’ is calling for authority regarding the object of our knowledge
claim. Not in the sense of giving others just an information that I have
a knowledge, for this would be merely descriptive, which has already been
ruled out by Austin. To receive attention in my epistemic authority and
being accepted in this authority by others this what we are doing by saying
‘I know’ and this is the meaning of the act of saying ‘I know’, its social role,
so to speak, and this is calling for being a competent person. So, what does
a theory of knowledge look like according to Austin’s approach which does
not misconceive knowledge as the general doctrine of knowledge would do?—
The answer is that an appropriate theory of knowledge has to understand
knowledge in its social role as explained above. Knowledge is not a descriptive
but a performative case, i.e. some kind of a ‘social’ theory of knowledge is
needed here. But in fact Austin doesn’t develop any such theory. He merely
seems to be satisfied to point out that there is this demand to do so.
Perhaps, we can do now some tiny little step in that direction, i.e. give
some idea what such a theory could look like. Some results of our analysis
of knowledge in the chapter 2 may help us here. Remember our notion of
knowing how in the second chapter. There we first characterized knowing
how in subsection 2.2.2 as the competence of an epistemic subject to do
something. That is, being competent is knowing how to do something, which
means that an epistemic subject has a practical knowledge. But as it turns
out, practical knowledge is a matter of degree from mere competence to
excellence. Therefore an epistemic subject has to specify in which way exactly
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she knows how to do X in order to decide whether she is merely competent or
excellent. Second, we have seen in subsection 2.2.3 that the way of acquisition
of such practical knowledge is necessarily direct, so that practical knowledge
has to be understood as direct knowledge. Now, recalling those insights from
the second chapter, we can see the parallels concerning the Austinian notion
of knowledge as a performative.
i) As we have seen, having knowledge is characterized by Austin as having
authority and having authority means having competence in a special realm
and the capacity to deliver knowledge to others. So we can conclude that
having authority means having a practical knowledge and therefore Austin’s
notion of knowledge equals our notion of practical knowledge. More precisely,
if Austin is talking about knowledge, i.e. having authority, he is talking about
being excellent in a given realm. For, authority means having a high degree of
reliance and that is guaranteed by doing something well, which means being
excellent in performing competence. So we can conclude that the nature
of knowledge, i.e. the ultimate knowledge, according to Austin, is practical
knowledge.
(ii) Then—taking for granted that Austin’s notion of knowledge has to
be understood in terms of practical knowledge—Austin’s denial of a general
theory of knowledge could be explained with our notion of direct knowledge
as explicated in subsection 2.2.3. There we have noticed two things: first,
that direct knowledge means experiencing something and, hence, that direct
knowledge is necessarily bound to the epistemic subject. Because of this,
knowledge couldn’t exist independently of that subject who really has had
such an experience. (The same thing is claimed by Austin in his argument,
if you remember his notion that seeing X settles the question whether or not
there is an X.) For reasons we have given above, practical knowledge is a
direct knowledge. Second, we have further argued in subsection 2.2.3 that
direct knowledge is the foundation of indirect, i.e. propositional, knowledge
so that the propositional knowledge is reducible to the direct knowledge,
i.e. the practical knowledge. But if it is true that the propositional knowl-
edge is reducible to the direct, i.e. in Austin’s case the practical, knowledge,
then the propositional knowledge couldn’t be the ultimate, i.e. the nature
of knowledge. Therefore, as Austin has maintained, the general doctrine of
knowledge is misconceived, and in this sense no general theory of knowledge
that would define knowledge as independent of any direct knowledge situ-
ation is possible. For this theory, as we have seen, maintains the primacy
of propositions—having evidence, giving reasons etc.—regarding the foun-
dations of knowledge which as the argument above has shown misconceives
something derivative as ultimate. Having propositional knowledge rather
means, as Austin has argued above, at best referring to an authority which
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is second hand. For if one had direct knowledge she wouldn’t rely on evidence
with her knowledge claim, but just claim that she has seen so. So the only
role to play for propositional knowledge in the game of knowledge is then
the way “ ‘I know’ is transmissible, in the sort of way that other authority
is transmissible” too.
(iii) But doing the transmission, as Austin talks about, from practical
knowledge into propositional knowledge means some crucial consequence as
seen in section 2.4: fallibilism. Because during the transmission from di-
rect into indirect knowledge the awareness of, i.e. the direct access to, the
thing known gets irretrievably lost. But because only seeing X settles the
question whether there is X, as Austin has maintained, it sometimes hap-
pens that we are misled in knowing something, i.e. in having a propositional
knowledge. For, in having a propositional knowledge there is no direct ac-
cess to the known thing. Taking this argument from section 2.4 for granted,
Austin’s notion of fallible knowledge receives some justification, at least some
plausibility.
3.3.3 Some criticism’s
Of course Austin’s approach provokes some criticisms, perhaps many criti-
cisms. And the first criticism we can imagine is whether it is really conclusive
to set aside truth, justification, evidence and all that stuff? But as in the
cases of Cook Wilson and Prichard in the case of Austin too those criti-
cisms were unwarranted. For as we have seen in the previous subsections,
Austin had conclusively shown that arguing so would mean to misconceive
the notion of knowledge.
But, as we have already noticed, there is a fundamental difference between
the approaches of Cook Wilson and Prichard on the one hand and Austin on
the other. This is the (radical) conclusion of Austin that because such items
as truth, justification and evidence don’t matter in an appropriate notion
of knowledge, knowledge therefore has to be understood as a performative,
i.e. it has a performative role. Now, taken this for granted, then the crucial
question arises from where or from what exactly does one get the authority
which is necessary for being in the position to know, and, hence, doing some
successful knowledge claim? As a matter of fact, Austin doesn’t explain or
introduce performatives in his Other Minds very much apart from stating
some analogies of ‘I know’ with the performative ‘I promise’. We find his
theory concerning performatives in his How to do things with words 1962a.
One, surely the essential, condition for “the smooth and ‘happy’ functioning
of a performative” (Austin 1962a: 14) is the need of some generally accepted
procedure (see Austin 1962a: 14/15). As Austin has argued above, in order to
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be in a position to know, i.e. to achieve the required authority, one must have
apprehended the object she is claiming a knowledge of. Now the question is:
is the apprehension of something a generally accepted procedure to achieve
the required epistemic authority?
On the one hand it seems as if it was so. For, having authority entails
being reliable in some field. And what could be more reliable than having
apprehended something?—Remember that “I can now just see that it is”
settles the question, as Austin has argued. But on the other hand, is the
apprehension of something really to be called a generally accepted procedure
to achieve an authority? It doesn’t seem so. For generally accepted pro-
cedures are essentially social practices or roles, but apprehension is no such
thing. Therefore mere apprehension is not sufficient to achieve the social role
of being an authority. Having authority is a social thing, so we need some
social thing, too, in order to perform it. We can call this the problem of the
assignment of authority.
The way out of this problem of assigning authority seems to me our notion
of practical knowledge as applied to Austin’s approach in the section above.
There we have explained that having authority means having a practical
knowledge and having a practical knowledge could be understood in terms
of being excellent in some field. But being excellent is a social role. For, it is
distinguished from mere competence by performing a competence well. By
contrast, the rating that someone has performed his competence well is an
act of a generally accepted procedure which is awarded by a board of experts
in that realm. In other words, being excellent means being affiliated by a
board of experts to be a member of that board—indeed a social practice
through and through.
The second criticism Austin had to face is his notion of fallible knowledge.
Something Cook Wilson and Prichard, and, of course, also the proponents
of the general doctrine of knowledge, would vehemently reject as nonsense,
as we have seen in previous sections. But here, too, the application of our
results from the second chapter might help to refute such a criticism. For
the notion of fallible knowledge doesn’t arise in the realm of the ultimate,
i.e. the direct or practical, knowledge. It is rather a necessary feature of
the propositional knowledge. But because propositional knowledge is a mere
derivative of the ultimate practical knowledge, there is no harm for Austin’s
approach in arguing that a derivative kind of knowledge is fallible. First,
because this notion doesn’t concern the nature of knowledge and, second,
we can deliver an appropriate account of fallible knowledge, as presented in
section 2.4.
A third criticism could arise concerning Austin’s denial of a general the-
ory of knowledge. Instead of this Austin himself explores a ‘social’ theory of
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knowledge. But, so one could argue, all theories are necessarily and in princi-
ple generalising. For being general is an essential feature of theories because
this is the reason for constructing them: to give general explanations of oc-
currences in the world. Although I do not want to doubt this understanding
of theory, a criticism like that cannot really undermine Austin’s argumen-
tation that there is no such thing as a general theory of knowledge. For it
misconceives Austin’s claim completely. For Austin doesn’t mean in claiming
that there is no general theory of knowledge that there is no (or could not be
some) theory of knowledge at all, as Cook Wilson and Prichard had argued
and the current criticism implies.
But, as we have seen in the subsection 3.3.2, Austin’s notion concerning
the inappropriateness of a general theory of knowledge consists in arguing
that there is no such thing as knowledge in general in the sense that one
could dissociate or distinguish knowledge from a direct knowledge situation
in order to expose the nature of knowledge. Because knowledge couldn’t be
dissociated from the direct knowledge situation there couldn’t be any general
criteria of knowledge either, as Austin had shown by refusing those criteria
such as reality or certainty. So if there are no general criteria to define
knowledge, as the JTB thesis assumes, then there is no basis from which
a general theory of knowledge could be explored. From having no general
criteria of knowledge follows the impossibility of having some general theory
of knowledge. And, indeed, in Austin’s ‘social’ theory of knowledge no such
criteria are claimed.
His ‘social’ theory of knowledge rather is the attempt to expose the ex-
istence of two ways of having knowledge: (i) having direct knowledge, i.e.
a knowing how that enables a person to call for authority in a special
realm; and (ii) having some indirect knowledge, i.e. relying on someone
else’s authority—a ‘second hand knowledge’ as Austin would call it—which
is aﬄicted with the possibility to be mistaken in one’s knowledge claim be-
cause the epistemic subject who claims for knowledge in this way didn’t have
apprehended what she is claiming for.
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3.3.4 Conclusion
Even though Austin is a full member of the school of Oxford Realism, he
denies some crucial points of the ‘Old Boys’ Cook Wilson and Prichard. It is
especially Austin’s claim that there is an appropriate theory of knowledge—
his social theory of knowledge—whereas Cook Wilson and Prichard, as we
have seen, deny the appropriateness of a theory of knowledge at all as mis-
conceiving the nature of knowledge. But then, note that Austin has argued
regarding the appropriateness of a theory of knowledge that, even though
there is one, no general theory of knowledge is possible. By contrast, he
justifies this claim with the same reason as Cook Wilson and Prichard in re-
jecting the appropriateness of any theory of knowledge at all: a misconceived
notion of what the nature of knowledge really is all about. In doing so, Austin
merely adjusts the focus of the appropriateness of a theory of knowledge by
explicating in what way exactly the existence of some theory of knowledge
would mean misconceiving the nature of knowledge. And this is abstracting
away the necessary directness of any ‘real’ knowledge, i.e. knowledge which
is not fallible. Thus we had to conclude two things regarding Austin’s social
theory of knowledge:
1. It is not a general theory of knowledge.
2. It explores two ways of claiming knowledge (i) having direct or prac-
tical knowledge, i.e. having apprehended something, X, and therefore
calling for authority regarding X, which is the ultimate, the foundation
of knowledge and (ii) indirect knowledge, i.e. merely propositional, be-
cause it means relying on the authority of (i) in knowing that X which
is derivate and, hence, in principle fallible.
Since, as we have seen, Austin’s theory of knowledge is essentially based on
the notion of practical knowledge, i.e. having authority which means calling
for excellence in a special realm, we should perhaps call his theory a ‘practical
theory of knowledge’ rather than a ‘social theory’. In this context it would, of
course, be interesting to take a look for example at the approaches of Edward
Craig 1986, 1990, 1993 or, more recently, of Stephen Hetherington 2001,
2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2008a, 2008b in what way their notions of knowledge
as essentially practical rely implicitly or explicitly on Austin’s approach,
respectively whether their approaches could be reduced or explained with
the Austinian one. But this would necessitate some new consideration.
Chapter 4
Summary
121
122
4.1 Knowledge as a metal state!
Yet, having reached the end of our consideration, it is now time to summarize
the results of our efforts. This discussion is entitled with a question: can
knowledge be understood in terms of mental states? And as the main result of
this consideration, we have to change the question mark into an exclamation
mark.—Yes, knowledge has to be understood in terms of the MS thesis!
Stating this, three consequences follow from this result:
1. The JTB thesis, the “general doctrine of knowledge”, is mistaken in its
analysis of knowledge. For the JTB thesis misconceives the notion of
knowledge in its substantial points and thus has to be rejected. This
is so because the JTB thesis considers in its analysis of knowledge
merely the propositional knowledge. But the second chapter has shown
that the propositional knowledge is, first, just one kind of knowledge
among others, second, it is a derivative kind of knowledge and, third,
it is fallible. Therefore another theory of knowledge is needed here
to explain these items and, hence, the JTB thesis is insufficient to
illuminate the notion of knowledge.
2. Further, there are two kinds of knowledge: first, direct knowledge which
is characterized by apprehension and, second, indirect knowledge which
is characterized by having propositions. By contrast, the second is the
derivative knowledge of the first one, which is the ultimate knowledge.
Because the MS thesis deals with apprehension as the core notion of
knowledge, we had to explicate ways how the MS thesis could be applied
as a conclusive theory of knowledge.
3. Seeing the development of the MS thesis as considered through Cook
Wilson, Prichard and Austin, we can conclude that the account of Cook
Wilson as a conclusive theory of knowledge is inapplicable. For Cook
Wilson is unable to develop a ‘positive’ account of knowledge except
for the mere notion of apprehension which at best could be character-
ized as coarse-grained in its ‘negativity’ and really parsimonious in its
equation: knowledge is apprehension, full stop! But Prichard’s account,
even though highly sophisticated in its analysis of perception, was in
its consequences too limited: knowledge consists in having bare sensa-
tions which is in the end no better than knowing nothing. Austin was
the first to find and abolish the error consequently. The controversial
JTB thesis as well as the accounts of Cook Wilson and Prichard share
the same general assumption: that there is only one kind of knowledge
and knowledge is in principle unfallible. Austin had shown that such
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an assumption is unwarranted and in principle misleading and there-
fore leads to a misconceived understanding of knowledge, regardless
of stating the MS thesis or the JTB thesis. In rejecting the notion
of certainty and reality as main features of having knowledge, Austin
revised the analysis of knowledge and then could establish an appropri-
ate MS thesis which wasn’t aﬄicted with the problems that have forced
Cook Wilson and Prichard to their limited and unsatisfying accounts
of knowledge.
4. Hence, a successful theory of knowledge, i.e. the MS thesis, has to con-
sist of two core items, first, distinguishing at least two kinds of knowl-
edge, second, permitting the existence of fallible knowledge. These
are the fundamental insights of the above consideration. Disregarding
them means strictly misconceiving the notion of knowledge, as Austin
had shown.
Seeing this, I have justified the three theses stated in the introduction.
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